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Abstract 
 
Software vulnerabilities are a major problem for organizations and society given how 
pervasive the use of computers and the Internet and networks has become. 
Computers, the Internet and networks in general are underpinned by operating 
system software and, increasingly, software applications are integrated with the 
Internet.  In this increasingly complex environment hackers and attackers are more 
likely to take advantage of software vulnerabilities and exploit operating system 
software and application software. These software exploitations can result in huge 
losses to businesses which are highly reliant on computerized systems. Software 
vendors are responsible for securing these vulnerabilities through software patching. 
This study examines the effect of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, 
type of software vendor and type of software on the software vendors‘ response time 
in releasing software patches once software vendors have been informed of 
vulnerabilities in their software. 
 
The main theoretical support for this study is software security disclosure theory and 
an economic model of software security investment. These theories provide a 
framework for understanding how open source versus proprietary software vendors 
respond with patches to software vulnerabilities depending on the level of criticality 
of the software vulnerability and the type of software.  
 
Empirical data was collected from four related software vulnerability databases: 
SecurityFocus, Open Source Vulnerability Database, National Vulnerability 
Database and Secunia. These four software vulnerability databases contain archival 
data about software vulnerabilities which has been rigorously collected and screened. 
This research focuses on software vulnerabilities that have been recently reported in 
these software vulnerability databases from 2008 to 2010. To test the hypothesised 
relationships in the proposed research model, multiple regression analysis is used as 
the main statistical tool. 
 
Analysis of the archival data confirms that software vendors release patches for 
software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time 
 iii 
 
than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor 
has been informed of the software vulnerability. Open source vendors release patches 
for open source software vulnerabilities 39% quicker than proprietary source vendors 
release patches for proprietary software. Patches for operating system software 
vulnerabilities are released 8% slower than patches for application software 
vulnerabilities.  
 
This study contributes to the existing knowledge and theory by investigating how the 
different levels of criticality of software vulnerabilities, the differences between open 
and proprietary source software vendors and the difference between operating system 
software and application software impact on the response time of software vendors in 
releasing patches once the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities. 
The findings of this study also establish that responsible disclosure is a more 
effective mechanism than full disclosure for determining the response time of 
software vendors. This study contributes to practice by providing an enhanced 
understanding of the software vulnerability landscape and the complex process of 
software vendors‘ patching behaviour.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the dissertation topic, followed by a description of the 
specific project and the general research questions to be analysed in detail in later 
chapters. The chapter begins with an overview of software vulnerabilities, their 
impact on organisations, the general public and the economy in general; and the 
consequences for software vendors, IT managers and policy makers. The importance 
and motivation for releasing patches for software vulnerabilities in a timely and 
responsible manner is discussed and justified. This study attempts to identify to what 
extent the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches once the 
software vendors are informed of software vulnerabilities is influenced by the level 
of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of software and type of software 
vendor. 
 
1.2 Background and Significance of the Study 
Since the late 1980s, economies of the world have become increasingly reliant on 
computerised systems and, more recently, networks. Businesses and governments 
have increased their productivity substantially through the use of software 
applications, the Internet and networked operating systems (Min 2009; Thong,  Yap 
&  Raman 2012). However, significant information security risks threaten these 
systems and applications. Most of these types of information security incidents are 
caused by flaws in software and the poor security of computer networks which are 
constantly attacked by viruses, worms and hackers (Cavusoglu &  Zhang 2006). It is 
estimated that there are as many as 20 flaws per thousand lines of software code 
(Cavusoglu et al. 2006; Dacey &  Robert 2003; Gerace &  Cavusoglu 2009). This is 
evident in the number of errors in design and implementation phases—which 
increase incrementally over the software development life cycle (Cavusoglu et al. 
2006; Dacey et al. 2003). Similarly, the added problem of design complexity or 
program complexity increases the difficulty that a programmer encounters in 
ensuring that the design and coding of software systems has ‗security‘ in mind. Such 
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difficulties in the software development life cycle are likely to result in potential 
software vulnerabilities that can be susceptible to cyber attack (Frei, May, Fiedler & 
Plattner 2006).  
 
The CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey 2010/2011 reported that the average 
loss per company from a software cyber attack was  $ 234,000 between July 2008 to 
June 2009; and just under $ 100,000 between July 2009 to June 2010 (Richardson 
2009, 2010). Losses from software cyber attacks in the UK were estimated to be 
$43.5 billion; and around $1 trillion globally in 2010 (Jackson &  King 2011).  
 
The Symantec MessageLabs Intelligence Report announced that targeted attacks 
have significantly increased year by year (Albin 2011; Fossi 2011; Fossi,  Mack &  
Johnson 2010). In 2005, the average monthly attack rates were 0.5 percent higher in 
comparison to past years and increased dramatically to 25 percent higher in 2010. 
Typically 200-300 organizations worldwide are targeted each month and attacks 
number 77 per day (Fossi et al. 2010). Similarly, Computer Emergency Response 
Team/Coordination Centre‘s (CERT/CC) statistics reveal that the number of software 
vulnerabilities catalogued by CERT increased significantly over the years from 171 
in 1995 to 6,058 in 2008 (Q1-Q3) (CERT 2009) and, overall, 44,074 software 
vulnerabilities were catalogued by CERT in that period of time. 
  
Security industry and software vendors endeavour to proactively identify and patch 
new software vulnerabilities by analysing identified common vulnerability exposures 
(CVE) from past years. Despite these efforts, attackers are often able to exploit 
software vulnerabilities. A large number of software vulnerabilities have been 
identified and released publicly since the late 1990s (Arora,  Telang &  Xu 2008). In 
general, when software vendors are informed of software vulnerabilities, users 
expect software vendors to patch these vulnerabilities. However, this does not seem 
to always be the case because poor software quality and resulting excessive delay in 
the release of software patches has emerged as a prominent issue of concern (Arora, 
Krishnan, Telang & Yang 2010a). Software vulnerabilities reported to CERT/CC are 
fully disclosed after 45 days; software vulnerabilities reported to the Organization for 
Internet Safety (OIS) are fully disclosed after 30 days; and software vulnerabilities 
reported to the NTbugtraq are fully disclosed after 14 days after the initial reporting 
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of a software vulnerability—in spite of the existence or accessibility of software 
patches or workarounds from affected software vendors (CERT 2008; Cooper 1999; 
OIS 2004). Software vendors are seriously concerned about security breaches and 
have attempted to strengthen their product quality to reduce software vulnerabilities. 
However, the ultimate solution to fix software vulnerabilities is to apply patches 
developed by software vendors in the earliest possible timeframe. Therefore, in order 
to better manage the potential risks associated with software vulnerabilities it 
becomes crucial to gain a better understanding of the relationship between software 
vulnerabilities and the key factors which influence the response time of software 
vendors in releasing software patches. 
 
1.3 Research Problem 
Software security is affected by a broad range of factors in a multifaceted 
environment of software engineering (Ardi,  Byers &  Shahmehri 2006). When a new 
software vulnerability is discovered, various parties such as software vendors, IT 
managers, policy makers and researchers actively participate to solve the problems 
encountered with each software vulnerability. This has been a continuous trend since 
the beginning of the use of computer systems in mainstream organisations. A number 
of studies classified software vulnerabilities to enable real-world benefits in 
proactively addressing software vulnerabilities, including automatic assessment of 
threat posed by software vulnerabilities and assessment of mitigation strategies and 
techniques (Bishop 1999; Howard,  LeBlanc &  Viega 2010; Landwehr, Bull, 
McDermott & Choi 1994; Seacord &  Householder 2005; Tsipenyuk,  Chess &  
McGraw 2005). However, software vulnerability assessment is dynamic and the 
threat environment is changing rapidly over time (Xueqi,  Nannan &  Hsiao 2008) 
and software vulnerabilities are increasing exponentially. Previous studies examined 
software security investment issues and software quality issues in an attempt to solve 
the problems associated with software vulnerabilities. However, specific solutions to 
prevent software vulnerabilities occurring remain under investigation (Arora et al. 
2010a; Banerjee &  Pandey 2009; Kannan &  Telang 2005; Krishnan, Kriebel, Kekre 
& Mukhopadhyay 2000).  
 
Many studies have identified that the only way to solve a software vulnerability is to 
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inform the software vendor of the software vulnerability in order to encourage the 
software vendor to decrease the response time taken to release a software patch for a 
software vulnerability (Cencini,  Yu &  Chan 2005; Chambers &  Thompson 2004). 
The response time that software vendors take to release a software patch in previous 
studies was estimated from the full disclosure date of a software vulnerability (Arora, 
Krishnan, Telang & Yang 2005b; Arora et al. 2010a; Telang &  Wattal 2005). 
However, analysing the response time on the basis of the full disclosure date of 
software vulnerability does not provide an accurate estimation of the response time 
because software vendors are commonly informed of software vulnerabilities before 
the full disclosure of software vulnerability (Whitney 2009). Scant attention has been 
paid in previous research to analysing the response time of software vendors‘ 
patching behaviour on the basis of the vendor informed date.  
 
To address the research problem and gaps identified in the existing literature, the 
following general research question is investigated:   
 
To what extent does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of 
software vendor (Open source, Proprietary source vendor), type of software 
(Operating system software, Application software) influence the response time of 
software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of 
software vulnerabilities? 
 
1.4 Justification for the Research 
This research is justified on the basis that it is unique in the depth that it intends to 
examine software vendors‘ response time in releasing a software patch in terms of 
level of criticality, type of software vendor and type of software once a software 
vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability. Patch release date is the date 
on which software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities. Similarly, 
vendor informed date is the date when a researcher discloses the software 
vulnerability to the vendor (OSVDB 2011b). Software vendors‘ response time is the 
amount of time taken to release a software patch based on the date when the software 
vendor is informed of a software vulnerability (OSVDB 2011b). One of the key 
aspects of better and more secure software is minimizing the response time in 
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releasing patches for the software vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 2010).  
 
Some of the key factors which have greater impact on the response time of software 
vendors in releasing a software patch are (1) level of criticality of software 
vulnerability, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software. The level of 
criticality of a software vulnerability is the degree of security risks which are brought 
to operating system software or application system software in terms of potential 
security property violations (Xueqi et al. 2008). The level of criticality is associated 
with the type of software vendor and type of software. Therefore type of software 
vendor and type of software also make a significant difference to the response time 
in releasing software patches for software vulnerabilities.  
 
Gordon and Leob (2002) argue that the response time of software vendors in 
releasing software patches is an optimization decision where software vulnerabilities 
with a medium level of criticality are most optimal for software vendors in terms of 
effort to develop and release patches; whereas for low and high level of criticality 
vulnerabilities the effort of software vendor is less optimal to develop and release 
patches. Similarly, software security disclosure theory suggests that full disclosure of 
software vulnerabilities encourages software vendors to be more proactively and 
timely in responding to software vulnerabilities (Swire 2004, 2006). The response 
time of software vendors in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities is 
determined by the date of disclosure of software vulnerability. Therefore it is also 
important to understand the different types of software vulnerability disclosure in 
order to identify the actual response time.  Arora et al. (2010a, p. 115) defined that 
‗Full disclosure of software vulnerability refers to the publication of vulnerability 
information (i.e. publicly disclosed) before a patch to address the software 
vulnerability has been issued by the software vendor‘. The full disclosure date of 
software vulnerability is the date on which software vulnerabilities are publicly 
disclosed to end users or reported to the information security advisories or reported 
to the software vendors (Ozment 2007).  
 
A gap has been identified in previous studies regarding software vendors‘ patching 
behaviour for software vulnerabilities. Previous studies which analysed software 
vendors‘ patching behaviour for disclosed software vulnerabilities were inconsistent 
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in their key findings (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu &  Zhang 2011; Mangalaraj &  Raja 
2005; Schryen 2009; Schryen &  Rich 2010; Telang &  Wattal 2007). This might be 
because the response time for disclosed software vulnerabilities was calculated from 
the full disclosure date of software vulnerability. Different information security 
advisories follow different timeframes to disclose software vulnerabilities 
(Cavusoglu &  Raghunathan 2004 ; Cooper 1999; OIS 2004; SANS 2003). To 
address this inconsistency in determining the actual response time of software 
vendors in releasing software patches, this research calculates the response time of 
software vendors in releasing software patches on the basis of vendor informed date. 
 
The findings from this analysis of the response time of software vendors in releasing 
patches based on the vendor informed date should provide a better understanding 
about how quickly software vendors release patches to current software 
vulnerabilities depending on a number of key factors. These key factors are (1) the 
level of criticality of the software vulnerability, (2) whether the software vendor for 
the software vulnerability is an open source software vendor or proprietary source 
software vendor and (3) whether the software vulnerability is an operating system 
software vulnerability or an application software vulnerability. 
 
1.4.1 Contribution to Theory and Existing Knowledge 
This study seeks to confirm  
1. Whether and how the level of criticality of current software vulnerabilities 
influences the response time of the software vendor in releasing software 
patches;  
2. Whether the operating system software patches are released more quickly 
than   application software patches; and  
3. Whether the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches 
in response to software vulnerabilities is different between open source 
software vendors and proprietary source software vendors.  
This research contributes to existing theory and knowledge by empirically testing the 
impact of three independent variables on the response time of software vendors in 
releasing software patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities in the current 
threat environment faced by organizations. Software security disclosure theory and 
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the economic model of software security investment provide the theoretical basis for 
this research. Software security disclosure theory is extended in this study to consider 
the impact of responsible disclosure of software vulnerability which provides a more 
accurate mechanism for determining the response time of software vendors in 
releasing software patches. The economic model of software security investment 
provides a means for explaining software vendors response time in releasing patches 
in terms of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities. 
 
1.4.2 Contribution to Practice 
This research contributes to practice by providing a better understanding of the 
complex process of disclosing and releasing patches for software vulnerabilities in 
the context of the level of criticality of the software vulnerability; open source versus 
proprietary source software vendor; and operating system software versus application 
once a software vendor has been informed of a software vulnerability. This study 
also assists practitioners to decide how to more effectively undertake preventive 
measures for software vulnerabilities based on the impact of the level of criticality, 
the software type and the type of software vendor on the process of releasing 
software patches. These findings should better inform the management of software 
patching in practice. Furthermore, the findings of this study show that the responsible 
disclosure of software vulnerabilities is an effective mechanism that Government and 
regulators can use for encouraging software vendors to be more proactive in 
releasing software patches for software vulnerabilities once informed of software 
vulnerabilities. 
 
 1.5 Methodology 
This study grounded in a positivist paradigm and used a quantitative methodology to 
undertake an explanatory investigation of the relationship between vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities and the response time of software vendors in releasing 
software patches. The data collected to test hypothesised relationships in the 
proposed research model are drawn from four related and connected software 
vulnerability databases: SecurityFocus, Open Source Vulnerability Database, 
National Vulnerability Database and Secunia. These four software vulnerability 
databases contain archival data about software vulnerabilities which has been 
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rigorously collected and screened. This research focuses on software vulnerabilities 
that have been recently reported from 2008 to 2010 in the Open Source Software 
Vulnerability database and other related databases listed previously in this section. 
The following three hypotheses are tested in this study.  
 
H1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium 
level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low 
and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software 
vulnerability. 
 
H2: Open source vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities 
more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary 
software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software 
vulnerability.  
 
H3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly 
than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has 
been informed of the software vulnerability in the proposed research model. 
 
A multiple regression analysis is the main statistical tool used. Figure 1.1 represents 
a proposed research model for this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The Proposed Research Model for this Study 
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Vulnerability 
 
Type of 
Software 
Vendor 
Type of 
Software 
 
 
Response 
Time 
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1.6 Structure of Dissertation 
This dissertation is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 2—Literature Review: This chapter provides an in-depth review of the 
relevant literature in relation to software vulnerabilities and the patching behaviour 
of software vendors. Specific research questions and a set of hypotheses are 
developed and justified from the relevant literature. These form the basis of the 
theoretical and conceptual model which will be tested in this research. Chapter 2 
concludes with a theoretical and conceptual model for investigating the response 
time of software vendors in releasing software patches once software vendors are 
informed of software vulnerabilities in terms of (1) the level of criticality of software 
vulnerabilities, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software.  
 
Chapter 3—Research Design and Methodology: This chapter describes and justifies 
the research methodology used to collect data and test the research model presented 
in Chapter 2 in the context and scope of the general research questions and set of 
hypotheses. The research design and appropriate research strategies employed for 
this study are described in detail. Further, the sources from where the archival data 
were obtained are discussed, followed by a discussion of the sample generation and 
measurement of variables. Finally, data analysis using descriptive statistics and 
multiple regression analysis techniques are discussed. 
 
Chapter 4—Data Analysis: This chapter presents and discusses the key findings 
from the analyses of archive data collected from four related and connected software 
vulnerability databases, namely, SecurityFocus, Open Source Vulnerability 
Database, National Vulnerability Database and Secunia Database, in order to provide 
answers to the three specific research questions and to test the three specific 
hypotheses developed for this research.  
 
Chapter 5—Conclusion: This chapter summaries the key finding of this study in 
relation to the three research questions investigated and the three hypotheses tested in 
this study; and provides a number of conclusions about the research problem and 
general research question addressed in this study. The contributions of this study to 
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theory and practice are discussed. Finally, the limitations of this study are 
acknowledged and suggestions for future research are offered. 
 
1.7 Definition of Key Terms 
Software Vulnerability 
A software vulnerability is a hole or weakness in a software application which can be 
a design flaw or an implementation bug that allows an attacker to cause harm to 
stakeholders of a software application (OWASP 2011). 
 
Full Disclosure of Software Vulnerability 
This study adopts the definition by Arora et al. (2010a, p. 115): ‗Full disclosure of a 
software vulnerability refers to the publication of vulnerability information (i.e. 
publicly disclosed) before a patch to address the vulnerability has been issued by the 
software vendor‘.    
 
Responsible Disclosure of Software Vulnerability 
The following definition is used for the responsible disclosure of a software 
vulnerability in this study: responsible disclosure of software vulnerability means 
when a vulnerability is discovered, the researcher, information security advisories 
inform the software vendor and the researchers, information security advisories and 
vendors work together diligently and ethically to produce a timely patch to reduce 
the risk as much as possible for the individuals and organizations (Cavusoglu &  
Raghunathan 2005, 2007; Shepherd 2003; Williams,  Pescatore &  Proctor 2006). 
 
Software Patching 
The following definition of software patching is used in this study: software patching 
is blocking the attacking paths and providing protection against the exploitation of 
software vulnerabilities which are caused by software vulnerabilities (Chen,  Boehm 
&  Sheppard 2007; Frei et al. 2006).  
 
Vendor Informed Date 
In this study, the vendor informed date is defined as: the date when researcher 
disclosed the vulnerability to the vendor (OSVDB 2011b). 
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Full Disclosure Date 
The following definition is used for the full disclosure date in this study: the date on 
which software vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed to their users or reported to the 
information security advisories or reported to the software vendors (Ozment 2007). 
 
Response Time 
The following definition is used for response time in this study: It is defined as the 
amount of time taken to release a software patch based on the date when the software 
vendor is informed of a software vulnerability. In this study, there are also some 
instances where software vendors have released software patches before the software 
vendor is informed about software vulnerabilities. In these situations, the response 
time is zero or a negative number of days (source: developed for this research). 
 
The Level of Criticality of a Software Vulnerability  
The following definition is used for the level of criticality of a software vulnerability 
in this study: It is the risk level assigned to each software vulnerability which 
describes the extent of damage that could be caused by a specific breach of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability for that software vulnerability (Liu et al. 
2011). 
 
Proprietary Source Software Vendor 
This study adopts the definition by Ming-Wei and Ying-Dar (2001, p. 33) 
‗Proprietary software vendors operate on a closed-source model: They develop their 
own software and release that software to the public with the intention of gaining 
market penetration and earning a profit‘. 
 
Open Source Software Vendor 
The following definition is used for open source vendor in this study:  Vendors who 
provide open source software with compilable source codes and these source codes 
can be modified or redistributed often free of cost (Payne 2002; Schryen et al. 2010) 
 
Operating System Software 
The following definition is used for operating system software in this study: It is a set 
of special programs that run on a computer system itself and run other programs as 
well. It also controls and coordinates the use of the hardware among the various 
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system programs and application programs for various users (Bhatt 2007; 
Silberschatz,  Galvin &  Gagne 2009).  
 
Application Software 
The following definition is used for application software in this study: It is defined as 
a set of programs written in a specific programming language to solve a particular 
problem. It is independent of the machine on which it is operated and intended to 
support the operation of a particular task (Nithyashri 2010). 
 
1.8 Delimitations of Scope and Key Assumptions 
Software vulnerabilities are a major problem for organizations and society given the 
pervasive use of computers, the Internet and networks (Farahmand, Navathe, Enslow 
& Sharp 2003; Martin 2001). Although a number of software vulnerabilities are 
identified and recorded in many software security databases, this research analysed 
software vulnerability data obtained as a primary source from the Open Source 
Vulnerability Database (OSVDB). Some of the required information for each 
software vulnerability is incomplete in this database to test the research model 
developed for this study. Thus, additional information for each software vulnerability 
was obtained from SecurityFocus database, National Vulnerability Database (NVD), 
Secunia database and vendor websites. The software vulnerabilities analysed in this 
study was limited to current software vulnerabilities from 2008 to 2010 that have 
been recorded in the OSVDB database and which have a vendor informed. 
 
 1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter lays the foundation for this dissertation. It provides a background on 
software vulnerabilities and the significance of better management of software 
patching of software vulnerabilities in practice. This study is justified because it 
makes a significant contribution to better understanding the complex process of 
patching of software vulnerabilities in the context of the level of criticality of 
software vulnerabilities; open source versus proprietary source software vendors; and 
operating system software versus application once software vendors have been 
informed of software vulnerabilities. The method by which this research has been 
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conducted is briefly described, the structure of the dissertation is outlined with an 
overview of each subsequent chapter, and a list of key definitions used in this 
dissertation is provided. Finally, the delimitations of scope and key assumptions of 
this study are provided. 
 
The next chapter conducts an in-depth review of the relevant literature in the field of 
information security in relation to software quality, software security investment, 
software vulnerabilities and software vulnerability disclosure and patching. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an in-depth review of the published literature and research on 
information security and, in particular, software vulnerabilities with the purpose of 
developing a research model grounded in the existing literature. According to 
Kitchenham et al. (2009) a systematic review of literature is an aggregation of 
empirical evidence achieved by using a number of techniques in different contexts. 
Software security disclosure theory and economic model of software security 
investment provide the theoretical lens for the research model developed in this 
study. Thus, the main output of this chapter is a research model for investigating 
how, once informed of software vulnerabilities—and depending on the level of 
criticality of the software vulnerabilities and the type of software—open source 
versus proprietary software vendors respond with patches. A specific set of research 
questions and hypotheses are developed from the relevant literature as the basis for 
testing the hypothesised relationships in the proposed research model. 
 
This chapter opens with an introduction to the parent disciplines applicable to this 
study and fundamental to information security. Throughout the discussion of the 
relevant literature there are references made to a number of previous research papers 
which address problems in the field of information security. This review 
systematically analyses major concepts underpinning the process of disclosure and 
patching software vulnerabilities. Figure 2.1 depicts how the review of relevant 
literature starts with the broad field of information security, software quality and 
software security investment as the parent literatures; and then moves to a narrow 
focus of software vulnerability disclosure and software patching. Subsequently, a 
conceptual framework is developed from the relevant literature to investigate the 
following research objectives: 
 
1. whether the level of criticality of current software vulnerabilities influence the 
response time of the software vendor in releasing software patches;  
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2. whether the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches in 
response to software vulnerabilities is different between open source software 
and proprietary source software; and 
3. whether the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches in 
response to software vulnerabilities is different between operating system 
software and application software.  
Finally, the research questions and related hypotheses that test the relationships in the 
proposed research model are presented and justified in the context of the existing 
literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Topics Reviewed in Software Vulnerability Disclosure and Software 
Patching 
Information Security Software Quality Software Security Investment 
Software Vulnerabilities 
Classification of Software Vulnerability  Software Vulnerability Databases and Software 
Vulnerability Classification 
Software Vulnerability Disclosure 
Software Vulnerability Disclosure Policy 
Software Vendors 
Proprietary Source Software Vendor Open Source Software Vendor 
 
Debate on Open and Proprietary Source Software Vulnerabilities 
Software Vulnerability Disclosure and Software Patching 
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2.2 Information Security 
 
It is somewhat ironic that one of the first uses of the computer was to break codes 
and ciphers used to protect information during World War II. The allied effort was 
greatly assisted by the use of the first computer to break the German Enigma code, 
which subsequently helped stop the German U-Boat Wolf-Packs from savaging 
allied shipping. Now, the security of all information stored and transmitted using 
computers or other electronic devices is subject to potential compromise (Alnatheer 
&  Nelson 2009; Whitman &  Mattord 2010, 2011).  
 
Security is a broad concept which has its own language and focuses on the processes 
of attacks on information, and in preventing, detecting and recovering from attacks 
(Alnatheer et al. 2009; Whitman et al. 2011). Information security is defined as 
procedures and actions designed to prevent the unauthorised disclosure, transfer, 
modification or destruction—whether accidental or intentional—of information from 
a computer system (Alnatheer et al. 2009; Gordon et al. 2002). Information includes 
data, voice, video, images and fax (Schumacher &  Ghosh 1997). Similarly, 
information security—also termed as computer security—refers to the security of 
computer programs, procedures and associated documentation and data pertaining to 
the operation of a computer system (Sulaiman &  Kassim 2010).  
 
One of the critical aspects of the information security problem is a software problem. 
According to Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003), information security is the preservation 
of the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information and information 
resources. The potential weakness in software that can be subsequently exploited in 
any of these information security components (confidentiality, integrity and 
availability) tends to be software vulnerabilities (Igure &  Williams 2008). Software 
vulnerabilities enable external attacks and allow attackers to exploit their privileges 
to gain unauthorised access to information, systems and services. Therefore, software 
security is one of the critical elements in managing information security for any 
organization or individual (Grand 2005). Additionally, software also interfaces with 
other application software and operating systems and network components that allow 
the processing of transactions, sharing of information and delivery of other services. 
A breach in software security occurs when an attacker exploits a flaw in a software 
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that causes the software to work in a manner for which it was not developed; and 
attackers exploit unexpected benefits of the interfaces with other information, 
applications systems and network components, resulting in undesirable consequences 
(Grand 2005). 
2.2.1 Information Security Components 
Information security can be categorised into three classic principles (Whitman et al. 
2011) 
 Confidentiality  
 Integrity  
 Availability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2.2 represents the information security triangle consisting of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability which have a significant effect on the security of 
information in software. In this study, these three classic principles of information 
security are used to rate the criticality of a software vulnerability.  
 
Confidentiality 
Confidentiality—also referred to as privacy or secrecy—refers to the protection of 
data so that it cannot be disclosed in an unauthorised fashion (Alnatheer et al. 2009; 
Escamilla 1998; Hassler 2001). In general, most IT users recognise the need to 
ensure that the information they transmit to a recipient should arrive without being 
                        Confidentiality 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integrity      Availability 
 
       Figure 2.2 Three Classic Principles of Information Security 
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read by a third party. Encryption is the most widely used technique or process to 
provide confidentiality to data and systems. 
 
In terms of software security, a software vulnerability which provides root level 
access to unauthorised information is scored as a complete loss of confidentiality and 
has a severe adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or 
individuals. Similarly, a software vulnerability which provides user level access to 
unauthorised information is scored as a partial loss of confidentiality and has a 
limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or 
individuals (Mell,  Scarfone &  Romanosky 2007; NVD 2011b; OSVDB 2011b; 
Whitman et al. 2011; Zevin 2004).  
 
Integrity 
In general, the data integrity component of information security aims at ensuring that 
data is not modified or altered by unauthorised system users (Escamilla 1998; 
Hassler 2001). It is possible there could be serious consequences should users of 
systems make business decisions based on flawed information. System integrity 
relates to the assurance of accuracy, completeness and performance according to 
defined specifications (Khadraoui &  Herrmann 2007). Integrity is normally provided 
in a computing system through a number of approaches. Encryption can assist in 
providing data integrity by ensuring that data packets are not intercepted, modified 
and then re-transmitted to an unsuspecting recipient. Access control, which involves 
ensuring that only authorised users can gain access to data, is another mechanism 
that can be used to provide or ensure data integrity (Escamilla 1998; Hassler 2001; 
Khadraoui et al. 2007). Restricting access to a particular system makes it potentially 
harder for an outsider to access and then modify the data.  
 
In terms of software security, a software vulnerability which provides root level 
access to modify information is scored as a complete loss of integrity and has a 
severe adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or 
individuals. Similarly, a software vulnerability which provides user-level access to 
modify information is scored as partial loss of integrity and has a limited adverse 
effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals (Mell et al. 
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2007; NVD 2011b; OSVDB 2011b; Whitman et al. 2011; Zevin 2004).  
 
Availability 
The availability goal in information security aims to protect network services and 
data from unauthorised attempts to withhold information or computer resources 
(Escamilla 1998). Lack of access to information can be a critical concern. For 
instance, if patients‘ medical records become unavailable due to a network security 
problem the consequences could be fatal. Statements about the availability of 
network and data services cannot be made with the same level of confidence as those 
relating to confidentiality and integrity (Escamilla 1998). A hardware failure 
resulting in a network traffic congestion problem could deny users access to 
resources—either of which could be a result of equipment failure, poor network 
planning or some other reason than the result of a security incident per se. A number 
of controls may, however, be implemented to increase availability. Network design, 
access control and prioritising services and users can all promote enhanced resource 
availability. 
 
In terms of software security, a software vulnerability which provides root level 
disruption of access to information or an information system is scored as a complete 
loss of availability and has a severe adverse effect on organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or individuals. Similarly a software vulnerability which 
provides user-level disruption of access to information or an information system is 
scored as a partial loss of availability and has a limited adverse effect on 
organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals (Mell et al. 2007; 
NVD 2011b; OSVDB 2011b; Whitman et al. 2011; Zevin 2004). 
 
2.3 Software Quality 
Computer software has become a driving force for all organizations and individuals 
(Pressman 2010). The capabilities of computer systems to safeguard the information 
and information resources are dependent on the performance of their software 
quality. Quality in the context of software involves a variety of quality attributes, for 
example, performance, security, reliability and so on. In this study, software quality 
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is investigated in relation to all kinds of software security flaws.  The International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) defined quality as ‗the totality of features and 
characteristics of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy stated or 
implied needs‘ (Palvia,  Sharma &  Conrath 2001). IEEE defined software quality as 
the degree to which software possesses a desired combination of quality attributes 
such as design, performance, security, reliability and so on (IEEE 2009). Agarwal, 
Tayal and Gupta (2009, p. 89) defined software quality as a ‗Conformance to 
explicitly stated functional and performance requirements, explicitly documented 
development standards, and implicit characteristics that are expected of all 
professionally developed software‘.  This study adopts a definition of software 
quality by Kan (2003) which defines software quality as clearly defined software 
requirements (i.e. either users, owners or both) to avoid all kinds of security holes 
during software development life cycle (SDLC) phase using regular measurements of 
quality attributes such as reliability, integrity, availability, efficiency, security, 
maintainability and size of source code to protect the information security. Kan 
(2003) also added that any deviations from those requirements are considered to be a 
software vulnerability.  
 
Quality software protects users‘ information from potential software vulnerability 
exploitations. Software experts often blame software vulnerabilities on poor software 
development practices, such as improper testing, failure to control common 
programming errors, and poor understanding of the interactions between different 
components of complex software (Schneier 2001). The quality of software can be 
improved through the utilisation of superior personnel, effective use of computer 
aided software engineering (CASE) tools and early investment in planning and 
design of software (Arora et al. 2010a; Kannan et al. 2005; Krishnan et al. 2000). 
Lieberman and Fry (2001) argued that debugging is necessary and should be used to 
improve the quality of software. Banerjee and Pandey (2009) contended that to 
improve the quality of software, proper attention (such as not only thinking through a 
developer‘s perspective, but also through an attacker‘s perspective) should be given 
during the entire SDLC process because many critical functions such as access 
control, privacy, security, reliability, backup plan are entirely dependent on software 
development. They proposed 21 security rules to be implemented and obeyed by all 
stakeholders of a software development life cycle to provide better security in 
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software (see Figure 2.3). They found that practical implementation of these 21 
security rules throughout the stages of a software development life cycle resulted in 
software that is more secure and reliable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Rules of Software Security in SDLC 
Source: (Banerjee et al. 2009) 
 
Banker (2002) and Mercuri (2003) identified that software reliabilities are affected 
through administratively-controllable factors. They argued that to increase the 
reliability of software and to harden software, a number of measures need to be 
implemented including enforcing release control, the need for programmers to be 
better trained in designing and writing secure code, incorporating more security 
testing in the testing phase, and creating and enforcing complexity metric standards.   
 
Although researchers and software security industries have conducted many studies 
on how to improve the quality of software to reduce the occurrence of vulnerabilities 
from a number of different perspectives, software vulnerabilities are still increasing 
exponentially. To improve the quality of software, it has become essential for an 
increased investment in the initial phase of the software development process. 
However, most organizations these days do not build software: they tend to purchase 
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software packages and services and customise them to their needs. Hence, they are 
reliant on the organisations which develop software to build security into software as 
part of the process of improving software quality.  
 
2.4 Software Security Investment 
Software vulnerabilities are a fact of life for organizations of all sizes. Unfortunately, 
some level of defects has also become the expected norm for a software purchase, 
whether for a small business payroll system, a medium business inventory control 
system, or a large business enterprise resource planning (ERP) deployment (Chelf 
2006). Researchers in the field of information security have mainly focused on the 
tools, techniques and policies that individuals and organizations can use to protect 
themselves from security breaches. However, information security is also strongly 
linked with software security (Telang et al. 2005). Costs related to software security 
have had an increasingly-significant impact on the U.S. economy (Arora, Forman, 
Nandkumar & Telang 2006b). The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) estimated that software defects cost the U.S. economy upwards of $60 billion 
a year. NIST also found that detecting these defects earlier and with more diagnostic 
accuracy could result in as much as $22 billion in annual savings (Anonymous 2003; 
Arora,  Caulkins &  Telang 2006a; Chelf 2006). The hard truth is that software 
vulnerabilities affect both open source and proprietary source software and are very 
costly to all users and producers of software (Mell,  Bergeron &  Henning 2005).  
 
According to Kissel, Stine, Scholl, Rossman, Fahlsing and Gulick (2008), early 
integration of security in the SDLC enables software vendors to maximize return on 
investment in their security programs through early identification and mitigation of 
security vulnerabilities and mis-configurations, resulting in lower cost of security 
control implementation and vulnerability mitigation. Macro (n.d.) empirically 
analysed the software security development life cycle (S-SDLC). He found that 85% 
of software vulnerabilities are introduced in the coding phase of a software security 
development life. He argued that this occurs because of a lack of investment in 
software security. Microsoft identified that the cost of software security in USA for 
unbudgeted time to fix security problems is about 1000 man-hours; software security 
cost of training software developers in security is about $100 million; and NIST 
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identified that in the USA the cost of inadequate software testing is about $3.3 billion 
(Morana 2008).  
 
Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan (2004) designed a model focusing on ROSI 
(Return on Security Investment). They found that it is very difficult to calculate 
ROSI because of unexpected security breaches. They also found that risk analysis 
and cost effectiveness analysis tools work with high level of aggregate data (such as 
taxing, increasing possibility and scope of IT security breaches), which have limited 
value in an IT security setting. The difficulty of calculating ROSI is also proved by 
the 2010/2011 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey. The 2010/2011 CSI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey revealed that 67.1% of respondents detected 
security breaches (Richardson 2010).  
 
Gordon and Loeb (2002) proposed that software vulnerabilities are an index of 
information security investment and developed a model that determined that there is 
a relationship between level of severity of software vulnerability and the 
effectiveness of security investment—explained as follows. When the level of 
severity of software vulnerability is low, a significant investment in security is hard 
to justify because the reduction of expected loss is low. Conversely, with a medium 
level of severity of software vulnerability, the level of security investment reduces 
expected loss more effectively. When the severity of software vulnerability is at the 
highest level, reduction of expected loss becomes more difficult to justify because of 
the significant security investment required by the software vendor. Under these 
assumptions, the model showed that the optimal level for software security 
investment peaks at a medium level of severity for software vulnerabilities (Tanaka,  
Matsuura &  Sudoh 2005). The nature of investments in software patching is a fixed 
cost which means the cost of fixing vulnerable software is almost independent of the 
number of software copies sold. Software vendors are taking advantage of this fixed 
cost nature and deliberately release a vulnerable software product, but patch the 
software later for the market (Arora et al. 2006a; Arora et al. 2008; Telang et al. 
2007) as this optimises their investment in a particular software product. 
Furthermore, currently there is little in the way of government regulation and 
legislation which discourages this type of behaviour by software vendors (Kuechler 
2007; Otter 2007; Saint-Germain 2005).  
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Although this study does not analyse the investment in software security, from the 
preceding discussion on software security investment it has been identified that 
software security investment is a key factor that influences the quality of software 
from an information security perspective and, potentially, how quickly software 
vendors response to software vulnerabilities to optimise their investment and effort 
based on the level of criticality of a software vulnerability. Similarly, the discussion 
also highlights that the reason so many software vulnerabilities exist is because of the 
lack of software security investment. In order to understand software vulnerabilities 
more fully, it is critical to understand the landscape of software vulnerabilities in 
detail.  
 
2.5 Software Vulnerabilities 
The following definitions of a software vulnerability have been identified from the 
literature.  According to Schryen (2009, p. 155), ‗When bugs on software can be 
directly used by attackers to gain access to a system or network, they are termed a 
software vulnerability‘. Telang and Wattal (2007, p. 544) provide a more detailed 
definition of a software vulnerability, namely, ‗a flaw in a software system that can 
cause it to work contrary to its documented design and could be exploited to cause 
the system to violate its documented security policy‘.  
 
This study adopts a broader and more current definition of a software vulnerability as 
a hole or a weakness in a software application which can be a design flaw or an 
implementation bug that allows an attacker to cause harm to stakeholders of a 
software application (OWASP 2011). To mitigate the risk of software vulnerabilities 
to organisations and individuals, it is important to classify software vulnerabilities 
appropriately so that they can be understood in depth. Different researchers and 
information security advisories have classified software vulnerabilities for different 
aspects of information security risk; therefore, a review of the classification of 
software vulnerabilities is discussed below.  
 
2.5.1 Classification of Software Vulnerabilities  
Tsipenyuk, Chess and  McGraw (2005) presented eight kingdoms of software 
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security vulnerabilities, and provided a mapping to 19 deadly sins of software 
security (Howard et al. (2005)) and to the top ten Open Web Application Security 
Project (OWASP (2005)) software vulnerabilities, as shown in table 2.1. A kingdom 
refers to a group of classes that share a common theme and a sin refers to software 
security defects. The main purpose of this classification is to reduce unnecessary 
levels of confusion among practitioners and software developers about common 
software coding errors that affect information security.  
 
Table 2.1 Mapping 19 Sins and Top 10 OWASP Software Vulnerabilities into Eight 
Kingdoms of Software Vulnerabilities 
Eight Kingdoms 19 Sins Top 10 Open Web 
Application Security Project 
(OWASP) Software 
Vulnerabilities 
1.Input validation 
and representation 
(1) Buffer overflows (2) command injection  (3) cross-site scripting, 
(4) format string problems (5) integer range errors (6) SQL injection 
(1) Buffer overflows (2) cross-
site scripting flaws (3) 
injection flaws (4) unvalidated 
input 
2. API abuse (7) Trusting network address information  
3.Security features (8) Failing to protect network traffic (9) failing to store and protect 
data (10) failing to use cryptographically strong random numbers, 
(11) improper file access (12) improper use of SQL (13) use of weak 
password-based systems (14) unauthenticated key exchange 
(5) Broken access control (6) 
insecure storage 
4.Time and state (15) Single race conditions (16) use of ―magic‖ URLs and hidden 
forms 
(7) Broken authentication and 
session management 
5.Errors (17) Failure to handle errors (8) Improper error handling 
6.Code quality (18) Poor usability (9) Denial of service 
7.Encapsulation (19) Information leakage  
8.Environment  (10) Insecure configuration 
management 
Source: adopted from (Tsipenyuk et al. 2005) 
 
Furthermore, Berghe, Riordan and Piessens (2005) proposed an approach for the 
creation of predictive taxonomies regarding likely software vulnerabilities, and 
presented an example based on Bugtraq software vulnerabilities data. Bugtraq is a 
high volume, full disclosure mailing list for the detailed discussion and 
announcement of computer security vulnerabilities (SecurityFocus 2010). Similarly, 
Weber, Karger and Paradkar (2005) presented a new software vulnerability 
taxonomy analysing incident reports in modern software and previously categorised 
software vulnerabilities together. The main purpose of creating a new taxonomy is to 
adequately represent software vulnerabilities in modern software. Table 2.2 shows a 
software vulnerability taxonomy. This taxonomy categorises software vulnerabilities 
in terms of intentional and inadvertent software vulnerabilities to represent both 
previously identified software vulnerabilities, as well as modern software 
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vulnerabilities—an aspect lacking in prior research on the classification of software 
vulnerabilities.  
 
Intentional refers to software flaws—which may be malicious or non-malicious—
developed intentionally to harm the system. Similarly, inadvertent refers to software 
flaws generated accidently while, for example, coding, designing, implementing and 
testing software. Although, the security of software is threatened by both intentional 
and inadvertent software vulnerabilities, inadvertent or unintentional software 
vulnerabilities can be exploited once hackers are aware these software vulnerabilities 
exist. Jarzombek (2011) reported that the most exploitable software vulnerabilities 
(which are unintentional software vulnerabilities) are attributed to non-secure coding 
practices (i.e. not defined in software testing phase). He also added that hackers are 
opting to target these unintentional software vulnerabilities in operating system 
software and application software to circumvent security controls rather than attempt 
to break or defeat network or system security. Conversely, the internal crime 
department of the United States Secret Service (USSS) investigated internal data 
breaches within the organizations in 2010. It found that 90% of data breaches were 
intentional and 10% of data breaches were unintentional (Baker, Goudie, Hutton, 
Hylender, Niemantsverdriet, Novak, Ostertag, Porter, Rosen & Sartin 2010).  
 
The intentional and unintentional software vulnerabilities taxonomy based on Weber 
et al. (2005) in Table 2.2 is mapped with OWASP top ten 2010 web-based software 
vulnerabilities. 
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Table 2.2 Intentional and Unintentional  Software Vulnerability Taxonomy 
 
Type of Software 
Vulnerability 
High level 
classification 
Specific classification OWASP Top Ten Software 
Vulnerability Items mapped 
 
 
Intentional 
 
 
 
 
Inadvertent 
(Unintentional) 
Malicious Trap door N/A 
Logic/Time Bomb N/A 
Non-malicious Convert Channel  N/A 
Inconsistent access paths N/A 
Validation Error Addressing errors N/A 
Poor parameter value check Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
Incorrect check positioning N/A 
Identification/authentication 
inadequate 
Insecure Direct Object References,  
Broken Authentication and Session 
Management 
Abstraction Error Object Reuse N/A 
Exposed Internal Representation N/A 
Asynchronous Flaws Concurrency (including 
TOCTTOU)  
N/A 
Aliasing N/A 
Subcomponent 
misuse/failure 
Resource Leak N/A 
Responsibility Misunderstanding Injection 
Functionality Error Error handling failure Cross-Site Scripting 
Other security flaw Insecure Cryptographic Storage 
Source adapted: (Weber et al. 2005) 
 
The OWASP top ten 2010 web based software vulnerabilities are: (1) Injection, (2) 
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), (3) Broken Authentication and Session Management, (4) 
Insecure Direct Object References, (5) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), (6) 
Security Misconfiguration, (7) Insecure Cryptographic Storage, (8) Failure to 
Restrict URL Access, (9) Insufficient Transport Layer Protection and (10) 
Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards (OWASP 2010). In table 2.2, Cross-Site 
Scripting and Insecure Cryptographic Storage are partially mapped with the Weber et 
al. (2005) taxonomy where as Injection, Broken Authentication and Session 
Management,  and Insecure Direct Object References are completely mapped in the 
Weber et al. (2005) taxonomy. The other OWASP Top Ten software vulnerabilities 
which are only partially mapped or not mapped in Weber et al. (2005) taxonomy are 
design or configuration errors and considered to be out of scope. Moreover none of 
the intentional software flaws in Weber et al. (2005) taxonomy are mapped with 
OWASP Top Ten software vulnerabilities. This study examined both intentional and 
unintentional software vulnerabilities but it should be acknowledged most software 
vulnerabilities are unintentional and are a result of poor design, coding, configuration 
and testing of software and related hardware. 
 
Similarly, Engle, Whalen, Howard and Bishop (2006) described a tree-based 
classification approach to classify existing software vulnerabilities on the basis of 
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software vulnerability characteristics. This classification approach allows software 
vulnerabilities to fall into multiple classes without ambiguity. Characteristics in this 
classification of software vulnerabilities indicate attributes of a vulnerable state. 
Although classification of software vulnerabilities on the basis of characteristics 
provides more in-depth understanding and meaning of the impact of software 
vulnerabilities, this classification approach provided no guidance on which 
characteristics to use or where to derive those characteristics from. 
 
Moreover, Yu, Aravind and Supthaweesuk (2006) discussed security-related 
software vulnerabilities in SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) based web 
services and analysed the common pattern of attacks in the increased complexity and 
connectivity of the web services environment. However, no further software 
vulnerability classification was provided. The main purpose of analysing web related 
software vulnerabilities is to map common attack patterns for security verification 
requirements with regard to web service software systems. Similarly, the SANS Top 
20 (2007) did not list single software vulnerabilities, but it classified software 
vulnerabilities into high level in terms of client-side software vulnerabilities and 
server-side software vulnerabilities and the risks they cause.  
 
With the increasing problems in web based software and security, software 
vulnerabilities have been more broadly classified from late 2010.  Parrend and Frénot 
(2008) created a classification of Java component vulnerabilities in the OSGi (Open 
Services Gateway Initiative) platform. Similarly, security experts at Microsoft 
corporation, Howard, LeBlanc and Viega (2010) provided the ‗24 deadly sins of 
software security‘ as a comprehensive high level framework for classifying software 
vulnerabilities based on their practical knowledge and experiences (see table 2.3).   
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Table 2.3 The ‗24 Deadly Sins of Software Security‘ 
 
Web Application Sins 
1 SQL Injection 
2 Server side Cross-Site Scripting  
3 Web Client Related Vulnerabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementation Sins 
4 Use of Magic URLs 
5 Buffer Overruns 
6 Format String Problems 
7 Integer Overflows 
8 C + + Catastrophes 
9 Catching All Exceptions 
10 Command Injection 
11 Failure to Handle Errors 
12 Information Leakage 
13 Race Conditions 
14 Poor Usability 
15 Not Updating Easily 
 
Cryptographic Sins 
16 Not Using Least Privileges 
17 Weak Password Systems 
18 Unauthenticated Key Exchange 
19 Random Numbers 
 
Networking Sins 
20 Wrong Algorithm 
21 Failure to Protect Network Traffic 
22 Trusting Name Resolution 
Stored Data Sins 23 Improper Use of SSL/TLS 
24 Failure to Protect Stored Data 
Source: (Howard et al. 2010) 
 
In table 2.3, 24 deadly sins are classified under five domains of software security 
defects. In this classification, sins are also referred to as software security defects. 
Although this classification of software defects is the most current and 
comprehensive classification of software defects, not all of the classified software 
defects are relevant to this proposed study. Software defects related to web 
application sins, implementation sins and cryptography sins are relevant in terms of 
their impact (the level of criticality of a software vulnerability). However, 
networking sins and stored data sins are not relevant and beyond the scope of this 
research. Networking and stored data sins are not discussed in Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE) and National Vulnerability Database (NVD) from where the 
level of the criticality of software vulnerabilities is obtained to test the proposed 
research hypotheses in this study. 
 
 
Furthermore, The Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) classified 46 types 
of web based software vulnerabilities with the contribution of application developers, 
security professionals, software vendors and compliance auditors to ensure a 
consistent language for web applications related issues (WASC 2010). Similarly, the 
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is dedicated to improving the 
security of software applications worldwide and have categorised software 
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vulnerabilities into 165 categories. The main purpose of the categorisation of 
software vulnerabilities is to make the software consumer more aware of the impact 
of software vulnerabilities. Thus, individuals and organisations can make informed 
decisions about software exploitation risks and take appropriate action to reduce the 
risks of software exploitation to an acceptable level (OWASP 2011). The CAPEC 
(2011), CWE (2011) and OVAL (2011) classified software vulnerabilities in terms of 
attacks, weakness and vulnerabilities respectively.  
 
The review of software vulnerability classifications provided the background to how 
software vulnerabilities are classified in terms of their common characteristics and 
their nature of impact. On the basis of this review, this study empirically analysed 
software vulnerabilities classified in CWE (2011) in terms of their impact (the level 
of criticality of a software vulnerability) on the response time of software vendors in 
releasing software patches. Software vulnerability classification in CWE (2011) is 
discussed in more detail with regard to NVD database in the next section.  
Furthermore, to obtain the detailed information about the impact (i.e. the level of 
criticality of software vulnerability), software vendor type and software type, this 
study also used the classification of software vulnerabilities from the prominent 
software vulnerabilities databases SecurityFocus (2010), OSVDB (2011b), NVD 
(2011b), and Secunia (2011), which are discussed in detail in the next section.  
 
2.6 Software Vulnerability Databases and Software Vulnerability 
Classification 
Landwehr et al. (1994) observed that the history of software vulnerabilities has been 
mostly undocumented, however, knowing how systems have failed can help in 
designing a system which is less prone to being vulnerable. The software 
vulnerability database is a right step in that direction as it provides a historical record 
of software vulnerabilities that is a useful reference resource for organizations to 
proactively manage software vulnerabilities in their organisational context. 
 
A software vulnerability database serves as a repository of software vulnerability 
information collected from different sources, is organized to allow useful queries to 
be performed on the data, and can provide valuable information to system designers 
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in identifying areas of weaknesses in the design, requirements or implementation of 
software within an organisation (Venter &  Eloff 2004). A software vulnerability 
database can also be used to maintain vendor patch information, vendor and response 
security advisories, and catalogue the patches applied in response to those security 
advisories (Mell &  Tracy 2002). This information is also helpful for system 
administrators to protect the systems from information security breaches. 
 
The most prominent software vulnerability databases are listed in alphabetical order 
in Table 2.4, with a column to indicate which software vulnerability databases are 
used in this research.  
 
Table 2.4 Software Vulnerability Databases 
Database name Unique identity Databases used in 
this research 
IBM‘s Internet Security System (ISS) (IBM ISS 2009) ISS X-Force ID  
Microsoft Security Bulletin  (Microsoft 2011) Microsoft Bulletin ID  
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) (NVD 2011) CVE ID YES 
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) 
(OSVDB 2011) 
OSVDB ID YES 
Secunia (Secunia 2011) Secunia Advisory ID YES 
SecurityTracker (SecurityGlobal 2011) Security Tracker Alert ID  
SecurityFocus (SecurityFocus 2010) Buqtraq ID YES 
US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database (US-CERT 2011) Vulnerability Notes ID  
Vupen Security (Vupen Security 2011) Vupen ID  
Source: adapted from (Langweg &  Snekkenes 2004) 
 
All these software vulnerability databases provide the following information for each 
software vulnerability recorded:  
 A unique identity for each software vulnerability 
 A detailed description of software vulnerability 
 Full disclosure date of software vulnerability  
 Vulnerable software‘s name  
 Vulnerable software vendor‘s name 
 Severity of software vulnerability  
 Software vulnerability disclosing references 
 References to the affected software vendors and their product 
 References to related reports and to descriptions in other databases 
 Software patch release information 
 Protection links from particular software vulnerability.  
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This research is based on four major software vulnerability databases: Security 
Focus, OSVDB, NVD and Secunia. Although the unique identity for each software 
vulnerability is provided in these databases (i.e. SecurityFocus, OSVDB, NVD and 
Secunia) and is referenced in the OSVDB database, the details and classification of 
software vulnerabilities in each of these software vulnerability databases are 
described in their own way, which makes it difficult to map each software 
vulnerability into a single table.  
Therefore, the main features of each software vulnerability database are discussed in 
turn. Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.8 and 2.10 represent the main features of SecurityFocus, 
OSVDB, NVD and Secunia software vulnerability databases respectively. The 
SecurityFocus database is a main source of software vulnerability data because it has 
been maintained since 1999 (see Table 2.5).   
 
2.6.1 SecurityFocus 
SecurityFocus is a vendor-neutral site that provides objective, timely and 
comprehensive security information to all members of the security community, from 
end users, security hobbyists and network administrators to security consultants, IT 
managers, CIOs and CSOs (Arora, Forman, Nandkumar & Telang 2010b; Arora et 
al. 2010a; Li &  Rao 2007; SecurityFocus 2010). SecurityFocus hosts the Bugtraq 
mailing list which is a high volume, full disclosure mailing list for the detailed 
discussion and announcement of computer security vulnerabilities, including all 
vendor-informed and fully-disclosed software vulnerabilities.  
 
BugTraq also serves as the cornerstone of the Internet-wide security community 
(SecurityFocus 2010).  
 The SecurityFocus Vulnerability Database provides security professionals 
with up-to-date information on vulnerabilities for all platforms and services.  
 SecurityFocus Mailing Lists allow members of the security community from 
around the world to discuss security issues. There are currently 31 mailing 
lists; most are moderated to keep posts on-topic and to eliminate spam.  
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Table 2.5 summarises main features of SecurityFocus database. 
Table 2.5 Features of SecurityFocus Database 
Unique 
Identity 
Information Discussion Exploit Solution References 
Bugtraq 
ID 
Class, CVE, Remote, 
Local, published date, 
updated date, creditor‘s 
name  and vulnerable 
software 
Discussion 
regarding 
software 
vulnerability 
Information about 
the exploits from the 
each software 
vulnerability 
Information 
about the 
solution 
provided 
Affected vendors 
and products and 
advance security 
notification 
Source: (SecurityFocus 2010) 
 
The following list provides a brief description of the main fields in the SecurityFocus 
database (SecurityFocus 2010):  
 Bugtraq id represents a unique identification of each software vulnerability 
through the Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE_ID) identification for 
each software vulnerability  
 Remote or local attack of software vulnerability  
 Full disclosure date of software vulnerability 
 Solution provided date for software vulnerability  
 Information about the researcher who disclosed the vulnerability and affected 
software from that particular software vulnerability  
 Discussion provides core information about the software vulnerability  
 Exploit provides exploitation details for each software vulnerability  
 Solution provides details of how software vulnerability is fixed and reference 
provides links and cross-references for the vulnerability.  
 
Overall, the SecurityFocus database provides more qualitative information than 
quantitative information about software vulnerabilities. 
 
2.6.2 Open Source Vulnerability Database 
OSVDB is an independent and open source database created by and for the software 
security community (Frei et al. 2006; OSVDB 2011b; Yu et al. 2006). The goal of 
this database is to provide accurate, detailed, current and unbiased technical 
information on software security vulnerabilities. This database promotes greater, 
more open collaboration between companies and individuals, eliminates redundant 
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work, and reduces expenses inherent with the development and maintenance of in-
house software vulnerability databases (OSVDB 2011a). The database currently 
covers 72,658 vulnerabilities, spanning 34,257 products from 4,735 researchers, over 
46 years (Frei et al. 2006; OSVDB 2011b; Yu et al. 2006). Table 2.6 summarises the 
main features of OSVDB database. 
 
 
Table 2.6 Features of the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) 
Unique 
Identity 
Timeline Description Classification Products References Credit CVSSv2 
score 
OSVDB 
ID 
Discovery date, 
Full Disclosure 
date, Vendor 
informed date 
Description 
provided by 
CVE 
Location, 
Attack type, 
Impact, Exploit, 
Full Disclosure 
Product 
name 
Security 
advisories 
team and 
affected 
vendors 
Name of person 
or security 
advisories team or 
software vendor 
CVSSv2 
Base 
Score 
Source: (OSVDB 2011b) 
 
The following list provides a brief description of main fields of the OSVDB database 
(OSVDB 2011b):  
 The unique identity of a software vulnerability  
 Timeline provides software vulnerability discovery date (i.e. the date when 
vulnerability was discovered) 
 Full disclosure date (i.e. the date when software vulnerability was fully 
disclosed) 
 Vendor informed date (i.e. the date when software vendor was informed 
about software vulnerability)  
 Description provides core information about the software vulnerability  
 Classification provides attribution about the software vulnerability which can 
be added  
 Products provides a software vendor name, as well as the name of affected 
software  
 Reference provides links and cross-references for the software vulnerability  
 Credit provides information about the researcher who disclosed the 
vulnerability 
 Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSSv2) provides a base score for 
the software vulnerability. 
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Table 2.7 presents a high level of classification of software vulnerabilities by attack 
types for OSVDB software vulnerabilities. The table also provides a brief description 
of each attack type to classify the software vulnerability attack types in OSVDB 
database. 
 
 
Table 2.7 Classification of Software Vulnerabilities in OSVDB by Attack Type 
Attack Type  Description 
1. Authentication 
Management 
 A vulnerability that attacks or bypasses an authentication mechanism. Exception: If an attack uses 
SQL injection to bypass auth or add an administrative account, the attack itself is not authentication 
based, unless that is the only thing that can be done with the attack. 
2. Cryptographic  A vulnerability that attacks a cryptographic implementation (e.g., compromising an algorithm), relies 
on the presence of weak cryptography (e.g., password protection via XOR) or relies on the lack of 
cryptography (passwords stored in plaintext, information transmitted in clear text). 
3. Denial of Service  A vulnerability that results in a loss of service, functionality or capability. This includes making a 
service unresponsive, consuming resources (e.g., CPU, memory) or forcing a reboot. 
4. Information 
Disclosure 
A vulnerability that results in the disclosure of information that may be sensitive (e.g., passwords, 
credit info) or useful in conducting additional more focused attacks (e.g., usernames, installation 
path). 
5. Infrastructure A vulnerability that attacks an infrastructure device, such as a large router, firewall or another device 
supporting BGP. This does not apply to SOHO routers. Input Manipulation- A vulnerability that is 
exploited by sending manipulated and unexpected data to a service or process. This includes all types 
of overflows, memory corruption, XSS, SQLi, RFI, traversals and more. 
6. Misconfiguration A vulnerability that exploits a misconfiguration in a system or software. Misconfigurations can be as 
shipped by a vendor (e.g., version 3.3 accidentally shipped with insecure options), or by 
administrators who would reasonably configure software incorrectly (e.g., common sense or product 
documentation would lead to it). 
7. Race Condition  A vulnerability that can only be exploited during a specific 'window of attack'. Typically a race 
between two actions where the first makes a system vulnerable and the second removes the condition 
for exploit. This is frequently seen in temporary file handling, but may apply to a wide variety of 
attacks. 
8. Other  A vulnerability that cannot be defined by any other Attack Type classification. 
9. Attack Type 
Unknown 
The attack type for this vulnerability is not known. 
Source: adopted from (OSVDB 2011b) 
 
Although OSVDB classifies software vulnerabilities into nine types of attack as 
shown in table 2.7, the mostly commonly-found attack types are Infrastructure, 
Authentication Management, Misconfiguration, Denial of Service and Information 
Disclosure. Furthermore, these nine types of attack classifications do not 
comprehensively classify all software vulnerabilities found in the OSVDB database 
into attack types. Therefore, this study used a more comprehensive classification of 
software vulnerabilities provided by the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), 
which is described in section 6.2.3 (see Table 2.9). 
 
2.6.3 National Vulnerability Database 
NVD is the U.S. Government‘s repository of standards-based vulnerability 
management data represented using the Security Content Automation 
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Protocol (SCAP). This data enables automation of vulnerability management, 
security measurement, and compliance (Arora et al. 2010b; Arora et al. 2010a; NVD 
2011b).  
 
Table 2.8 summarises the main features of NVD database including databases of 
security checklists, security related software flaws, misconfigurations, product 
names, and impact metrics (NVD 2011b). 
 
 
Source: (NVD 2011b) 
 
The following list provides a brief description of the main fields of the NVD 
database (NVD 2011b): 
 
 CVE ID represents a unique identification of a software vulnerability  
 Overview provides general information about the software vulnerability  
 Impact provides a CVSS severity and CVSS metrics where CVSS severity 
gives the level of the criticality of software vulnerability and CVSS metrics 
gives an access vector, access complexity, authentication and impact type 
 References provide links and cross-references for the software vulnerability; 
and technical details provide the cause of software vulnerability with 
vulnerability type  
 NVD provides technical details integrating with Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE). 
 
 
Furthermore, to classify software vulnerabilities into comprehensive and specific 
types, this study used a standard classification of software vulnerability types: the 
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) classification which is cross  mapped with 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) through the Common Vulnerability 
Exposure (CVE) entries (NVD 2011b) in OSVDB. However, the following software 
vulnerabilities ‗Other‘, ‗Not in CWE‘, ‗Insufficient Information‘ and ‗Design Error‘ 
Table 2.8 Features of National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
Unique 
Identity 
Overview Impact References Technical 
Details 
CVE ID General description about the 
software vulnerability 
CVSS base score v2, access vector, access 
complexity, authentication and impact type 
To advisories, 
solutions and tools  
Vulnerability 
type 
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are not mapped in NVD.  
 
Table 2.9 lists and briefly describes a comprehensive classification of 23 specific 
types of software vulnerabilities developed by NVD and OSVDB and which is used 
to classify the software vulnerabilities analysed in this study.  
 
Table 2.9 Comprehensive Classification of 23 Specific Types of Software 
Vulnerabilities 
Name CWE-ID Description 
1. Authentication 
Issues 
CWE-287 Failure to properly authenticate users. 
2. Credentials 
Management 
CWE-255 Failure to properly create, store, transmit, or protect passwords and other credentials. 
3. Permissions, 
Privileges, and 
Access Control 
CWE-264 Failure to enforce permissions or other access restrictions for resources, or a privilege 
management problem. 
4. Buffer Errors CWE-119 Buffer overflows and other buffer boundary errors in which a program attempts to put more data 
in a buffer than the buffer can hold, or when a program attempts to put data in a memory area 
outside of the boundaries of the buffer. 
5. Cross-Site 
Request Forgery 
(CSRF) 
CWE-352 Failure to verify that the sender of a web request actually intended to do so. CSRF attacks can 
be launched by sending a formatted request to a victim, then tricking the victim into loading the 
request (often automatically), which makes it appear that the request came from the victim. 
CSRF is often associated with XSS, but it is a distinct issue. 
6. Cross-Site 
Scripting (XSS) 
CWE-79 Failures of a site to validate, filter, or encode user input before returning it to another user‘s web 
client. 
7. Cryptographic 
Issues 
CWE-310 An insecure algorithm or the inappropriate use of one; an incorrect implementation of an 
algorithm that reduces security; the lack of encryption (plaintext); also, weak key or certificate 
management, key disclosure, random number generator problems. 
8. Path Traversal CWE-22 When user-supplied input can contain ―..‖ or similar characters that are passed through to file 
access APIs, causing access to files outside of an intended subdirectory. 
9. Code Injection CWE-94 Causing a system to read an attacker-controlled file and execute arbitrary code within that file. 
Includes PHP remote file inclusion, uploading of files with executable extensions, insertion of 
code into executable files, and others. 
10. Format String 
Vulnerability 
CWE-134 The use of attacker-controlled input as the format string parameter in certain functions. 
11. Configuration CWE-16 A general configuration problem that is not associated with passwords or permissions. 
12. Information 
Leak / 
Disclosure 
CWE-200 Exposure of system information, sensitive or private information, fingerprinting, etc. 
13. Input Validation CWE-20 Failure to ensure that input contains well-formed, valid data that conforms to the application‘s 
specifications. Note: this overlaps other categories like XSS, Numeric Errors, and SQL 
Injection. 
14. Numeric Errors CWE-189 Integer overflow, signedness, truncation, underflow, and other errors that can occur when 
handling numbers. 
15. OS Command 
Injections 
CWE-78 Allowing user-controlled input to be injected into command lines that are created to invoke 
other programs, using system () or similar functions. 
16. Race Conditions CWE-362 The state of a resource can change between the time the resource is checked to when it is 
accessed. 
17. Resource 
Management 
Errors 
CWE-399 The software allows attackers to consume excess resources, such as memory exhaustion from 
memory leaks, CPU consumption from infinite loops, disk space consumption, etc. 
18. SQL Injection CWE-89 When user input can be embedded into SQL statements without proper filtering or quoting, 
leading to modification of query logic or execution of SQL commands. 
19. Link Following CWE-59 Failure to protect against the use of symbolic or hard links that can point to files that are not 
intended to be accessed by the application. 
20. Other No Mapping NVD is only using a subset of CWE for mapping instead of the entire CWE, and the weakness 
type is not covered by that subset. 
21. Not in CWE No Mapping The weakness type is not covered in the version of CWE that was used for mapping. 
22. Insufficient 
Information 
No Mapping There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unknown or 
unspecified. 
23. Design Error No Mapping A vulnerability is characterized as a ‗Design error‘ if there exists no errors in the 
implementation or configuration of a system, but the initial design causes a vulnerability to 
exist. 
Source: adopted from (NVD 2011a; OVAL 2011) 
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2.6.4 Secunia  
Secunia is a comprehensive and trusted source of security information on the 
Internet. Secunia provides Secunia Security Factsheets that inform users about the 
state and evolution of software vulnerabilities with respect to the product specified in 
the factsheet (Borders, Weele, Lau & Prakash 2009; Nazario 2009; Secunia 2011). 
Whenever a new vulnerability is reported, Secunia releases a Secunia Advisory after 
verification of the information. A Secunia Advisory provides details of the software 
vulnerability including a description, a risk rating, impact, recommended mitigation, 
credits, and references (Borders et al. 2009; Nazario 2009; Secunia 2011).Table 2.10 
summarises the main features of Secunia database.  
 
Table 2.10 Features of Secunia Database 
Unique 
Identity 
Description Release 
Date 
Last 
Update 
Criticality 
Level 
Impact 
Type 
Location Solution 
Status 
Type of 
Software 
Secunia 
CVSS 
Score  
Secunia 
Advisory 
ID 
Description 
of software 
vulnerability 
Full 
disclosure 
date 
Solution 
date 
Severity 
level 
Name of 
software 
vulnerability 
From 
where 
attack 
originates 
Software 
vulnerability 
patching 
information 
Operating 
system or 
Application 
software 
Severity 
score 
Source: (Secunia 2011) 
 
The following list provides a brief summary of the main fields in the Secunia 
database (Secunia 2011): 
 
 Secunia advisory id is a unique identity to represent a software vulnerability 
 Description provides general information about a software vulnerability 
 Release date is the date when a software vulnerability is fully disclosed 
 Last update date is a solution date 
 Criticality level represents the severity of software vulnerability 
 Impact type represents a cause of software vulnerability 
 Location represents the origin of attack 
 Solution status represents whether software vendor patched a software 
vulnerability or not 
 Type of software provides whether a software vulnerability originates from 
operating system software or application software  
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The four software vulnerability databases discussed previously provide detailed 
information for the useful classification of software vulnerabilities used in this study. 
However, in order to examine the response time of software vendors in releasing a 
software patch for the above classified software vulnerabilities in terms of their level 
of criticality, type of software vendor and type of software, software vulnerability 
disclosure can provide a much clearer picture of how the response time can be 
accurately determined.   
 
2.7 Software Vulnerability Disclosure 
The following definitions of a full disclosure of software vulnerability have been 
identified from the literature.  Telang and Wattal (2005, p. 1) stated that ‗Any public 
announcement about a software defect is termed as full disclosure of software 
vulnerability‘. McKinney (2008, p. 76) states that ‗ A full disclosure of software 
vulnerability is a phenomenon of openness and transparency among security 
researchers, security vendors, product vendors and other stakeholders‘. This study 
adopts the definition by Arora et al. (2010a, p. 115) that: ‗A full disclosure of 
software vulnerability refers to the publication of vulnerability information before 
the software vendor has released a patch to address the vulnerability‘.   
 
2.7.1 Software Vulnerability Disclosure Debate 
It is inevitable that software vulnerabilities are discovered in software products in 
spite of how much time and effort is spent in identifying and removing flaws during 
development of software preliminary maturity. Based on this inevitability, one can 
guess that a logical structured procedure could be pursued for disclosing software 
vulnerabilities. However, the current process for disclosing software vulnerabilities 
can range from a loosely organized effort to complete disorder (Bollinger 2004; 
SANS 2003).    
 
This lack of structure has resulted in a heated debate within the information security 
community about the socially optimal method of disclosure of a software 
vulnerability. The full disclosure movement of the late 1990s argues that by 
providing as much open detail about software vulnerabilities as possible will help 
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system administrators and software programmers to fully understand the technical 
details of software vulnerabilities in order to prevent and defend software 
vulnerabilities (Bollinger 2004; Cooper 1999). A software programmer can review 
the structure of the software vulnerability through the full technical details of a 
software vulnerability; and try to avoid similar software vulnerabilities in future 
software development. Similarly, users can take appropriate defensive security action 
such as implementing an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), shutting down a 
vulnerable service or using exploit code to scan the network for vulnerable 
applications (Bollinger 2004; SANS 2003).  
 
Moreover, full disclosure supposedly puts pressure on software vendors to issue a 
high quality software patch for newly-discovered software vulnerabilities as soon as 
possible and improve the quality of software over time. If software vendors fail to 
release a software patch and a software vulnerability is subsequently fully disclosed, 
public media coverage will negatively impact on the reputation and revenue of 
software vendors. To reduce negative public media coverage, software vendors are 
more likely to develop less vulnerable software products (Arora,  Telang &  Xu 
2004a; Bollinger 2004; SANS 2003). 
 
Although the concept of full disclosure of software vulnerabilities has a number of 
advantages, it is lacking by not providing a grace period in which software vendors 
can address those software vulnerabilities. The major problem of full disclosure of 
software vulnerabilities is that software vendors are notified at the same time as the 
vulnerability is fully disclosed. Information security is affected by the time software 
vendors take in releasing software patches to fix the software vulnerability (Arora, 
Krishnan, Nandkumar, Telang & Yang 2004b; Bollinger 2004).Thus, the concept of 
delayed or responsible disclosure was introduced, where information about the 
identification of a software vulnerability is first informed to a software vendor and 
then disclosed fully when the software vendor releases a software patch (Arora &  
Telang 2005a; Farrow 2000; Meunier 2008). 
 
A number of papers have discussed the pros and cons of non-disclosure, full 
disclosure and socially planned software vulnerability disclosure (Arora et al. 2004b; 
Arora et al. 2005b; Farrow 2000; Laakso,  Takanen &  Röning 2001; Rescorla 2003, 
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2005). A discussion on the various types of software vulnerability disclosures is 
beyond the scope of this research. However, the responsible disclosure of software 
vulnerabilities provides a vendor informed date which facilitates a more accurate 
response time by software vendors in releasing software patches to be calculated. 
This approach is used in this study to examine the effect of the level of criticality of 
software vulnerabilities on the response time of software vendors in releasing a patch 
for software vulnerability. The response time is based on the responsible disclosure 
date or vendor informed date.  
 
Full disclosure of software vulnerability has a serious effect on the software vendors‘ 
response time in releasing software patches, however, the concern is that different 
types of software vulnerability disclosures have a different impact on the software 
vendor response time in releasing software patches. To gain a better understanding of 
an actual response time, software vulnerability disclosure policy needs to be 
examined in more detail.  
 
2.8 Software Vulnerability Disclosure Policy 
Flaws in software make software products vulnerable and prone to violating software 
security policy (Arbaugh,  Fithen &  McHugh 2000). The examination of optimal 
policy for software vulnerability disclosure was demonstrated through the optimal 
timing of disclosure policy. It was shown that policy makers such as those in 
government and regulatory authorities in specific industries have the power to 
influence behaviour of software vendors and also minimise the magnitude of patch 
developing costs and loss to customers (Arora et al. 2008; Cavusoglu et al. 2007). It 
was also shown that any software vulnerability disclosure is not optimal. Software 
vendors always decide to release patches afterwards, rather than when informed of a 
software vulnerability, because this optimises their effort and investment in their 
software products (Arora et al. 2008). Does this mean that the type of software, type 
of software vendor and the level of criticality of software vulnerability also affect the 
decision of software vendors to develop and release timely patches?  
 
Information security advisories have moved away from a policy of immediate 
disclosure to having a period of grace before full disclosure. A policy of immediate 
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disclosure of software vulnerability in this study means the disclosure of software 
vulnerability when it is recognized as being a security threat. Information security 
advisories such as CERT/CC introduced their own software vulnerability disclosure 
policy to determine when to fully disclose software vulnerability. The software 
disclosure policy of CERT/CC provides a reasonable 45 days grace period for 
software vendors to release a software patch before full disclosure. Similarly, 
Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) provides a 30 day grace period for software 
vendors to release a software patch before full disclosure (Cavusoglu et al. 2004 ). In 
the same way, Russ Cooper‘s NTbugTraq policy provides a maximum of 14 days 
grace period to software vendors to release a software patch before full disclosure. 
Likewise, Rain Forest Puppy‘s ‗RFPolicy‘ provides 5 working days for software 
vendors to respond after initially being informed about software vulnerabilities. 
Failure to respond in 5 days resulted in full disclosure of software vulnerabilities 
(Cooper 1999; OIS 2004; SANS 2003).  
 
From the above discussion, a full disclosure of software vulnerability depends upon 
the policy of the individual information security advisory. There is no single standard 
policy for the full disclosure of software vulnerabilities. What this means for this 
research is that the full disclosure of a software vulnerability does not provide an 
accurate means for calculating the actual response time in releasing a software patch. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to identify the vendor informed date and solution 
date in order to calculate the actual software vendors‘ response time in releasing 
software patches. 
 
2.9 Software Vendors 
Software is generally developed and distributed by two main types of software 
vendors: proprietary source software vendors and open source software vendors 
(Comino &  Manenti 2003; Leoncini,  Rentocchini &  Vittucci Marzetti 2010).  
 
2.9.1 Proprietary Source Software Vendor 
According to Payne (2002, p. 63), ‗Vendors who provide licensed software are often 
described as proprietary software vendors‘. This study adopts the definition of 
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proprietary source software vendors provided by Ming-Wei and Ying-Dar (2001, p. 
33): ‗Proprietary source software vendors operate on a closed-source model: They 
develop their own software and release that software to the public with the intention 
of gaining market penetration and earning a profit‘. 
2.9.2 Open Source Software Vendors 
The following definition is used for open source software vendors in this study:  
vendors who provide open source software with compilable source code and this 
source code can be modified or redistributed free of cost (Payne 2002; Schryen et al. 
2010) 
 
Both these two main types of software vendor are responsible for fixing software 
vulnerabilities through developing and releasing software patches for their vulnerable 
software products. However, the main focus of this study is to determine if there is a 
difference in the time taken in releasing software patches by open source software 
vendors versus proprietary source software vendors once software vulnerabilities 
have been informed to software vendors.   
 
2.9.3 Debate on Open and Proprietary Source Software Vendors  
There has been considerable debate about the software security of open source 
software vendors and proprietary source software vendors. Open source software 
vendors do not develop software in a controlled environment. Open source software 
is not always peer reviewed or validated for use. Users are free to examine and verify 
source code, however, the expert software programmer could embed back door 
Trojans to capture private and confidential information without the user ever 
knowing. This lack of a quality software development process results in open source 
software being viewed as having security issues (Hoepman &  Jacobs 2007; Saltis 
2009). Additionally, the reviewers of an open source software project may not 
continue on the software project for the duration of its development lifetime (i.e. 
reviewers might leave one software company and join another one). This lack of 
continuity and common direction leads to barriers to effective communication among 
reviewers and delays in resolving software vulnerabilities once the open source 
software vendors have been informed of the software vulnerability.  
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On the other hand, proponents of open source software stress the strength of having a 
large number of potential reviewers because source code of open source software is 
publicly distributed. The numbers of reviews of the source code of open source 
software maintains the maturity of software quality (Payne 2002). Similarly, 
Raymond (2001, p. 19) argued that ‗Given enough eyeballs, bugs are shallow‘. This 
strength of the open source software review process is assumed to enable easier 
identification of software vulnerabilities, and enable software vendors to be informed 
accordingly so they can more quickly release software patches once they have been 
notified of a software vulnerability.  
 
Proprietary source software vendors develop software in a controlled environment 
with a concentrated team effort in a common direction; whereas open source 
software vendors do not always develop software in a controlled environment and 
have individual users worldwide developing the software. A lack of continuity and 
common direction prevents effective communication, thus, proprietary source 
software vendors appear more secure than open source software vendors (Saltis 
2009). Additionally, the source code from proprietary source software vendors is 
viewed and edited in-depth by a dedicated software development team—eliminating 
the risk of back door Trojans and reducing the risk of occurrence of any software 
vulnerabilities. Although the source code of proprietary source software is viewed 
only by a dedicated software development team, Raymond (2001) argued that 
finding a software vulnerability in proprietary source software is not a difficult task. 
Expert software reviewers who are not in the dedicated software development team 
can find software vulnerabilities in proprietary source software without any trouble.  
 
Nonetheless, the problem is the response time of the proprietary source software 
vendor in releasing a software patch. Once software vulnerability is found in 
proprietary source software and informed to the software vendor, only the dedicated 
software development team in a controlled environment can review the source code. 
The idea is that a large number of source code reviewers, rather than a small number 
of reviewers, can resolve the informed software vulnerability. Open source software 
often has an uncountable number of reviewers compared to proprietary source 
software, which has a limited number of reviewers. 
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Both open source software vendors and proprietary source software vendors are 
equally vulnerable in the perspective of software developers and specific type of 
software development (MacCormack, Rusnak, Baldwin & Research 2006). However, 
the main concern of this study is to determine which type of software vendor is 
quicker to respond in releasing a software patch once the software vendor is 
informed of the software vulnerability.  
 
2.10 Software Vulnerability Disclosure and Software Patching 
Nizovtsev and Thursby (2007) developed a model to motivate users to disclose 
software vulnerabilities through an open community forum under the circumstance 
of instant disclosure which is socially optimal. Likewise, Telang and Wattal (2007) 
analysed the full disclosure of software vulnerability through an event study and 
demonstrated that full disclosure is one of the best possible ways to lower the stock 
prices of software vendors. Full disclosure should encourage software vendors to be 
more proactive in releasing software patches. Li and Rao (2007) identified that there 
is no change in optimal time of full disclosure, even if private information security 
advisories (e.g. iDefense, TippingPoint, ISS Inc.) participate and put pressure on 
software vendors to release software patches. However, private information security 
advisories‘ services decrease a vendor‘s willingness to release a patch promptly. 
Arora et al. (2010a; 2008) proved that larger software vendors are more responsive to 
software vulnerabilities if software vulnerabilities are fully disclosed by CERT. 
However, the study by Arora et al. (2010a; 2008) did not tested the extent to which 
the level of criticality of a software vulnerability influences the response time of 
software vendors in releasing a patch once the software vendor is informed of the 
software vulnerability.  
 
2.10.1 Open Source versus Proprietary Source 
Schryen (2009) argued that there is no significant difference in vendors‘ patching 
behaviour on fully disclosed vulnerabilities between open and proprietary source 
software. However, Arora et al. (2010a) argued that open source vendors are quicker 
to release a patch than proprietary source vendors. Both these studies analysed 
software vendor patching behaviour of fully disclosed software vulnerability and 
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both studies analysed 2003 and 2006 data from the same vulnerability database—
which is quite dated in the current threat and attack environment. It is expected that 
software vendors‘ patching behaviour is clearer if the behaviour is analysed with the 
date the vendor was informed of software vulnerabilities, rather than the date the 
software vulnerabilities are fully disclosed.  
 
2.10.2 The Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability 
Arora et al. (2010a) argued that vendors are more responsive to critical 
vulnerabilities. However, Schryen and Rich (2010) empirically showed that a 
vendor‘s patching behaviour does not significantly differ in terms of the criticality of 
software vulnerabilities in open and proprietary source software vendors. Both these 
studies analysed software vendor patching behaviour and the level of criticality of 
software vulnerability with the full disclosure date of software vulnerability. It is 
expected that software vendors‘ response to the level of criticality of software 
vulnerabilities is more accurately measured using the vendor informed date for 
software vulnerabilities rather than using full disclosure date for software 
vulnerabilities, because the full disclosure date varies with software vulnerability 
disclosure policy across different information security advisories—as discussed in 
section 2.8.  
 
2.10.3 Operating System Software versus Application Software 
Similarly, Christey and Martin (2007) categorised software types into operating 
system and non operating system (i.e. application software) to classify software 
vulnerabilities. Lowis and Accorsi (2009) classified software vulnerabilities into 
operating system and web application to better understand their cause and effect, as 
well as to improve vulnerability management tool support. Young and Conklin 
(2010) found that most organizations are using two to three operating systems and 
are concentrating on hardening those systems, which currently leaves the door open 
for hackers and attackers in relation to application software which is poorly managed 
in terms of patching, as organizations are often using dozens, if not hundreds, of 
different types of software applications—all with potential software vulnerabilities. It 
is much more difficult to manage the patching of software applications given the 
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large number of software applications in relation to operating system software. 
Moreover, SANS institute analysed the patching behaviour of application software 
and system software by taking software vulnerabilities data from Microsoft, Adobe 
and Sun Microsystems and found software vendors are much slower in patching 
application software than patching operating system software (SANS 2009).  
 
Similarly, TippingPoint security community also analysed detected operating system 
software and application software vulnerabilities to rectify the changing dynamics in 
the software vulnerability assessment field. It also found that software vendors are 
much slower in patching application software than patching operating system 
software (TippingPoint 2009).  This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that 
most software applications interact with the Internet in some way these days 
(Rehman &  Mustafa 2009; Telang et al. 2007). This indicates there is a relationship 
between software vulnerabilities and type of software. However, previous studies 
have not concentrated on analysing software vendor patching behaviour in terms of 
the type of software and the level of criticality of vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities.   
  
2.11 Theoretical Support for this Study 
Software security disclosure theory is an extension of the theory of full disclosure 
which was first raised in the context of lock smithing in the 19
th
 century regarding 
whether weaknesses in lock systems should be kept secret in the lock smithing 
community or revealed to the public (Hobbs, Tomlinson, Fenby & Mallet 1868). 
Alfred Hobbs noted in 1853 that ‗Rogues are very keen in their profession, and know 
already much more than we can teach them’ when questioned on the wisdom of 
publishing the weaknesses of existing locks. Similarly, software security disclosure 
theory argues that full disclosure of software vulnerabilities encourages software 
vendors to be more proactive and timely in responding to software vulnerabilities; 
and makes organisations and individuals more aware of the potential risks associated 
with vulnerabilities in the software they are using (Swire 2004, 2006).  
 
Previous empirical studies on full disclosure of software vulnerability have also 
identified that when software vulnerabilities are fully disclosed, open source software 
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vendors release patches more quickly than proprietary source software vendors 
(Arora et al. 2010a; Swire 2004, 2006; Xueqi et al. 2008); software vendors are more 
responsive to severe software vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 2010a); and patches are 
released more quickly by software vendors for operating system software 
vulnerabilities than for application software (SANS 2009; TippingPoint 2009; Young 
et al. 2010). 
 
Furthermore, the economic model of software security investment developed by 
Gordon and Loeb (2002) also suggests that the response time of software vendors in 
releasing software patches is an optimisation decision where software vulnerabilities 
with a medium level of criticality are the most optimal for software vendors to 
develop and release patches; whereas for low level and high level of criticality 
software vulnerabilities the effort of software vendors is less optimal to develop and 
release patches. 
 
Therefore, this study has used the concept of software security disclosure theory 
developed by Swire (2004, 2006) and the economic model of software security 
investment developed by Gordon and Loeb (2002) as the theoretical lens for this 
study which assesses the extent of the (1) level of criticality of a software 
vulnerability, (2) type of software vendor, and (3) type of software impact on the 
response time of software vendors in releasing a patch once the software 
vulnerability has been informed to the software vendor.   
 
2.12 Research Gaps 
The review of the literature reveals the following gaps: 
 
1. Previous studies identified that the level of the criticality of software 
vulnerabilities potentially impacts on the response time of software vendors in 
releasing software patches for disclosed software vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 
2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et al. 2007). Schryen and 
Rich (2010) did not find any significant difference in software vendors‘ patching 
behaviour for severe software vulnerabilities.  Although all the above studies 
analysed the relationship of vendors‘ patching behaviour and the level of 
criticality of software vulnerability with the full disclosure date of software 
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vulnerability, they did not analyse the relationship between the level of criticality 
of software vulnerability and software vendors‘ patch release behaviour with 
vendor informed date.  
Similarly, Gordon and Loeb‘s (2002) economic model of software security 
investment showed that software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality 
have the highest potential impact on the software vendors‘ patch release 
behaviour compared to low and high level of criticality of software vulnerability. 
Therefore, this study analyses the relationship between the level criticality of 
software vulnerabilities and the response time to release software patches once 
the software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerabilities.  
2. Arora et al. (2010a) argued that open source software vendors are quicker to 
release software patches for software vulnerabilities than proprietary source 
software vendors. Schryen (2009) argued that there is no significant difference in 
software vendors‘ patching behaviour on fully disclosed software vulnerabilities 
between open and proprietary source software vendor. Both studies analysed the 
software vendors‘ patching behaviour using the full disclosure date of software 
vulnerabilities. This study analyses software vendor patching behaviour using the 
vendor informed date of software vulnerabilities because response time 
calculated to release software patches is more accurate when using the date of 
vendor informed software vulnerabilities than the date of full disclosure of 
software vulnerabilities.  
3. Prior studies that concentrated on classifying software vulnerabilities into 
different types of software (Christey &  Martin 2006; Lowis et al. 2009) found 
that organisations are more proactive in hardening operating system software, 
rather than application software (Young et al. 2010). SANS Institute analysed the 
patching behaviour of three software vendors: (1) Microsoft Corporation, (2) 
Adobe Systems Incorporated and (3) Sun Microsystems, in relation to application 
software versus operating system using software vulnerabilities data (SANS 
2009). SANS found that these three software vendors released software patches 
more quickly for operating system software vulnerabilities than for application 
software. Similarly, TippingPoint security community also analysed detected 
operating system software and application software vulnerabilities to rectify the 
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changing dynamics in the software vulnerability assessment field. It also found 
that software vendors are much slower in patching application software than 
patching operating system software (TippingPoint 2009). Therefore, this study 
will address these issues and, based on software vulnerability data from 2008 to 
2010, analyse the response time of software vendors in releasing software 
patches to determine if there is a difference in the response time between 
operating system software and application software. 
 
2.13 Research Question and Sub Questions 
The general research question should focus on the specifics of the enquiry at hand 
(Zikmund 1997; McPhail 2000). Therefore, the general research question for this 
study is as follows: 
 
To what extent does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of 
software vendor (Open source, Proprietary source vendor), type of software 
(Operating system software, Application software) influence the response time of 
software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of 
software vulnerabilities? 
 
To answer the general research question for this study, the following three specific 
research questions are addressed. 
 
RSQ1. How does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities influence the 
response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is 
informed of software vulnerabilities? 
 
RSQ2. Is there a difference between open and proprietary source software vendors in 
terms of their response time in releasing patches when the software vendor is 
informed of software vulnerabilities? 
 
 
RSQ3. Is there a difference between operating system software and application 
software in terms of response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the 
software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities? 
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2.14 Conceptual Model 
The theoretical basis of the conceptual model for this study  is software security 
disclosure theory, which is an extension of the theory of full disclosure and the 
economic model of software security investment developed by Gordon and Loeb 
(2002) and (Hobbs et al. 1868; Swire 2004, 2006).  The theory of software security 
disclosure provides an explanation for why the disclosure of a software vulnerability 
will encourage software vendors to be more proactively in responding and releasing 
a patch to a software vulnerability once they informed of its existence. Previous 
studies have argued that the patching behaviour of software vendors when a software 
vulnerability is disclosed are different for the type of software (operating system 
software versus application software) and the type of software vendor (proprietary 
software vendor versus open source software vendor). The economic model of 
software investment explains how the response time of software vendors in releasing 
software patches is an optimisation decision and suggests that software 
vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality are the most optimal for software 
vendors to develop and release quickly (Gordon et al. 2002). Conversely for low and 
high level of criticality software vulnerabilities the economic model of software 
investment suggests that the effort of software vendors is less optimal and software 
vendors develop and release patches more slowly.  
 
In this study, the conceptual model underpinned by on the theory of software security 
disclosure and the economic model of software security, is based on the relationships 
among four key variables identified from the previous relevant literature. The level 
of criticality of a software vulnerability, software vendor type and type of software 
are independent variables in this study. The level of criticality of software 
vulnerabilities is measured as a continuous variable on a scale of 0 to 10. The scale 
of 0 to 10 is categorised into 5 levels (very low, low, medium, high and very high). 
Software vendor type is a dummy variable (open source software vendor, proprietary 
source software vendor) and is measured as a binary variable. Similarly, type of 
software is a dummy variable (operating system software, application software) and 
is also measured as a binary variable.  The response time is the dependent variable in 
this study and is a continuous variable measured by number of days taken to release a 
software patch based on when the software vendor is informed about a software 
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vulnerability. The response time is determined on the basis of the vendor informed 
disclosure date. Type of vendor release a software patch based on the level of 
criticality of software vulnerability and type of software. Therefore, it is anticipated 
that these three independent variables are hypothesised to have a direct impact, 
although they are interrelated with each other, on the dependent variable, the 
response time of software vendors in releasing software patches in this study. To test 
proposed relationships in this model, three hypotheses have been specifically 
formulated from the three research sub questions stated previously in section 2.13.  
 
2.15 Hypotheses 
The level of criticality of software vulnerability is the risk level assigned to each 
software vulnerability which describes the extent of damage that could be caused by 
a specific breach of confidentiality, integrity and availability for that software 
vulnerability (Liu et al. 2011). The levels of criticality is categorised into 5 levels 
(very low, low, medium, high and very high) in this study. Previous studies have 
argued that the higher the level of the criticality of software vulnerabilities, the 
higher potential impact on the software vendors‘ response time in releasing software 
patches for fully disclosed software vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu et al. 
2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et al. 2007). In contrast, Schryen and Rich 
(2010) did not find any significant difference in software vendors‘ patching 
behaviour for critical software vulnerabilities. Furthermore, Gordon and Loeb (2002) 
argued that the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches is an 
optimisation decision where medium level of criticality of software vulnerabilities 
are the most optimal for software vendors to develop and release patches promptly; 
whereas low level and high level of criticality software vulnerabilities are less 
optimal and software vendors to develop and release patches for software 
vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality less quickly for. Based on these 
issues in the existing literature, the following hypothesis will be tested. 
 
H1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium 
level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low 
and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software 
vulnerability.  
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Schryen (2009) argued that there is no significant difference in vendors‘ patching 
behaviour on fully disclosed vulnerabilities between open and proprietary source 
software. However, Arora et al. (2010a) argued that open source vendors are quicker 
to release a patch than proprietary source vendors. Both studies analysed 2003 and 
2006 data from the same vulnerability database—which is dated in the current threat 
and attack environment. Both these studies also analysed software vendors‘ patching 
behaviour using the full disclosure date of software vulnerabilities. Similarly, Xueqi, 
Nannan and Hsiao (2008) argued that software vulnerabilities data and its 
relationship with the release of software patches will change over time due to the 
dynamic and rapidly-changing nature of software vulnerabilities. Therefore, this 
hypothesis will test whether the response time to release a software patch is different 
between open source vendors and proprietary source vendors based on the vendor 
informed date. Therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested. 
 
H2: Open source vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities 
more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary 
software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software 
vulnerability. 
 
As mentioned previously in section 2.10.3, Young and Conklin (2010) argued that 
most organizations concentrate more on hardening operating systems rather than 
application software, as organizations use two or three operating systems as opposed 
to dozens, if not hundreds, of different types of software applications—all with 
potential software vulnerabilities. Moreover, SANS and TippingPoint (2009; 2009) 
found that software vendors release patches for operating system software 
vulnerabilities more quickly than for application software. Indeed most operating 
systems have built-in mechanisms for software updates.  Based on these reasons, the 
following hypothesis developed from the existing literature will be tested. 
 
H3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly 
than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has 
been informed of the software vulnerability. 
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Figure 2.4 represents an integrated conceptual model with the three proposed 
hypothesised relationships which will be tested in this study to investigate and 
determine the level of impact of key factors, namely, (1) the level of criticality of 
software vulnerability, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software, on the 
software vendors‘ response time in releasing software patches  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Key Factors impacting on Response Time  
 
2.16 Conclusion 
This chapter firstly provided a context for understanding the background and parent 
literatures surrounding software vulnerabilities and software patches by reviewing 
the relevant literature. The immediate literature focused on the issues of software 
vulnerabilities: software vulnerability classification, software vulnerability 
disclosure, software vulnerability disclosure policy and software vendors‘ patching 
behaviour. Gaps in the literature are identified in the areas of software vulnerabilities 
and software vendors‘ response time in releasing software patches in terms of (1) the 
level of criticality, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software. There 
appears to be no study that focuses on the influences of key factors: (1) the level of 
criticality, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software, on the response time 
in releasing software patches once software vendors have been informed of software 
vulnerabilities. The main theoretical support for this study is software security 
disclosure theory and the economic model of software security investment. Based on 
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the relevant literature, software security disclosure theory and an economic model of 
software security investment as the theoretical lens, a research model is developed 
which can contribute a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship 
between key factors of software vulnerabilities and their impact on the response time 
of software vendors in releasing software patches once informed of software 
vulnerabilities. The relationships between the key factors of software vulnerabilities 
and response time are developed from the existing literature and are presented as 
research hypotheses. 
 
The following chapter (Chapter 3) discusses and justifies the research design and 
methodology used to collect and analyse empirical data to test the research model 
developed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the methodology used to collect and analyse empirical data to 
test the research hypotheses proposed in chapter two and developed from the general 
research question specified in chapter one. The purpose of this chapter is to describe 
and justify the methodology used to answer the main research questions of this study 
by testing the research model and research hypotheses presented in the literature 
review. This chapter provides justification for the choice of a positivist paradigm, 
research design and research strategy, and then discusses how the issues of validity 
and reliability are addressed in this study. This chapter is divided into four major 
sections. First, it discusses the research purpose and commonly-used strategies for 
collecting data to answer research problems. Second, it explores the issues of validity 
and reliability of this study. The data collection strategies adopted for this research, 
including data sources, sample generation and data measurement approaches are 
discussed next. Finally, the appropriate method of data analysis used in this research 
is outlined, justifying the choice of multiple regression analysis and the test of 
significance in the context of this study.  
 
3.2 Research Paradigm 
This study adopts the positivist research paradigm which means the object of this 
study is independent of researchers individual beliefs and biases. Knowledge is 
discovered and verified through direct observations or measurements of phenomena. 
Similarly, the facts are established by the testing of hypotheses developed from the 
existing theory through the measurement of observable social realities (Krauss 2005; 
Tuli 2011). Flowers (2009) argued that the positivism assumes the knowledge is 
valid only if theoretical models can be developed that are generalisable, can explain 
cause and effect of relationships, and predict outcomes. Similarly, positivism is 
based upon values of reason, truth and validity and there is a focus purely on facts, 
gathered through direct observation and experience and measured empirically using 
quantitative methods-surveys and experiments and statistical analysis (Eriksson &  
Kovalainen 2008; Saunders,  Lewis &  Thornhill 2009). For this study, the positivist 
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paradigm is adopted to test the impact of key factors on the software vendors‘ 
response time in releasing software patches through a series of hypothesised 
relationships using quantitative archival data. 
 
3.3 Research Design 
The research design provides an overall framework for the research process (Davis 
2005; Zikmund 2010). It is designed to guide researchers in their quest to solve the 
research problem being studied (Davis 2005). The research design process involves a 
series of decisions which need to be answered systematically based upon the context 
of the research problem. These decisions need to be made carefully as there are a 
number of potential sources of error which may affect the results of the study (Davis 
2005). For example, errors may occur during research planning, data collection, data 
analysis, or when reporting the results of the study. Thus, the purpose of a research 
design is to ensure that the researcher is aware of these potential sources of error and 
has planned sufficiently to control or limit errors in the research process, thereby 
producing accurate and useful information (Davis 2005). This research uses a 
quantitative method to undertake an explanatory investigation of the relationship 
between critical levels of software vulnerabilities, open source software vendors 
versus proprietary software vendors, operating system software versus application 
software and the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches. 
The main aspect of this research is designed within a positivist framework. This 
means that data are collected in a form that are quantitative, detached and objective 
(Leedy &  Ormrod 2001). The research design for this study is illustrated in figure 
3.1. 
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     Figure 3.1 Research Design 
 
3.3.1 Research Strategy 
Research strategy refers to a plan specifying the methods and procedures for 
collecting and analysing the required information (Zikmund 2010). There are five 
types of research strategies, experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case 
study (Yin 2009). Accordingly, the research strategy should be aligned with the goals 
and characteristics of the study (Yin 2009). 
 
SecurityFocus 
 (Initial population) 
OSVDB 
(Reduced population) 
Review data  
Impact of the level of criticality of 
software vulnerability on response time 
Impact of type of software vendors on response 
time 
Impact of type of software on response 
time 
Data Presentation 
Data Analysis/ Interpretations 
Draw Conclusion 
NVD 
(Additional information) 
Further reduced on the 
availability of complete field of 
information for data analysis  
Secunia 
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Table 3.1 explains the relevant situations for different research strategies. 
 
Table 3.1 Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies 
Strategy  Form of Research Question  Requires Control of Behavioural 
Events  
Focuses on Contemporary 
Events  
Experiment  How, why  Yes  Yes  
Survey  Who, what, where, how many, 
how much  
No  Yes  
Archival 
analysis  
Who, what, where, how many, 
how much  
No  Yes/No  
History  How, why  No  No  
Case study  How, why  No  Yes  
Source: (Yin, 1994, p.6) 
 
The purpose of this research is to confirm:  
(1)  whether the level of criticality of current software vulnerabilities influences 
the response time of the software vendor in releasing software patches;  
(2)  whether the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches 
in response to software vulnerabilities is different between open source 
software vendor and proprietary source software vendor; and   
(3) whether the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches 
in response to software vulnerabilities is different between operating system 
software and application software.  
 
Archival data analysis strategy is considered to be appropriate for this research 
because data are obtained from software vulnerability databases.   
 
The primary approach to the collection of data for this research was to collect 
quantitative data concerning software vulnerabilities. Quantitative data were in the 
form of archive data based on factual data which already has a pre-established degree 
of validity and reliability and goes through rigorous screening processes before being 
entered into these software vulnerability databases. By being in close proximity to 
the variables being studied, richer data and description can be obtained to improve 
the quality of the research results (Yin 2009). 
 
3.3.2 Archival Analysis 
Archival analysis refers to a form of the longitudinal observation method where the 
researcher examines the accumulated documents. This analysis presents an 
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opportunity to access potentially rich data that helps to reveal current events, as well 
as historical events, and also provide a map of what decisions and actions can be 
taken, by whom, how many and where. A great strength of archival analysis lies in 
its ability to analyse historical data continually over time. However, a 
poorly-maintained database can cause problems. Internal archival and current 
documentation do not have this weakness and is useful as a source of summary data, 
although it can be difficult to come by if confidential in nature (Insights 2009; 
Jankowicz 2005; Yin 2009). 
 
3.4 Data Collection 
3.4.1 Data Sources 
The data collected to test hypothesised relationships in the proposed research model 
are primarily drawn from the software vulnerability database: Open Source 
Vulnerability Database (OSVDB), with SecurityFocus database providing the initial 
sample population for this study. SecurityFocus cross-references its software 
vulnerabilities with the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) through the 
Bugtraq ID. Moreover, OSVDB provides both definition of software vulnerabilities 
and a dictionary of software vulnerabilities (OSVDB 2011b). This dictionary for 
each software vulnerability provides a standard identifier number (i.e. osvdb id), a 
brief description and references to related software vulnerabilities reports and 
advisories. As the data sources of OSVDB are cross referenced with trusted 
organizations such as NVD, SecurityFocus, Secunia, Nessus, Snort, Microsoft 
Bulletin, Vupen and CERT, the software vulnerabilities input in OSVDB is assumed 
to be rigorous, screened and comprehensive. National Vulnerability Database and 
Secunia provided additional information needed to conduct data analysis. National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) cross-references its software vulnerability data with 
OSVDB through the Common Vulnerabilities Exposures (CVE) catalogue and 
Secunia cross-references its software vulnerability data with OSVDB through 
Secunia Advisory ID.  
 
This research analyses data fields such as primary software vendor, description of the 
software vulnerability, vendor informed date, full disclosure date of software 
vulnerability, and software patch release date obtained from OSVDB. The level of 
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criticality of software vulnerabilities was obtained by using a Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System Version 2.0 (CVSS V2), access vector, access complexity, 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, availability and impact type obtained from 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Similarly, the type of software (Application 
software or Operating system software) for each fully disclosed software 
vulnerabilities sample constructed for this study is obtained from Secunia, This 
research also analyses software vulnerabilities under a standard classification of 
software vulnerability types provided by Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) 
which are cross section mapped by National Vulnerability Database (NVD) with 
Common Vulnerability Exposure (CVE) entries (NVD 2011b).  The information 
contained in these databases is factual information on software vulnerabilities and 
table 3.2 shows the data fields from these databases, as well as calculated fields used 
in this research. OSVDB track a large number of security problems, but not all 
SecurityFocus vulnerabilities meet its criteria to be listed in the OSVDB.  
 
To verify the archival data obtained as a sample population from the OSVDB 
database is accurate and complete, software vulnerability data was randomly selected 
from the sample population. The OSVDB id (primary key in the OSVDB database) 
was used to track and confirm the validity of the data fields in each OSVDB software 
vulnerability with the various original data sources. The original data sources for 
each OSVDB software vulnerability are cross referenced in the OSVDB database 
(such as CVE ID, NVD, Bugtraq ID, Secunia advisory ID etc) and can be 
systematically cross checked for accuracy (OSVDB 2011b). 
 
Therefore, for the purpose of empirical analysis, this research has considered only 
the software vulnerabilities published in both OSVDB and SecurityFocus and which 
can be identified through Bugtraq ID field which is contained in SecurityFocus and 
OSVDB; CVE catalogue which is contained in NVD and linked with CVE field in 
OSVDB; and Secunia Advisory ID which is contained in Secunia and linked with 
Secunia Advisory ID in OSVDB. Additional information such as the classification of 
software vulnerabilities as open source or close source are obtained from software 
vendor websites for each vendor informed software vulnerability in this study. 
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Table 3.2 OSVDB Data Fields, NVD Data Fields, Secunia Data Fields plus Fields calculated for this Research 
 
Source: (NVD 2007; OSVDB 2011a) 
Data fields taken from Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Additional 
Information 
obtained 
from 
National 
Vulnerability 
Database 
(NVD) 
Additional 
Information 
obtained from 
Vendors Websites 
Additional 
Information 
obtained from 
Secunia  
Calculated Fields 
for this Research 
Primary 
Vendor 
Product 
Description of Software Vulnerability Software 
Vulnerability 
Vendor 
informed Date 
Patch Release 
Date/Solution 
Available Date 
Criticality 
Score 
(CVSS V2 
Base Score) 
Type of Software 
Vendor 
Type of Software Response time (in 
days) 
(Patch Release Date 
– Software 
Vulnerability 
Vendor informed 
Date) 
Open Source 
Software Vendor 
(1) / 
Proprietary Source 
Software Vendor 
(0) 
(Dummy Variable) 
 
Operating System 
Software (1) / 
Application 
Software (0)  
(Dummy Variable) 
IBM 
 
AIX is prone to an overflow condition. Pioout command fails to 
properly sanitize unspecified user-supplied input resulting in a 
buffer overflow. With a specially crafted command-line 
argument, a local attacker can potentially cause arbitrary code 
execution. 
29/11/2007 
 
23/01/2008 
 
7.2 
 
1 1 55 
 
Microsoft 
Corporation 
 
Microsoft Windows contains a flaw that may allow an attacker to 
gain access to unauthorized privileges. The issue is triggered 
when the kernel-mode drivers in win32k.sys fail to properly 
validate pseudo-handle values in callback parameters during 
window creation, allowing a local authenticated attacker to gain 
full user privileges.  
15/06/2010 
 
10/08/2010 
 
9.3 0 1 56 
 
Apple 
computer Inc 
 
Apple Safari WebKit contains a memory corruption flaw related 
to WebKit's handling of CSS counters. The issue is triggered 
when visiting a maliciously crafted website. This may allow a 
context-dependent attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted 
HTML document. 
1/06/2010 
 
28/07/2010 
 
9.3 
 
0 0 57 
 
Adobe Systems 
Incorporated 
 
Adobe Flash Player before 9.0.277.0 and 10.x before 10.1.53.64, 
and Adobe AIR before 2.0.2.12610, allows attackers to cause a 
denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly execute 
arbitrary code via vectors related to SWF files, decompression of 
embedded JPEG image data, and the DefineBits and other 
unspecified tags.  
8/06/2010 
 
10/06/2010 
 
9.3 
 
0 0 2 
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3.4.2 Sample Generation 
From January 1
st
 2008 to December 30
th
 2010 the SecurityFocus database reported 
21,527 software vulnerabilities. This population is reduced to 11,758 software 
vulnerabilities which are also reported in OSVDB database. As discussed in data 
sources section (3.4.1), not all the SecurityFocus software vulnerabilities meet the 
criteria to be listed in the OSVDB. The population of 11,758 software vulnerabilities 
reported in OSVDB is further reduced to 2,714 software vulnerabilities. This 
population is reduced on the basis of the availability of a patch solution date from the 
software vendors. Then the 2,714 software vulnerabilities obtained from OSVDB 
were further reduced to 667 software vulnerabilities that had the complete relevant 
information to test the proposed hypothesized relationships in this study. The 667 
software vulnerabilities were filtered on the basis of having a vendor informed date 
in OSVDB. Moreover, the whole population of 667 software vulnerabilities with 
complete information required is taken as a sample size for this study (Anonymous 
2010; Bartlett,  Kotrlik &  Higgins 2001; Cochran 1977; Krejcie &  Morgan 1970).  
 
Table 3.3 summarises the number of software vulnerabilities documented by 
OSVDB in each year from 2008 to 2010 and the sample generation for this study 
(OSVDB 2011a).  
 
Table 3.3 Number of Software Vulnerabilities Documented in OSVDB from 
SecurityFocus  
Number of software vulnerabilities documented in OSVDB from SecurityFocus 
Years Number of Fully Disclosed 
Software Vulnerabilities 
Fully Disclosed 
Software 
Vulnerabilities 
Solution Available 
Population/Sample of Vendor informed Software 
Vulnerabilities for this Study with Complete 
Information  
2008 5,768 574 144 
2009 3,690 1199 281 
2010 2,300 941 242 
Total Data 
(From 2008 to 
2010) 
11,758 2714 667 
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3.4.3 Measurement  
In order to test the proposed hypothesis, the variables defined should be measurable. 
The following discussion describes each of the variables in the research model which 
were tested in this study. 
 
 Full Disclosure Date of Software Vulnerability is the date on which 
software vulnerabilities are fully disclosed to their users; reported to 
information security advisories; or reported to software vendors. 
 Patch Release Date is the date on which software vendors release patches for 
software vulnerabilities. 
 Vendor informed Date is the date when a researcher disclosed the 
vulnerability to the vendor. This is typically evident when a timeline is 
included. 
 Response Time is the amount of time taken to release a software patch based 
on when the software vendor is informed of a software vulnerability. It is 
measured in terms of days (ratio scale) and is calculated as following:  
Response time = (Patch Release Date) – (Vendor informed Date)  
 
 The Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability is measured as an 
interval scale from 0 to 10. The level of criticality of software vulnerabilities 
is identified from the breach of software security in terms of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Confidentiality-related vulnerabilities are highly 
critical, whereas availability-related vulnerabilities are less critical. The 
criticality nature of software vulnerabilities is determined by the Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS is an open, mature and 
well-established definition of the fundamental characteristics of a software 
vulnerability (Frei et al. 2006; Jones 2007; Ransbotham 2010). Despite its 
shortcomings, it is objectively examined by many interested researchers and 
security advisories and uniformly applied to all software vulnerabilities. The 
CVSS scoring system used in this study is adopted from Mell, Scarfone and 
Romanosky (2007) (see tables 3.4 and 3.5). 
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 Two types of software vendors—open source and proprietary source software 
vendors—are examined and compared in this study. Vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities are categorised into one of these two types of 
software vendors (open source software vendor, proprietary source software 
vendor) based on the descriptions of software vulnerabilities in the OSVDB 
database. A binary variable is used to measure differences between these two 
types of software vendors in relation to their response time in releasing 
patches for software vulnerabilities. 
 Vendor informed software vulnerabilities will also be classified into one of 
these two types of software (operating system software and application 
software) in this study. A binary variable will be used to measure the 
difference between these two types of software in relation to the response 
time of software vendors in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 3.4 Criticality Measurement of Software Vulnerabilities 
Rating method listing 
ID Description Possible impact metrics 
cases 
Qualitative 
level 
Impact 
score 
1 Each of confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
properties has a ‗complete‘ loss  
[C:C/I:C/A:C] High  
 
(7.0-
10.0) 
2 One of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
properties has a ‗partial‘ loss. The other two have a 
‗complete‘ loss 
[C:P/I:C/A:C],[C:C/I:P/A:C], 
[C:C/I:C/A:P] 
High 
3 One of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
properties has a ‗none‘ loss. The other two have a 
‗complete‘ loss 
[C:N/I:C/A:C],[C:C/I:N/A:C], 
[C:C/I:C/A:N] 
High 
4 One of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
properties has a ‗complete‘ loss. The other two have a 
partial loss 
[C:P/I:P/A:P],[C:P/I:C/A:P], 
[C:P/I:P/A:C] 
High 
5 One of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
properties has a ‗complete‘ loss. One of them has a 
‗partial‘ loss and one has a ‗none‘ loss 
[C:C/I:P/A:N],[C:C/I:N/A:P], 
[C:P/I:C/A:N], 
[C:P/I:N/A:C],[C:N/I:C/A:P], 
[C:N/I:P/A:C] 
Medium  
 
 
 
(4.0-6.9) 6 One of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
properties has a ‗complete‘ loss. The other two have a 
‗none‘ loss 
[C:C/I:N/A:N],[C:N/I:C/A:N], 
[C:N/I:N/A:C] 
Medium 
7 Each of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
properties has a ‗partial‘ loss 
[C:P/I:P/A:P] Medium 
8 One of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
properties has a ‗none‘ loss. The other two have a ‗none‘ 
loss 
[C:N/I:P/A:P],[C:P/I:N/A:P], 
[C:P/I:P/A:N] 
Low  
 
(0.0-3.9) 
9 One of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
properties has a ‗partial‘ loss. The other two have a 
‗none‘ loss 
[C:P/I:N/A:N],[C:N/I:P/A:N], 
[C:N/I:N/A:P] 
Low 
10 Each of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
properties has a ‗none‘ loss 
[C:N/I:N/A:N] Low 
 
Source adapted from: (Liu et al. 2011; Mell et al. 2007; NVD 2007) 
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Table 3.5 Software Vulnerability Criticality Metrics 
Metrics of scoring method 
Exploitable metric Metric value Quantitative score 
Access vector (AV) Local (L)/ Adjacent network (A)/ Network (N) 0.395/0.645/1.0 
Access complexity (AC) High (H)/ Medium (M)/ Low (L) 0.35/0.61/0.71 
Authentication (Au) None (N)/ Single (S)/ Multiple (M) 0.704/0.56/0.45 
 
Source adapted from: (Liu et al. 2011; Mell et al. 2007; NVD 2007) 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
This section provides the justification for the statistical methods used to analyse the 
empirical data in this study. To begin with, a discussion of the descriptive statistics is 
provided, including the test for normality of the relevant variables. This is followed 
by a discussion of the reliability and validity of data. Then the appropriateness of the 
statistical tests used for testing the research model is discussed. Finally, the level of 
significance used in testing the research hypotheses is reviewed.  
 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and the Normality of the Raw Data 
Descriptive statistics were used to summarise patterns in the responses (Vaus 2002). 
Descriptive statistics were also used to confirm the normality of the raw data. As a 
requirement for conducting any multivariate data analysis, the data needs to be 
representative of a normal distribution (Cooper &  Emory 1995; Davis 2005; Hair,  
Black &  Babin 2010; Zikmund 2010). The following section provides an overview 
of the descriptive statistics used to determine the shape of the distribution of the 
archive data. 
 
The mean and standard deviation measures are used to determine the centre and the 
spread of the distribution of data. Cooper and Emory (1995) advised that visual 
representations (graphs), which are superior to numerical representations of the data, 
were used to discover the shape of the distribution of data. Moreover, the shape of 
the spread of data was measured by skewness and kurtosis. Skewness indicates 
whether there is a substantial departure from a normal distribution in the data (Moore 
2009). That is, the data is collected to one side of mean, rather than symmetrically 
distributed about the mean. Kurtosis indicates the peakedness or flatness of a 
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distribution (Cooper et al. 1995; Hair et al. 2010). 
 
Tests for skewness and kurtosis were used to determine outliers within the data set. 
Outliers are extreme cases within the data that lie outside the normal range of the 
data set (Hair et al. 2010; Moore 2009; Zikmund 2010). Outliers were retained to 
ensure the generalisability of the study, except in cases where there was sufficient 
evidence to suggest that the outlier does not provide an accurate representation of the 
target population. 
 
3.5.2 Reliability and Validity of Data 
The archival data used in this study is factual data which already has a pre-
established degree of validity and reliability (MacCallum 1998; McBurney 2001). 
The SecurityFocus database, OSVDB database and NVD database are the main 
archival data sources for this study. The provenance of these software vulnerability 
databases can be checked as this archival data is published on the Internet and open 
to scrutiny by organisations and the general public. All information relating to 
software vulnerabilities goes through a rigorous screening process before being 
entered into these databases.  These software vulnerability data have been proven to 
be reliable and valid in a number of previous empirical studies published in 
information systems research journals such as Information Systems Research, 
Information Systems Frontiers, Management Science, and Information Economics 
and Policy (Arora et al. 2006a; Arora et al. 2010b; Arora et al. 2010a; Li et al. 2007). 
 
3.5.3 Hypothesis Testing 
In conducting hypothesis testing there are three important decisions that need to be 
made: (1) the type of statistical test that will be used; (2) the appropriateness of that 
statistical test; and (3) the level of significance which is considered to be appropriate 
(Cooper et al. 1995). For this study, multiple regression analysis (MRA) was 
considered the most appropriate for testing the associations between type of software 
vendor, type of software and the level of the criticality of software vulnerability 
(independent variables) and the response time (dependent variable). The acceptable 
level of significance for rejecting the null hypothesis was determined by convention 
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to be five percent. The following sections discuss and justify the use of multiple 
regression analysis and tests of significance within the context of this study. 
 
Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) 
Regression is a statistical technique used to measure the linear association between a 
dependent and independent variables (Davis 2005; Moore 2009; Zikmund 2010). 
 
In this study, vendor informed software vulnerabilities are used as the unit of 
analysis and multiple regression extends the concept of regression to allow the 
simultaneous investigation of a set of independent variables (type of software 
vendor, type of software and the level of criticality of software vulnerability) upon a 
single dependent variable (response time).  
 
There are certain assumptions of MRA that need to be met to improve the accuracy 
of the results, namely: normal distribution of data, and multi-collinearity (Osbourne 
&  Waters 2002), as explained below: 
 
 Normal distribution of the level of criticality software vulnerabilities and 
response time of software vendors in releasing patches will be verified by 
producing the descriptive statistics. Normal Q-Q plot, box plot and histogram 
can also be used to verify these variables and are representative of a normal 
distribution. If normal distribution does not exist, data transformation can be 
undertaken to modify the data because normality is a condition of MRA 
(Osbourne et al. 2002). 
 
 Correlations between the independent variables will be analysed to determine 
whether there are any multi-collinearity problems. This will determine if 
there is a strong correlation between two or more predictors in the regression 
model. According to Nugroho and Sampurno (2010), if collinearity level is 
above 0.7 or, according to Field (2009), if VIF is more than 2, it is very likely 
that a predictor of the outcome will be regarded as insignificant and rejected 
from the model. 
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The following regression model is assumed as the model for this study:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A dependent variable is the response time. The independent variables are type of 
software vendor (Open source vendor, Proprietary source vendor); the type of 
software (Operating system software, Application software); and level of criticality 
of software vulnerability. Additionally, b1, b2 and b3 are the slope (Beta coefficient) 
for type of software vendor, the type of software and level of criticality of software 
vulnerability respectively.  
 
The significance of each variable with response time in patching software 
vulnerability is tested using the t-test with the null hypothesis (H0) and alternative 
hypotheses (Ha1, Ha2, Ha3) as follows: 
 
H0: b0 = 0 
Ha1: b1 ≠ 0 
Ha2: b2 ≠ 0 
Ha3: b3 ≠ 0 
 
H0 is rejected if t-calculated is less than –tn, α/2 or more than tn, α/2. Here, tn, α/2 is 
the tabulated value of t-statistics with n-degrees of freedom and α-level of 
b3 
 
b1 
 
b2 
 
Level of Criticality of 
Software Vulnerability 
 
Type of Software Vendor 
1. Open Source Software 
Vendors   
2. Proprietary Source 
Software Vendors 
Type of Software 
1. Operating System Software  
2. Application Software 
 
 
       
      Response Time 
Figure 3.2 Multiple Regression Model for this Study 
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significance of a two-tailed distribution. Alternatively, if the calculated t-statistics 
lies within the range of the tabulated value, then H0 is accepted.  
 
Tests of significance 
After determining the acceptance and rejection of null hypothesis, it is necessary to 
test the fitted regression for reality and linearity. This is done by the analysis of 
variance with the determination of the squared correlation coefficient (r
2
), which is 
the ratio of the sum of squares accounted for by regression (QR) to that accounted for 
by total (QT) as follows (Kumar 2010): 
 
r
2 
= QR/ QT 
 
Where    QR = [ΣY(X-XAV)]2/ Σ(X-XAV)2 
    QT = ΣY
2
- (ΣY)2/n 
 
Here, 
 X= independent variable; Y= dependent variable 
n= sample size; XAV = average of X  
 
According to Chaulagain (2006, p. 33) there are two kinds of significance—practical 
and statistical. If the regression is not practically significant, it is of little use to test 
its statistical significance. If, however, it is practically significant, then a test of the 
hypothesis must be made in order to test for statistical significance. Practical 
significance is measured by the squared correlation coefficient, r2. A larger 
correlation coefficient indicates a better fit of the regression equation. If r
2
< 0.25, 
then the regression is very doubtful for practical use and a further test for statistical 
significance is meaningless (ibid). But, if r
2
> 0.25, then the regression should be 
tested further for statistical significance. Statistical significance is tested by 
estimating the error in the regression equation (Anderson,  Sweeney &  Williams 
2010): 
 
y= b0+ b1, b2, b3 x+ e 
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Where, 
e = error in estimating the regression equation. 
 
The level of significance used to test the null hypothesis indicates the probability at 
which the results will be accepted or rejected based upon chance. The 
commonly-accepted level of significance for rejecting the null hypothesis is five 
percent (Davis 2005; Zikmund 2010). This study follows conventional hypotheses. 
However, bearing this mind, it is important to consider the statistical significance.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter described the main research methodology used in the study. The overall 
research design adopted quantitative research methods using archival data. A brief 
justification was provided for the appropriateness of archival data analysis in this 
study, followed by a detailed description of the process of data collection from the 
four predominant databases. The total sample population of vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities was generated from 2008 to 2010 archival data. Data 
analysis included descriptive analysis and multiple regression analysis. Descriptive 
analysis tests the normality, linearity and homoscedasticity; and multiple regression 
analysis tests the relationship between dependent and independent variables 
established as hypotheses for this proposed study. The following chapter provides 
detailed results of the data analysis. 
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse and discuss the results of descriptive 
statistics and multiple regression analysis. This chapter is organized in the following 
way: First, it discusses the results of descriptive statistics in relation to the 
characteristics of each of the variables used in this study. Second, it discusses the 
results of testing the proposed research model using multiple regression analysis. 
Finally, this chapter discusses the hypothesised relationships in the proposed research 
model in relation to the existing literature and concludes by summarising the main 
findings from the descriptive and multivariate statistical data analysis.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables in the Proposed Research 
This section presents and discusses the results of the descriptive statistics (mean, 
standard deviations, and correlations) for the explanatory variables used in the 
proposed research model for this study. As discussed in chapter 3, the total 
population/sample size for this study is 667 software vulnerabilities. On the basis of 
this population/sample size, each of the variables is discussed in turn in relation to 
the results of descriptive statistical analyses. 
4.2.1 Type of Software Vendor 
Type of software vendor is an independent variable and measured as a binary 
variable. Open source software vendors are coded as 1, with proprietary software 
vendors coded as the reference category of 0.  
 
Table 4.1 presents the distribution for proprietary source software vendors and open 
source software vendors across the total population of 667 software vulnerabilities. 
Table 4.1 shows that 418 (62.7%) software vulnerabilities in the total sample 
population are in proprietary source vendor software and 249 (37.3%) software 
vulnerabilities are in open source vendor software.  
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Table 4.1 Distribution of Software Vulnerabilities by Type of Software Vendor 
Type of Software Vendor Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Proprietary Source Software Vendor 418 62.7 62.7 
Open Source Software Vendor 249 37.3 100.0 
Total 667 100.0  
 
 
Top 12 Software Vendors and Informed Software Vulnerabilities (from 2008 to 
2010) 
 
Figure 4.1 presents the top 12 software vendors in the total sample population of 
software vulnerabilities for this study and their proportion of informed software 
vulnerabilities from 2008 to 2010.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Top 12 Software Vendors by Number of Software Vulnerabilities in this 
Study (from 2008 to 2010)  
(Source: developed for this research) 
 
The top 12 software vendors were selected on the basis that the numbers of software 
vulnerabilities informed to the software vendors were 10 or above in the sample 
population used for this research. The reason for choosing 12 software vendors is 
that more than half (341) informed software vulnerabilities from the total sample 
population of 667 are reported for these software vendors. Microsoft Corporation has 
the highest number of informed software vulnerabilities, numbering 60; followed by 
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Adobe Systems Incorporated and Apple Computer Inc with 49 each respectively. 
Cisco System Inc has the lowest number (10) of informed software vulnerabilities in 
these top 12 software vendors. Among these top 12 software vendors, 10 software 
vendors are proprietary source and 2 are open source. This indicates that most of 
these software vendors with the highest number of informed software vulnerabilities 
are proprietary source software vendors in the total sample population for this study. 
 
Types of Software Vulnerabilities and Their Proportion 
Figure 4.2 presents a pie chart of 21 different types of software vulnerabilities 
identified in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities from 2008 to 
2010 for this study.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Types of Software Vulnerabilities by Percentage Terms in this Study  
(Source: developed for this research) 
 
Figure 4.2 shows that buffer error is the most common software vulnerability (30%) 
in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, followed by cross site 
scripting (XSS) (17%), numeric errors and resource management errors (7%), SQL 
injection, path traversal, input validation, code injection (6%), insufficient 
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information and permission, privileges and access control (4%), authentication issues 
(2%), and CSRF, other design errors and OS command injection (1%).  The 
following software vulnerabilities configuration, credentials management, 
cryptographic issues, format string vulnerability and link following had a less than 
(1%) occurrence in the total sample population of 667 for this study.  
 
Type of Software Vulnerability across Software Vendor Type 
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of the 21 most commonly identified types of 
software vulnerabilities across proprietary source software vendors and open source 
software vendors. 
 
Table 4.2 Types of Software Vulnerability across Software Vendor Type 
Types of Software Vulnerability * Software Vendor Type  
Types of Software Vulnerability 
Software Vendor Type 
Total 
Proprietary Source Software 
Vendor 
Open Source Software 
Vendor 
 Authentication Issues 6 (1.4%) 5 (2.0%) 11 (1.6%) 
Buffer Errors 160 (38.3%) 37 (14.9%) 197 (29.5%) 
Code Injection 36 (8.6%) 5 (2.0%) 41 (6.1%) 
Configuration 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.1%) 
Credentials Management 2 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.3%) 
Cryptographic Issues 2 (0.5%) 1 (0.4%) 3 (0.4%) 
CSRF 8 (1.9%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (1.2%) 
Design Errors 3 (0.7%) 1 (0.4%) 4 (0.6%) 
Format String Vulnerability 2 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.3%) 
Information Leak/Disclosure 8 (1.9%) 1 (0.4%) 9 (1.3%) 
Input Validation 29 (6.9%) 11 (4.4%) 40 (6.0%) 
Insufficient Information 9 (2.2%) 15 (6.0%) 24 (3.6%) 
Link Following 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.1%) 
Numeric Errors 30 (7.2%) 19 (7.6%) 49 (7.3%) 
OS Command Injections 4 (1.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (0.6%) 
Other 4 (1.0%) 4 (1.6%) 8 (1.2%) 
Path Traversal 12 (2.9%) 25 (10.0%) 37 (5.5%) 
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control 18 (4.3%) 8 (3.2%) 26 (3.9%) 
Resource Management Errors 35 (8.4%) 10 (4.0%) 45 (6.7%) 
SQL Injection 8 (1.9%) 31 (12.4%) 39 (5.8%) 
XSS 42 (10.0%) 74 (29.7%) 116 (17.4%) 
Total 418 249 667 
 
Buffer errors, Cross Site Scripting (XSS), code injection, input validation, numeric 
errors, resource management errors and SQL injection are the most common 
software vulnerabilities in both types of software vendors.  
 
Although distribution of software vulnerabilities in open source software vendors 
and proprietary source software vendors is not equal, from table 4.2 it can be 
established that proprietary source software vendors have a higher occurrence of 
software vulnerability buffer errors (38.28 %) compared to open source software 
vendors (14.86 %). Similarly, proprietary source software vendors have a higher 
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occurrence of the following software vulnerabilities: code injection (8.61 %), 
resource management errors (8.37 %) and input validation (6.94 %), compared to 
open source software vendors of code injection (2.01 %), resource management 
errors (4.02 %), and input validation (4.42 %). In contrast, open source software 
vendors have a higher occurrence of Cross Site Scripting (XSS) (29.72 %) compared 
to proprietary source software vendors (10.05 %).  
 
Likewise, open source software vendors have a higher occurrence of the following 
software vulnerabilities: SQL injection (12.45 %), path traversal (10.04 %) and 
insufficient information (6.02 %), compared to proprietary source software vendors 
with SQL injection (1.91 %), path traversal (2.87 %) and insufficient information 
(2.15 %). The software vulnerability numeric errors are almost equally distributed in 
both types of software vendors with (7.63 %) occurrence in open source software 
vendors and (7.18 %) occurrence in proprietary source software vendors. 
4.2.2 Type of Software 
Type of software is an independent variable in the proposed research model for this 
study and is measured as a binary scale. Operating system software is represented 
as 1 and application software is represented as the reference category 0. Table 4.3 
presents the distribution for operating system software and application software 
across the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 4.3 Distribution of Software Vulnerabilities across Type of Software 
Type Of Software Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Application Software 611 91.6 91.6 
Operating System Software 56 8.4 100.0 
Total 667 100.0  
 
Table 4.3 shows that 56 (8.4%) software vulnerabilities are classified as operating 
system software and 611 (91.6%) software vulnerabilities are classified as 
application software. 
Types of Software Vulnerability across Software Type  
Operating system software and application software are affected by different types of 
software vulnerabilities (Telang et al. 2007). Table 4.4 shows how both operating 
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system software and application software are affected proportionately by the 21 most 
common types of software vulnerabilities in the total sample population of 667 
software vulnerabilities in this study (NVD 2011a; OVAL 2011).  
 
Table 4.4 Types of Software Vulnerability across Software Type 
Types of Software Vulnerability * Software Type  
Types of Software Vulnerability 
Software Type 
Total Application Software Operating System Software 
 Authentication Issues  11 (1.8%) 0 (0.00%) 11 (1.6%) 
Buffer Errors  178 (29.1%) 19 (33.9%) 197 (29.5%) 
Code Injection  31 (5.1%) 10 (17.9%) 41 (6.1%) 
Configuration  1 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.1%) 
Credentials Management  2 (0.3%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.3%) 
Cryptographic Issues  3 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (0.4%) 
CSRF  5 (0.8%) 3 (5.4%) 8 (1.2%) 
Design Errors  4 (0.7%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (0.6%) 
Format String Vulnerability  2 (0.3%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.3%) 
Information Leak/Disclosure  9 (1.5%) 0 (0.0%) 9 (1.3%) 
Input Validation  39 (6.4%) 1 (1.8%) 40 (6.0%) 
Insufficient Information  21 (3.4%) 3 (5.4%) 24 (3.6%) 
Link Following  0 (0.0%) 1 (1.8%) 1 (0.1%) 
Numeric Errors  42 (6.9%) 7 (12.5%) 49 (7.3%) 
OS Command Injections  3 (0.5%) 1 (1.8%) 4 (0.6%) 
Other  7 (1.1%) 1 (1.8%) 8 (1.2%) 
Path Traversal  37 (6.1%) 0 (0.0%) 37 (5.5%) 
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control  22 (3.6%) 4 (7.1%) 26 (3.9%) 
Resource Management Errors  39 (6.4%) 6 (10.7%) 45 (6.7%) 
SQL Injection  39 (6.4%) 0 (0.0%) 39 (5.8%) 
XSS  116 (19.0%) 0 (0.0%) 116 (17.4%) 
Total  611 (100%) 56 (100%) 667 (100%) 
 
Buffer errors, code injection, CSRF and input validation are the most common 
software vulnerabilities in these two different software types.  
 
Table 4.4 shows that the distribution of these different software vulnerabilities is not 
equal across application software and operating system software. From the table it 
can be identified that cross site scripting, SQL injection and path traversal have the 
highest occurrence in application software by (19%), (6.4%) and (6.1%) respectively, 
with no occurrence in operating system software in the total sample population for 
this study. Similarly, application software has a higher occurrence of the software 
vulnerability input validation (6.4 %) compared to occurrence of input validation 
(1.8%) in operating system software.  
 
In contrast, it can be identified that operating system software has the highest 
occurrence of the following software vulnerabilities: buffer errors (33.9%), code 
injection (17.9%), numeric errors (12.5%), resource management errors (10.7%) and 
CSRF (5.4%) compared to application software with the occurrence of buffer errors 
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(29.1%), code injection (5.1%), numeric errors (6.9%), resource management errors 
(6.4%) and CSRF (0.8%). 
4.2.3 The Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability 
The level of criticality of software vulnerabilities is an independent variable and 
measured as an interval scale from 0 to 10. Table 4.5 presents the distribution of the 
level of criticality of software vulnerabilities across the sample population of 667 
software vulnerabilities.  
 
Table 4.5 Distribution of Software Vulnerabilities related to the Level of Criticality 
Categories 
Categorization Of Level Of Criticality Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
Very Low              (0-2) 0 0 0 
Low                     (2.1- 4) 14 2.1 2.1 
Medium              (4.1 – 6) 195 29.2 31.3 
High                    (6.1 – 8) 139 20.8 52.1 
Very High           (8.1- 10) 319 47.8 100 
Total 667 100.0  
 
As shown in table 4.5, the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities is categorised 
into five classes: very low (0-2), low (2.1 to 4), medium (4.1 to 6), high (6.1 to 8) 
and very high (8.1 to 10). In the total sample population of 667 software 
vulnerabilities there are no software vulnerabilities which are considered to have a 
very low level of criticality. However, in the total sample population of 667 software 
vulnerabilities 68% are of a high or a very high level of criticality, 29% are a 
medium level of criticality and 2% are a low level of criticality.  
 
Table 4.6 summarizes the results of the descriptive statistics for the level of 
criticality of software vulnerability.  
 
Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics of the Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability 
Descriptive Statistics 
Categorization of Level of Criticality 
N Valid 667 
Missing 0 
Mean 4.1439 
Median 4.0000 
Std. Deviation .91384 
Skewness -.454 
Kurtosis -1.273 
 
Table 4.6 shows that for the variable level of criticality the Mean is 4.14, Median is 
4.00 and the Standard Deviation is 0.91384 in the total sample population of 667 of 
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software vulnerabilities. This indicates that this variable is considered to be normally 
distributed because mean and median are almost the same. The standard deviation is 
less than 1 which means the variable, the level of criticality of software vulnerability, 
is closely spread. Similarly, skewness and kurtosis present the shape of the 
distribution for the variable, the level of criticality of software vulnerability. If the 
value of skewness and kurtosis are zero, the observed distribution is exactly normal.  
From table 4.6, it can be observed that the value of skewness -0.45 and the value of 
kurtosis -1.27 are close to 0, which represents a normal distribution. However, the 
negative value of skewness indicated that the distribution for the variable, the level 
of criticality of software vulnerability, is negatively skewed and the negative value of 
kurtosis indicated that the distribution for the variable, the level of criticality of 
software vulnerability, is flatter. 
 
Figure 4.3 box plot graph and figure 4.4 Normal Q-Q plot graph indicate that the 
variable, the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, is representative of a 
normal distribution. Figure 4.3 shows that the distribution of the variable, the level of 
criticality, is normal because the horizontal line in the box known as median line is in 
the middle of the box. Similarly, figure 4.4 shows that the distribution of the 
variable, the level of criticality, is normal because the data points are on or around 
the straight line.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Box Plot for the Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability 
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Figure 4.4 Normal Q-Q Plots for the Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability 
 
Level of Criticality across Software Vendor Type 
Table 4.7 shows distribution of the different levels of criticality for software 
vulnerabilities across the type of software vendor.  
 
Table 4.7 Level of Criticality across Software Vendor Type 
Level of Criticality * Software Vendor Type  
Level of Criticality 
Software Vendor Type 
Total 
 
Proprietary Source Software Vendor  Open Source Software Vendor 
 Low  6 (1.4%) 8 (3.2%) 14 (2.1%) 
Medium  75 (17.9%) 120 (48.2%) 195 (29.2%) 
High  75 (17.9%) 64 (25.7%) 139 (20.8%) 
Very High  262 (62.7%) 57 (22.9%) 319 (47.8%) 
Total  418 (100%) 249 (100%) 667 (100%) 
 
Table 4.7 shows that in the total sample population, a very high level of criticality for 
software vulnerabilities has greater representation for proprietary source software 
vendors (62.7%) compared to open source software vendors (22.9%). In contrast, 
high, medium and low level of criticality of software vulnerabilities have higher 
representation for open source software vendors (25.7%, 48.2% and 3.2% 
respectively) compared to proprietary source software vendors (with 17.9%, 17.9% 
and 1.4 respectively).  
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Table 4.8 shows the variations of the mean values of the level of criticality across 
software vendor type.  
 
Table 4.8 Variations of Means for Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerabilities 
across Software Vendor Type 
Descriptives 
Level of Criticality 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Proprietary Source Software 
vendor 
418 4.4187 .83067 .04063 4.3388 4.4985 2.00 5.00 
Open Source Software Vendor 249 3.6827 .86121 .05458 3.5752 3.7902 2.00 5.00 
Total 667 4.1439 .91384 .03538 4.0745 4.2134 2.00 5.00 
 
As shown in table 4.8, the mean value of level of criticality of software vulnerability 
for open source software vendors is 3.6827; and for proprietary source software 
vendors is 4.4187. These mean values indicate that software vulnerabilities for open 
source software vendors are less critical overall than software vulnerabilities for 
proprietary source software vendors in the total sample population for this study. 
 
Table 4.9 shows the results of a one-way ANOVA analysis of the level of criticality 
of software vulnerability across type of software vendor.  
 
Table 4.9 ANOVA Analysis of Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability across 
Type of Software Vendor 
ANOVA 
Level of Criticality 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 84.513 1 84.513 119.153 .000 
Within Groups 471.670 665 .709   
Total 556.183 666    
 
Table 4.9 shows that there is a statistically significant difference between open 
source software vendor and proprietary source software vendor as determined by 
one-way ANOVA (F (1,665) = 119.153, p = 0.000 in terms of the level of criticality 
of software vulnerabilities. 
 
 
Level of Criticality across Type of Software  
Table 4.10 shows the distribution of different levels of criticality for software 
vulnerabilities across the type of software. 
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Table 4.10 Level of Criticality across Type of Software 
Level of Criticality * Software Type 
Level of Criticality 
Software Type 
Total 
Application Software 
Count/Percentage 
Operating System Software 
Count/Percentage 
 Low  13 (2.1%) 1 (1.8%) 14 (2.1%) 
Medium  192 (31.4%) 3 (5.4%) 195 (29.2%) 
High  123 (20.1%) 16 (28.6%) 139 (20.8%) 
Very High  283 (46.3%) 36 (64.3%) 319 (47.8%) 
Total  611 (100%) 56 (100%) 667 (100%) 
 
Table 4.10 shows that high to very high levels of criticality of software 
vulnerabilities in the total sample population are more representative in operating 
system software (64.3% and 28.6% respectively) compared to application software 
(46.3% and 20.1% respectively). In contrast, low level of criticality of software 
vulnerabilities in application software (2.1%) compares similarly to operating system 
software (1.8%).  
 
Table 4.11 shows the variations of the mean value of the level of criticality across 
type of software.  
 
Table 4.11 Variations of Level of Criticality across Type of Software 
Descriptives 
Level of Criticality 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Application Software 611 4.1064 .92336 .03736 4.0330 4.1797 2.00 5.00 
Operating System Software 56 4.5536 .68542 .09159 4.3700 4.7371 2.00 5.00 
Total 667 4.1439 .91384 .03538 4.0745 4.2134 2.00 5.00 
 
As shown in table 4.11, the mean value of level of criticality of software 
vulnerability for operating system software is 4.5536; and for application software is 
4.1064. These mean values indicate that the level of criticality of software 
vulnerabilities in operating system software is slightly higher than the level of 
criticality of software vulnerabilities in application software in the total sample 
population for this study. 
 
Table 4.12 shows the results of a one-way ANOVA analysis of the level of criticality 
of software vulnerability across type of software.  
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Table 4.12 ANOVA Analysis of Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerabilities 
across Type of Software 
ANOVA 
Level of Criticality 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 10.259 1 10.259 12.496 .000 
Within Groups 545.924 665 .821   
Total 556.183 666    
 
Table 4.12 shows that there is a statistically significant difference between operating 
system software and application software as determined by one-way ANOVA (F 
(1,665) = 12.496, p = 0.000 with the level of criticality of software vulnerability. 
  
Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time  
Table 4.13 shows the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities across response 
time to release patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities. 
 
 
Table 4.13 Level of Criticality across Response Time  
Level of Criticality * Response Time  
Level of 
Criticality  
Categorization of Response Time 
Total 
-1500 to 0 
Count / 
Percentage 
1 to 100 
Count / 
Percentage 
101 to 200 
Count / 
Percentage 
201 to 300 
Count / 
Percentage 
301 to 400 
Count / 
Percentage 
401 to 500 
Count / 
Percentage 
501 to 2500 
Count / 
Percentage 
  Low  2 (14.3%) 8 (57.1%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (21.4%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (7.1%) 0 (0.0%) 14 (100.0%)  
Medium  17 (8.7%) 147 (75.4%) 18 (9.2%) 7 (3.6%) 1 (0.5%) 3 (1.5%) 2 (1.0%) 195 (100.0%) 
High  10 (7.2%) 88 (63.3%) 19 (13.7%) 13 (9.4%) 3 (2.2%) 4 (2.9%) 2 (1.4%) 139 (100.0%) 
Very High  9 (2.8%) 134 (42.0%) 101 (31.7%) 30 (9.4%) 14 (4.4%) 7 (2.2%) 24 (7.5%) 319 (100.0%) 
Total  38 (5.7%) 377 (56.5%) 138 (20.7%) 53 (7.9%) 18 (2.7%) 15 (2.2%) 28 (4.2%) 667 (100.0%) 
 
 
Table 4.13 indicates that of 14 software vulnerabilities with a low level of criticality 
in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 8 (57.1%) had a 
software patch released between (1 to 100 days), while 3 (21%) had a software patch 
released between (201 to 300 days) and 1 (7%) had a software patch released 
between (401 to 500 days). However, 2 (14.3%) low level criticality software 
vulnerabilities had software patches released before the vendor informed date, hence, 
the response time in days is zero or a negative number of days. 
 
There are 195 medium level criticality software vulnerabilities in the total sample 
population of 667 software vulnerabilities for this study. The majority—147 
(75.4%)—of medium level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch 
released between (1 to 100 days). Eighteen (9.2%) medium level criticality software 
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vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (101 to 200 days), 7 (3.6%) 
medium level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released 
between (201 to 300 days) and 3 (1.5%) medium level criticality software 
vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (401 to 500 days). However, 
17 (8.7%) medium level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch 
released before the vendor informed date. 
 
Similarly, there are 139 high level criticality software vulnerabilities in the total 
sample population of 667 vendor informed software vulnerabilities for this study. 
The majority of high level criticality software vulnerabilities—88 (63.3%)—had a 
software patch released between (1 to 100 days); 19 (13.7%) high level criticality 
software vulnerabilities had a software patch released in (101 to 200 days); 13 
(9.4%) high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released 
between (201 to 300 days); 3 (2.2%) high level criticality software vulnerabilities 
had a software patch released between (301 to 400 days); 4 (2.9%) high level 
criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (401 to 500 
days); and 2 (1.4%) very high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software 
patch released between (501 to 2500 days). However, only 10 (8.7%) high level 
criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released before the vendor 
informed date. 
 
Furthermore, there are 319 very high level criticality software vulnerabilities in the 
total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities for this study: 134 (42.0%) 
very high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released 
between (1 to 100 days); 101 (31.7%) very high level criticality software 
vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (101 to 200 days); 30 (9.4%) 
very high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released 
between (201 to 300 days); 14 (4.4%) high level criticality software vulnerabilities 
had a software patch released between (301 to 400 days); 7 (2.2%) high level 
criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (401 to 500 
days); and 24 (7.5%) very high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a 
software patch released between (501 to 2500 days). However, only 9 (2.8%) very 
high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released before the 
vendor informed date. 
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Types of Software Vulnerability across Level of Criticality of Software 
Vulnerability 
 
Table 4.14 shows the distribution of types of software vulnerabilities across different 
levels of criticality.  
 
Table 4.14 Types of Software Vulnerability across Level of Criticality of Software 
Vulnerability 
Types of Software Vulnerability * Level of Criticality 
Types of Software Vulnerability 
Level of Criticality 
Total Low Medium High Very High 
 Authentication Issues 0 (0%) 4 (2.1%) 4 (2.9%) 3 (0.9%) 11 (1.6%)  
Buffer Errors 0 (0%) 4 (2.1%) 20 (14.4%) 173 (54.2%) 197 (29.5%) 
Code Injection 0 (0%) 2 (1.0%) 4 (2.9%) 35 (11.0%) 41 (6.1%) 
Configuration 0 (0%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.1%) 
Credentials Management 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.4%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.3%) 
Cryptographic Issues 0 (0%) 2 (1.0%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.3%) 3 (0.4%) 
CSRF 0 (0%) 1 (0.5%) 6 (4.3%) 1 (0.3%) 8 (1.2%) 
Design Errors 0 (0%) 3 (1.5%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.3%) 4 (0.6%) 
Format String Vulnerability 0 (0%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.3%) 2 (0.3%) 
Information Leak/Disclosure 1 (7.1%)  6 (3.1%) 2 (1.4%) 0 (0%) 9 (1.3%) 
Input Validation 1 (7.1%) 15 (7.7%) 8 (5.8%) 16 (5.0%) 40 (6.0%) 
Insufficient Information 1 (7.1%) 5 (2.6%) 8 (5.8%) 10 (3.1%) 24 (3.6%) 
Link Following 1 (7.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.1%) 
Numeric Errors 0 (7.1%) 3 (1.5%) 11 (7.9%) 35 (11.0%) 49 (7.3%) 
OS Command Injections 0 (7.1%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.9%) 3 (0.9%) 4 (0.6%) 
Other 2 (14.3%) 4 (2.1%) 2 (1.4%) 0 (0%) 8 (1.2%) 
Path Traversal 1 (7.1%) 12 (6.2%) 21 (15.1%) 3 (0.9%)  37 (5.5%) 
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control 0 (0%) 8 (4.1%) 15 (10.8%) 3 (0.9%) 26 (3.9%) 
Resource Management Errors 1 (7.1%) 4 (2.1%) 6 (4.3%) 34 (10.7%) 45 (6.7%) 
SQL Injection 0 (0%) 11 (5.6%) 28 (20.1%) 0 (0%) 39 (5.8%) 
XSS 6 (42.9%) 109 (55.9%) 1 (0.7%) 0 (0%) 116 (17.4%) 
Total 14 (2.1%) 195 (29.2%) 139 (20.8%) 319 (47.8%) 667 (100%) 
 
 
Buffer errors are the most representative critical software vulnerability in the total 
sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities for this study. One hundred and 
seventy-three buffer error software vulnerabilities are of a very high level of 
criticality, 20 are of a high level of criticality and 4 are of a medium level of 
criticality.  
 
Similarly, SQL injection is the second most representative software vulnerability. Of 
the 116 SQL injection software vulnerabilities, none are of a very high level of 
criticality, 1 has a high level of criticality, 109 have a medium level of criticality and 
6 have a low level of criticality. Likewise, numeric errors are the third most 
representative software vulnerability. Of 49 numeric errors software vulnerabilities, 
35 numeric errors are of a very high level of criticality, 11 are of a high level of 
criticality and 3 are of a medium level of criticality. 
- 86 - 
 
Similarly, resource management errors are the fourth most representative software 
vulnerability. Of the 45 resource management error software vulnerabilities, 34 are 
of a very high level of criticality, 6 are of a high level of criticality, 4 are of a 
medium level of criticality and 1 is a low level of criticality. Code injection is the 
fifth most representative software vulnerability. Of 41 code injection software 
vulnerabilities 35 are of a very high level of criticality, 4 are of a high level of 
criticality and 2 are of a medium level of criticality.  
 
Similarly, input validation is the sixth most representative software vulnerability. Of 
40 input validation software vulnerabilities, 16 are of a very high level of criticality, 
8 are of a high level of criticality, 15 are of a medium level of criticality and 1 is of 
low level of criticality. 
 
4.2.4 Response Time  
The response time is the dependent variable in the proposed research model in this 
study. As defined in chapter 1, response time is the amount of time taken to release a 
software patch based on when the software vendor is informed of a software 
vulnerability.  
 
This variable is measured in days as a ratio scale. Table 4.15 shows the distribution 
of response time for the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 4.15 Distribution of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time 
Response Time  
Response days Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
-1500 to 0 38 5.7 5.7 
1 to 100 377 56.5 62.2 
101 to 200 138 20.7 82.9 
201 to 300 53 7.9 90.9 
301 to 400 18 2.7 93.6 
401 to 500 15 2.2 95.8 
501 to 2500 28 4.2 100.0 
Total 667 100.0  
 
In table 4.15 the response time has been categorised into seven different categories  
(-1500 to 0, 1 to 100, 101 to 200, 201 to 300, 301 to 400, 401 to 500, 501 to 2500). 
In the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities for this study, software 
vendors had released software patches for 56.5 % software vulnerabilities between 1 
to 100 days; and released software patches for 20.7% software vulnerabilities 
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between 101 to 200 days.  Table 4.15 also shows that software vendors released 
software patches for 90% software vulnerabilities between 1 to 500 days. However, 
there are few instances of the release of software patches for software vulnerabilities 
that take less than 1 day (software patch released before the vendor is informed of the 
software vulnerability) and more than 500 days.  
 
Table 4.16 summarizes the results of descriptive statistics for the variable response 
time in days.  
 
Table 4.16 Descriptive Statistics for the Response Time  
Descriptive Statistics 
Response Time Statistic Std. Error 
Mean 110.55 7.410 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound 96.00  
Upper Bound 125.10  
5% Trimmed Mean 90.28  
Median 48.00  
Std. Deviation 191.364  
Skewness 2.967 .095 
Kurtosis 28.814 .189 
 
Table 4.16 shows that for the response time, the mean is 110.55 days, median is 
48.00 days and the standard deviation is 191.364 days. Similarly, skewness and 
kurtosis are 2.967 and 28.814 respectively, which present the shape of the 
distribution of the variable response time. From table 4.16 it can be observed that 
there is a large difference between mean and median; there is also a variation 
between mean and standard deviation. Likewise, skewness and kurtosis are not close 
to zero. This indicates that the distribution of the variable response time is not 
representative of a normal distribution (Field 2009; Hair et al. 2010).  
 
Similarly, figure 4.5 normal Q-Q plot and figure 4.6 box plot show that the 
distribution of the variable response time is not representative of a normal 
distribution.  From the normal Q-Q plot, it can be observed that the data points are 
highly deviated from the normal line. Likewise, from the box plot it can be observed 
that there are many outliers in the data set for the variable response time, which are 
illustrated with a circle and an asterisk (*) sign; and, also, median line is not in the 
middle of the box in the box plot graph. This also confirms that the variable response 
time is not representative of normal distribution. 
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Figure 4.6 Box Plot of the Response Time 
 
From the above descriptive statistics, normal Q-Q plot and box plot graphs for the 
response time indicate that the variable is peaked with severe kurtosis and a number 
of outliers, therefore, a natural log transformation is an appropriate technique to 
make the variable response time more representative of normal distribution 
(McCluskey &  Lalkhen 2007).   
Figure 4.5 Normal Q-Q Plot of the Response Time 
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Assumptions for conducting data transformation (Hair et al. 2010) in this study are as 
follows: 
 
 to correct violations of the statistical assumptions underlying the multivariate 
techniques (Multiple regression analysis) which are normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity; and 
 to improve the relationship (correlation) between variables.  
 
Table 4.17 summarizes the descriptive statistics after the transformation of the 
variable response time. Table 4.17 shows that the statistical value of the mean is very 
close to the median, and the standard deviation (.719) is within 3 times the upper and 
lower bound of mean value. Similarly, skewness and kurtosis are very close to zero. 
This indicates that the transformed variable response time is now much more 
representative of a normal distribution.  
 
Table 4.17 Results of Descriptive Statistics for the Variable Response Time after Log 
Transformation 
  
Descriptive Statistics 
Log(Response Time) Statistic Std. Error 
Mean 1.64 .028 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound 1.58  
Upper Bound 1.69  
5% Trimmed Mean 1.66  
Median 1.73  
Std. Deviation .719  
Skewness -.498 .096 
Kurtosis -.416 .191 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 shows a histogram of the variable response time after a natural log 
transformation.  
 
- 90 - 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Frequency Distribution of Log (Response Time) 
 
In figure 4.7, the mean 1.64 and standard deviation 0.719 on the top right corner 
shows that the data points (i.e. the variable response time) are distributed very close 
to mean. This suggests that the data in the variable response time is much more 
representative of normal distribution. 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the box plot of the variable response time after a natural log 
transformation. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Box plot of Log (Response Time) 
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In Figure 4.8, the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles are symmetrically arranged in the box 
plot. Similarly, the straight line inside the box plot indicates that the median is very 
close to mean. This also shows that after a natural log transformation, the variable 
response time is much more representative of a normal distribution. 
 
Figure 4.9 shows a normal Q-Q plot of the variable response time after a natural log 
transformation. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Normal Q-Q Plot of Log (Response Time) 
 
In figure 4.9, the transformation of the variable response time now is close to the 
normal straight line which indicates the transformed variable is much closer to a 
normal distribution.  
 
Response Time across Software Vendor Type 
Table 4.18 shows the distribution of different categories of response time across 
software vendor type.  
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Table 4.18 Response Time across Software Vendor Type 
Response Time * Software Vendor Type  
Response Time  
Software Vendor Type 
Total Proprietary Source Software vendor Open Source Software Vendor 
 -1500 to 0 12 (2.9%) 26 (10.4%) 38 (5.7%) 
1 to 100 183 (43.8%) 194 (77.9%) 377 (56.5%) 
101 to 200 116 (27.8%) 22 (8.8%) 138 (20.7%) 
201 to 300 50 (12.0%) 3 (1.2%) 53 (7.9%) 
301 to 400 17 (4.1%) 1 (0.4%) 18 (2.7%) 
401 to 500 13 (3.1%) 2 (0.8%) 15 (2.2%) 
501 to 2500 27 (6.5%) 1 (0.4%) 28 (4.2%) 
 Total 418 (100%) 249 (100%) 667 (100%) 
 
Table 4.18 shows that 56% of vendor informed software vulnerabilities software 
patches were released between (1 to 100 days) in the total sample population of 677 
vendor informed software vulnerabilities.  
 
Open source software vendors have a response time of between (1 to 100 days) to 
release a software patch for 77.9% of open source vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities. Open source software vendors have a response time of between (101 
and 200 days) to release a software patch for 8.8% of open source vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities. Software vulnerabilities which have software patches 
released above 200 days account for only 7 open source vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities. Software vulnerabilities which have negative response times for 
releasing software patches account for 10.4% of open source vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities.  
 
In contrast, proprietary source software vendors have a response time of between (1 
to 100 days) to release software patches for 43.8% of proprietary source vendor 
informed software vulnerabilities. Proprietary source software vendors have a 
response time of between (101 to 200 days) to release a software patch for 27.8% of 
proprietary source vendor informed software vulnerabilities. Proprietary source 
software vendors have a response time of between (201 to 300 days) to release a 
software patch for 12% of proprietary source vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities. Software vulnerabilities which have software patches released above 
300 days account for only 57 (13.7%) of proprietary source vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities.  Software vulnerabilities which have negative response 
times for releasing software patches account for 2.9% of proprietary source vendor 
informed software vulnerabilities. 
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Overall, open source software vendors have released software patches for 86.7% of 
open source vendor informed software vulnerabilities between (1 to 200 days); 
compared to proprietary source software vendors who released software patches for 
71.6% of proprietary source vendor informed software vulnerabilities between (1 and 
200 days). This finding lends support for the notion that software patches for open 
source software are released quicker than for proprietary source software. 
 
Response Time across Software Type 
Table 4.19 shows the distribution of different categories of response time to release 
software patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities across software type.  
 
Table 4.19 Response Time across Software Type 
Response Time * Software Type  
Response Time  
Software Type 
Total Application Software Operating system software 
 -1500 to 0  36 (5.9%) 2 (3.6%) 38 (5.7%) 
1 to 100  353 (57.8%) 24 (42.9%)  377 (56.5%) 
101 to 200  127 (20.8%) 11 (19.6%) 138 (20.7%) 
201 to 300  43 (7.0%) 10 (17.9%) 53 (7.9%) 
301 to 400  14 (2.3%) 4 (7.1%) 18 (2.7%) 
401 to 500  13 (2.1%) 2 (3.6%) 15 (2.2%) 
501 to 2500  25 (4.1%) 3 (5.4%) 28 (4.2%) 
Total  611 (100%) 56 (100%) 667 (100%) 
 
 
Table 4.19 shows that while the overall percentages are similar for each category of 
response time, the comparative percentages of vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities for application software and operating system software are different.  
 
For 57.8% of application software vulnerabilities, software patches are released in 1 
to 100 days, 20.8% in 101 to 200 days and 2% in above 500 days; whereas 5.9% of 
software patches for application software vulnerabilities have negative response 
times as the software patch is released before the vendor informed date (0 to -500 
days).  
 
In contrast, 42.9% of operating system related software vulnerabilities software  
patches have been released in 1 to 100 days, 19.6% in 101 to 200 days, 17.9% in  
201 to 300 days, 7.1% in 301 to 400 days, 3.69% in 401 to 500 days, and 5.4% in 
above 500 days.  For software patches for operating system software vulnerabilities 
3.6% have negative response times as the software patch is released before the 
vendor informed date (0 to -500 days). 
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Overall, for 78.6% of application software vulnerabilities, software patches are 
released in 1 to 200 days compared to 62.5% for operating system software 
vulnerabilities for which software patches are released in 1 to 200 days. This would 
suggest that software patches for application software vulnerabilities are overall 
released slightly quicker than software patches for operating system software 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Types of Software Vulnerability across Response Time  
Table 4.20 shows the distribution of the different types of software vulnerabilities 
across the different categories of response time.  
 
Table 4.20 Types of Software Vulnerability across Response Time  
Types of Software Vulnerability * Response Time  
Types of Software 
Vulnerability 
Response Time  
Total 
-1500 
 to 
 0 
1 
 to 
 100 
101 
 to  
200 
201  
to  
300 
301 
 to  
400 
401  
to  
500 
501 
 to  
2500 
 Authentication Issues 1(9.1%) 6 (54.5%) 1 (9.1%) 1 (9.1%) 2 (18.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 11 (100.0%) 
Buffer Errors 4 (2.0%) 87 (44.2%) 57 (28.9%) 20 (10.2%) 7 (3.6%) 2 (1.0%) 20 (10.2%) 197 (100.0%) 
Code Injection 2 (4.9%) 11 (26.8%) 18 (43.9%) 5 (12.2%) 4 (9.8%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (2.4%) 41 (100.0%) 
Configuration 0 (0.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (100.0%) 
Credentials Management 0(0.0%) 2 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (100.0%) 
Cryptographic Issues 0 (0.0%) 2 (66.7%) 1 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (100.0%) 
CSRF 0 (0.0%) 6 (75.0%) 1 (12.5%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (12.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (100.0%) 
Design Errors 1 (25.0%) 2 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (25.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (100.0%) 
Format String Vulnerability 0 (0.0%) 2 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (100.0%) 
Information Leak/Disclosure 1 (11.1%) 5 (55.6%) 1 (11.1%) 2 (22.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 9 (100.0%) 
Input Validation 6 (15.0%) 23 (57.5%) 2 (5.0%) 4 (10.0%) 1 (2.5%) 3 (7.5%) 1 (2.5%) 40 (100.0%) 
Insufficient Information 1 (4.2%) 9 (37.5%) 8 (33.3%) 3 (12.5%) 1 (4.2%) 1 (4.2%) 1 (4.2%) 24 (100.0%) 
Link Following 0 (0.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (100.0%) 
Numeric Errors 3 (6.1%) 26 (53.1%) 12 (24.5%) 2 (4.1%) 1 (2.0%) 3 (6.1%) 2 (4.1%) 49 (100.0%) 
OS Command Injections 0 (0.0%) 4 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (100.0%) 
Other 2 (25.0%) 4 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (25.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (100.0%) 
Path Traversal 2 (5.4%) 30 (81.1%) 2 (5.4%) 1 (2.7%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (2.7%) 1 (2.7%) 37 (100.0%) 
Permissions, Privileges, and 
Access Control 
1 (3.8%) 19 (73.1%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (7.7%) 1 (3.8%) 3 (11.5%) 0 (0.0%) 26 (100.0%) 
Resource Management Errors 2 (4.4%) 17 (37.8%) 19 (13.8%) 5 (42.2%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (2.2%) 1 (2.2%) 45 (100.0%) 
SQL Injection 5 (12.8%) 34 (87.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 39 (100.0%) 
XSS 7 (6.0%) 86 (74.1%) 16 (11.6%) 5 (4.3%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.9%) 1 (0.9%) 116 (100.0%) 
Total 38 (5.7%) 377 (56.5%) 138 (20.7%) 53 (7.9%) 18 (2.7%) 15 (2.2%) 28 (4.2%) 667 (100%) 
 
 
From the total sample population of 667 (100%) software vulnerabilities, table 4.20 
shows that the most commonly released software patches for vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities are buffer errors 197 (29.5%), followed by cross site 
scripting (XSS) 116 (17.4%), numeric errors 49 (7.3%), resource management errors 
45 (6.7%) and code injection 41 (6.1%) across the different response time categories.  
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Only 4 (2.0%) of buffer errors software vulnerabilities are patched before vendor 
informed date and hence have a negative response time; whereas 87 (44.2%) of 
buffer errors software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 100 
days), 57 (28.9%) in (101 to 200 days), 20 (10.2%) in (201 to 300 days), 7 (3.6%) in 
(301 to 400 days), 2 (1.0%) in (401 to 500 days) and 20 (10.2 %) in (above 501 
days).  
 
Similarly, only 7 (6.0%) of cross site scripting (XSS) software vulnerabilities are 
patched before vendor informed date and hence have a negative response time; 
whereas 86 (74.1%) of cross site scripting (XSS) software vulnerabilities have 
software patches released in (1 to 100 days), 16 (11.6%) in (101 to 200 days), 5 
(4.3%) in (201 to 300 days), none in (301 to 400 days), 1 (0.9%) in (401 to 500 days) 
and 1 (0.9 %) in above 501 days.   
 
Only 3 (6.1%) of numeric software vulnerabilities are patched before vendor 
informed date and hence have a negative response time; whereas 26 (53.1%) of 
numeric software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 100 days), 
12 (24.5%) in (101 to 200 days), 2 (4.1%) in (201 to 300 days), 1 (2.0%) in (301 to 
400 days), 3 (6.1%) in (401 to 500 days) and 2 (4.1%) in above 501 days.   
 
Only 2 (4.4%) of resource management software vulnerabilities are patched before 
vendor informed date and hence have a negative response time; whereas 17 (37.8%) 
of resource management software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 
to 100 days), 19 (13.8%) in (101 to 200 days), 5 (42.2%) in (201 to 300 days), none 
in (301 to 400 days), 1 (2.2%) in (401 to 500 days) and 1 (2.2 %) in above 501 days.  
 
Only 2 (4.9%) of code injection software vulnerabilities are patched before vendor 
informed date and hence have a negative response time; whereas 11 (26.8%) of code 
injection software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 100 days), 
18 (43.9%) in (101 to 200 days), 5 (12.2%) in (201 to 300 days), 4 (9.8%) in (301 to 
400 days), none in (401 to 500 days) and 1 (2.4 %) in above 501 days. 
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Types of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time for Open Source 
Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities 
 
Table 4.21 shows the distribution of different types of software vulnerabilities across 
the different categories of response time for open source vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 4.21 Types of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time for Open Source 
Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities 
Types of Software Vulnerability * Response Time for Open Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities 
Types of Software 
Vulnerability 
Response Time for Open Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities 
Total 
-1500  
to  
0 
1  
to  
100 
101  
to  
200 
201 
 to  
300 
301 
 to  
400 
401  
to  
500 
501 
 to  
2500 
 Authentication Issues 0 (.0%) 4 (80.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (20.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 5 (100.0%) 
Buffer Errors 3 (8.1%) 28 (75.7%) 6 (16.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 37 (100.0%) 
Code Injection 0 (.0%) 3 (60.0%) 2 (40.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 5 (100.0%) 
Configuration 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 
Cryptographic Issues 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 
Design Errors 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 
Information Leak/Disclosure 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 
Input Validation 0 (.0%) 11(100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 11 (100.0%) 
Insufficient Information 0 (.0%) 6 (40.0%) 5 (33.3%) 3 (20.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (6.7%) 15 (100.0%) 
Link Following 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 
Numeric Errors 3 (15.8%) 12 (63.2%) 3 (15.8%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (5.3%) 0 (.0%) 19 (100.0%) 
Other 1 (25.0%) 3 (75.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 4 (100.0%) 
Path Traversal 0 (.0%) 24 (96.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (4.0%) 0 (.0%) 25 (100.0%) 
Permissions, Privileges, and 
Access Control 
1 (12.5%) 7 (87.5%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 8 (100.0%) 
Resource Management Errors 0 (.0%) 9 (90.0%) 1 (10.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 10 (100.0%) 
SQL Injection 0 (.0%) 31(100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 31 (100.0%) 
XSS 2 (2.7%) 67 (90.5%) 5 (6.8%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 74 (100.0%) 
Total 10 (4.0%) 210(84.3%) 22 (8.8%) 3 (1.2%) 1 (.4%) 2 (.8%) 1 (.4%) 249(100.0%) 
 
 
In the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 249 software 
vulnerabilities are in the open source software vendor category in this study. Table 
4.21 shows the distribution of response times of open source vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities. The most common open source vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities in the following order are Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 74; followed by 
buffer errors 37; SQL injection 31; path traversal 25; and numeric errors 19. 
 
For the 74 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) software vulnerabilities, 97% of software 
patches are released in 1 to 200 days. For 37 buffer errors software vulnerabilities, 
92% of software patches are released in 1 to 200 days. For 31 SQL injection software 
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vulnerabilities, 100% of software patches are released in 1 to 100 days. For 25 path 
traversal software vulnerabilities, 96% of software patches are released in 1 to 100 
days. For 19 numeric errors software vulnerabilities, 79% of software patches are 
released in 1 to 200 days. 
 
Overall, for 249 software vulnerabilities in the open source software vendor 
category, 84% of software patches are released in 1 to 100 days. 
Types of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time for Proprietary Source 
Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities 
 
Table 4.22 shows the distribution of different types of software vulnerabilities across 
the different categories of response time for proprietary source vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 4.22 Types of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time for Proprietary 
Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities 
Types of Software Vulnerability * Response Time for Proprietary Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities 
Types of Software 
Vulnerability 
Response Time for Proprietary Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities 
Total 
-1500  
to  
0 
1  
to  
100 
101  
to  
200 
201 
 to  
300 
301  
to  
400 
401  
to  
500 
501 
 to 
 2500 
 Authentication Issues 0 (.0%) 3 (50.0%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 6 (100.0%) 
Buffer Errors 0 (.0%) 60 (37.5%) 51 (31.9%) 20(12.5%) 7 (4.4%) 2 (1.3%) 20(12.5%) 160(100.0%) 
Code Injection 1 (2.8%) 9 (25.0%) 16 (44.4%) 5 (13.9%) 4 (11.1%) 0 (.0%) 1 (2.8%) 36 (100.0%) 
Credentials Management 0 (.0%) 2 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (100.0%) 
Cryptographic Issues 0 (.0%) 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (100.0%) 
CSRF 0 (.0%) 6 (75.0%) 1 (12.5%) 0 (.0%) 1 (12.5%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 8 (100.0%) 
Design Errors 0 (.0%) 2 (66.7%) 0 (.0%) 1 (33.3%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 3 (100.0%) 
Format String Vulnerability 0 (.0%) 2 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (100.0%) 
Information Leak/Disclosure 0 (.0%) 5 (62.5%) 1 (12.5%) 2 (25.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 8 (100.0%) 
Input Validation 3 (10.3%) 15 (51.7%) 2 (6.9%) 4 (13.8%) 1 (3.4%) 3 (10.3%) 1 (3.4%) 29 (100.0%) 
Insufficient Information 0 (.0%) 4 (44.4%) 3 (33.3%) 0 (.0%) 1 (11.1%) 1 (11.1%) 0 (.0%) 9 (100.0%) 
Numeric Errors 0 (.0%) 14 (46.7%) 9 (30.0%) 2 (6.7%) 1 (3.3%) 2 (6.7%) 2 (6.7%) 30 (100.0%) 
OS Command Injections 0 (.0%) 4 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 4 (100.0%) 
Other 1 (25.0%) 1 (25.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (50.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 4 (100.0%) 
Path Traversal 0 (.0%) 8 (66.7%) 2 (16.7%) 1 (8.3%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (8.3%) 12 (100.0%) 
Permissions, Privileges, and 
Access Control 
0 (.0%) 12 (66.7%) 0 (.0%) 2 (11.1%) 1 (5.6%) 3 (16.7%) 0 (.0%) 18 (100.0%) 
Resource Management Errors 1 (2.9%) 9 (25.7%) 18 (51.4%) 5 (14.3%) 0 (.0%) 1 (2.9%) 1 (2.9%) 35 (100.0%) 
SQL Injection 0 (.0%) 8 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 8 (100.0%) 
XSS 1 (2.4%) 23 (54.8%) 11 (26.2%) 5 (11.9%) 0 (.0%) 1 (2.4%) 1 (2.4%) 42 (100.0%) 
Total 7 (1.7%) 188(45.0%) 116(27.8%) 50(12.0%) 17 (4.1%) 13 (3.1%) 27 (6.5%) 418(100.0%) 
 
In the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 418 software 
vulnerabilities are in the proprietary source software vendor category in this study. 
Table 4.22 shows the distribution of response times of proprietary source software 
vendors for vendor informed software vulnerabilities. The most common proprietary 
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source software vulnerabilities in the following order are buffer errors 160; followed 
by Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 42; code injection 36; resource management errors 35; 
and input validation 29. 
 
For the 160 buffer errors software vulnerabilities, the breakup of response times in 
releasing software patches shows that 86% of software patches are released in 1 to 
400 days. For 42 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) software vulnerabilities, 93% of 
software patches are released in 1 to 300 days. For 36 code injection software 
vulnerabilities, 94% of software patches are released in 1 to 400 days. For 35 
resource management software vulnerabilities, 91% of software patches are released 
in 1 to 300 days. For 29 input validation software vulnerabilities, 72% of software 
patches are released in 1 to 300 days. 
 
Overall, for the 418 software vulnerabilities in proprietary source software vendor 
category, 84% of software patches are released in 1 to 300 days. 
 
Level of Criticality across Response Time  
Table 4.23 shows the mean value for the response time across the different levels of 
criticality of software vulnerabilities. Table 4.23 shows that software vendors have 
the longest response time in releasing a software patch for software vulnerabilities 
with a very high level of criticality, and have the shortest response time for software 
vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality. Software vendors have also taken a 
longer response time to release a software patch for low level of criticality software 
vulnerabilities compared to medium level and high level of criticality software 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 4.23 Level of Criticality across Response Time  
Level of Criticality across Response Time  
Level of Criticality 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 14 97.31 135.840 36.305 18.88 175.74 0 413 
Medium 195 55.42 195.267 13.983 27.84 83.00 -1050 2225 
High 139 83.54 138.459 11.744 60.32 106.76 -716 577 
Very High 319 156.60 200.107 11.204 134.56 178.64 -697 1173 
Total 667 110.55 191.364 7.410 96.00 125.10 -1050 2225 
 
Table 4.23, shows that software vendors‘ response time in releasing software patches 
for low level of criticality software vulnerabilities is slower than medium and high 
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level of criticality of software vulnerabilities. Similarly, software vendors‘ response 
time in releasing software patches for medium level of criticality software 
vulnerabilities is the quickest and software vendors‘ response time in releasing 
software patches for very high level of criticality software vulnerabilities is the 
slowest.  
 
4.3 Testing Underlying Regression Assumptions  
In order to ensure the assumptions of multiple regression analysis have been met, it is 
necessary to check whether the conditions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity are met.  
 
Figure 4.10 shows the relationship between the regression standard residuals and the 
regression standardised predicted values.  
 
 
Figure 4.10 Scatter Plot of Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
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Figure 4.10 shows that there is no clear relationship between the regression standard 
residuals and the regression standardised predicted values, which means the scatter 
plot of residuals against predicted values is consistent with the assumption of 
linearity. 
 
Similarly, figure 4.11 shows the normal P-P plot of regression standardised residuals 
and figure 4.12 shows the histogram of regression standardised residual.  
 
 
Figure 4. 11 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardised Residual 
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Figure 4. 12 Histogram of Regression Standardised Residual 
 
Similarly, figure 4.11 (Normal plot of regression standardised residuals) and figure 
4.12 (Histogram of regression standardised residual) for the dependent variable 
(Response time) also indicate a relatively normal distribution because the most 
observed residual points lie on the normal distribution line and regression standard 
residuals appears to follow a bell-shaped curve respectively.  
Table 4.24 shows the normality test for the proposed regression model. 
 
Table 4.24 Normality Test for the Proposed Model  
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .552a .304 .301 .601 .304 94.253 3 646 .000 1.362 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Type of Software, Type of Software Vendor, Level of Criticality 
b. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time) 
 
 
To meet the assumptions of the normality of the regression model, the residuals 
terms should be uncorrelated or independent for any two observations. This 
assumption is tested using a Durbin-Watson test. Table 4.24 shows the value of the 
Durbin-Watson test for the regression model. The closer the value of the Durbin-
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Watson test is to 2, the better the multiple regression models meets the assumptions 
of independent errors; and for this proposed regression model the value is 1.362—
which meets the assumption of linearity. 
Table 4.25 and table 4.26 below show the residual statistics for any extreme cases 
which may be an outlier, < ±2 and <±3 respectively, in the multiple regression 
analysis in the proposed model.  
 
Table 4.25 Test for any Extreme Cases which may be an Outlier < ±2 
Casewise Diagnosticsb 
Case Number Std. Residual Log (Response Time)  Predicted Value Residual Status 
43 2.207 3 1.26 1.325  
59 -3.061 0 1.84 -1.839  
60 -3.061 0 1.84 -1.839  
105 -2.123 0 1.58 -1.275  
109 -2.166 1 2.26 -1.301  
130 -2.352 0 1.41 -1.412  
134 -2.472 0 1.96 -1.485  
135 -2.472 0 1.96 -1.485  
136 -3.007 0 1.81 -1.806  
154 -3.061 0 1.84 -1.839  
159 2.115 3 1.47 1.270  
161 2.483 2 .98 1.491  
211 2.229 3 1.26 1.339  
215 -2.513 0 1.99 -1.509  
216 -2.513 0 1.99 -1.509  
284 -3.307 0 1.99 -1.987  
305 2.062 2 1.00 1.239  
425 -2.106 0 1.26 -1.265  
465 2.949 3 1.58 1.771  
492 -2.106 0 1.26 -1.265  
544 -2.560 0 1.84 -1.538  
547 -2.806 0 1.99 -1.685  
567 2.271 2 1.06 1.364  
591 -2.259 0 1.62 -1.357  
667 -2.218 0 1.63 -1.332  
a. Missing Case 
b. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time  
    
 
 
 
Table 4.26 Test for any Extreme Cases which may be an Outlier <±3 
Casewise Diagnosticsa 
Case Number Std. Residual Log (Response Time) Predicted Value Residual 
59 -3.061 0 1.84 -1.839 
60 -3.061 0 1.84 -1.839 
136 -3.007 0 1.81 -1.806 
154 -3.061 0 1.84 -1.839 
284 -3.307 0 1.99 -1.987 
a. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)  
 
Residual statistics in the multiple regression analysis should also be examined for 
any extreme cases. In a normal sample, it is expected that 95% of cases will have 
standardized residuals within ±2 (Field 2009). With a sample of 667 software 
vulnerabilities, it is reasonable to expect about 5% (33 cases) to have standardised 
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residuals outside these limits. From the case-wise diagnostics (table 4.25) produced 
by SPSS, there are 25 (3.75%) cases that are outside the limits. Therefore, the 
research sample is within the expected normal range, with very few outlier cases. In 
addition to that, if 99% of cases should have standardised residuals within ±3, it is 
expected that only 1% of cases should be outside of these limits. From table 4.26, it 
is clear that 5 (0.75 %) cases lie outside the limits. This gives no real cause for 
concern of any possible outliers that may influence regression parameters because 
none of the cases have a standardised residual greater than 3.5. Therefore, the above 
sample appears to confirm what is expected for a reasonably accurate model. 
Subsequently, the value of R
2 
=0.301 and the level of significant of 0.000 in table 
4.24 indicates that the multiple regression model is highly significant and reasonably 
accurate as well. 
 
4.4 Multiple Regression Result Analysis 
Figure 4.13 shows the multiple regression model that was formulated to test the 
proposed hypotheses listed in chapter 2, section 2.15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In figure 4.13, dependent variable is the response time of a software vendor in 
releasing a software patch for a software vulnerability. The independent variables 
are:  
Figure 4.13 Multiple Regression Model for this Proposed Study 
H1 + 
H2 + 
H3 + 
Level of Criticality of 
Software Vulnerability 
 
Type of Software Vendor 
3. Open Source Software 
Vendors   
4. Proprietary Source 
Software Vendors 
Type of Software 
1. Operating System Software  
2. Application Software 
 
 
      
      Response Time 
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(1) Level of criticality of software vulnerability;  
(2) Software vendor type (Open source software vendor, Proprietary source 
software vendor); and  
(3) The type of software (Operating system software, Application software).  
 
Table 4.27 provides a summary of the results of multiple regression analysis. This 
table shows that all three independent variables (the level of criticality, type of 
software and type of software vendor) together explain 30 percent of the variance 
(R
2
) in the dependent variable (response time). The value of adjusted R
2 
is 0.301, F 
(3,646) value is 94.253 and the level of significance P<0.000. 
 
 
 
Table 4.28 provides the approximate parameters of the multiple regression model 
tested. As shown in table 4.27, the overall goodness of fit of the multiple regression 
model was assessed using the F-value and was found to be statistically significant at 
p<0.05 (F (3,646) = 94.253, p<0.05, R
2 =
 0.304, R
2
adj = 0.301) (Rokkan &  Buvik 
2003). The goodness of fit of the multiple regression model is very important 
because with multiple regression analysis it is mandatory that all the predictors 
(constant and independent variables) be taken into account simultaneously to 
establish the statistical significance of the overall model (Brown &  Churchill 2009). 
 
Table 4.27 Summary of Proposed Model Test 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .552a .304 .301 .601 .304 94.253 3 646 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Level of Criticality, Type of Software, Type of Software Vendor 
b. Dependent Variable:  Log (Response Time)  
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Table 4.28 Coefficients Test of Independent Variables in the Proposed Research 
Model 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
 Constant (b0) 1.223 .097  12.653 .000      
Type of Software Vendor (Svt) -.574 .052 -.387(***) -10.946 .000 -.487 -.396 -.359 .862 1.159 
Type of Software (Ts) .211 .086 .082(**) 2.467 .014 .140 .097 .081 .983 1.017 
Level of Criticality (Csv) .082 .011 .256(***) 7.191 .000 .410 .272 .236 .852 1.174 
a. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)  
 
R
2 
= 0.304    R
2
adj=0.301  F (3,646) = 94.253 
 
Predictors: (Constant), Type of Software, Type of Software Vendor, Level of 
Criticality 
Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)  
** = Significant at p<0.05 (two tailed), *** Significant at p<0.01 (one tailed) 
 
Table 4.28 also shows the tolerance value and variance inflation factor (VIF) for 
each independent variable used to check for multi-collinearity among the three 
independent variables. According to O‘Brien (2007), a value of tolerance less than 
0.20 and a value of VIF 10 or above indicates a multi-collinearity problem. However, 
in this regression analysis, the value of tolerance for each independent variable is 
greater than 0.20 and the value of VIF for each independent variable is smaller than 
10. This indicates that there are no multi-collinearity problems in this multiple 
regression analysis. 
 
The multiple regression model was tested using F-statistic and found to be significant 
in this study (see table 4.27). The value of R
2
adj=0.301 which is interpreted as 30% of 
the variance in the response time in days can be explained with the multiple 
regression model and the rest of the other variables have an additional impact on the 
response time. Similarly, the value of R
2 
= 0.304 which is referred to as a coefficient 
of multiple determination can also be interpreted as follows (Brown et al. 2009, p. 
604): it means that 30% of the variation in the dependent variable, the response time, 
is associated with variation in independent variables (type of software vendor, type 
of software and the level of the criticality of software vulnerability). Though table 
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4.28 shows that the type of software adds very little to improving the fitness of the 
multiple regression line, it can be inferred that there is an association between the 
type of software and the response time in releasing software patches. 
 
Analysis of the relationship between the three independent variables and the 
dependent variable from table 4.28 shows: 
 
 A strong positive relationship between the level of criticality of software 
vulnerabilities; and the response time indicates that software vendors increase 
their response time to release software patches with the increase in the level 
of criticality of a software vulnerability at the 0.01 significance level (one–
tailed). 
However, for a single positive result it is not possible to show whether the 
longer response time for both high and low level of criticality of software 
vulnerability and shorter response time for medium level of criticality of 
software vulnerability is supported as stated in H1. Therefore, the level of 
criticality has split into three levels—low, medium and high—and a multiple 
regression model (MRA) was run for each level to determine the actual 
relationship between each level of software vulnerability and the software 
vendor response time (see Appendix A). 
The MRA test for each level of criticality shows that high level and low level 
of criticality of software vulnerability have a positive relationship with the 
response time. This indicates the longer response time to release software 
patches for high level and low level of criticality of software vulnerability at 
the 0.01 significance level (one–tailed) for high level; and at the 0.754 
insignificance level for low level. The result shows insignificance for low 
level of criticality because the number of vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities with low level of criticality is only 14 in the total sample 
population of 667 software vulnerabilities (see Table 4.5 sub section 4.2.3). 
Similarly, the distribution of low level of criticality to the type of software is: 
1 for operating system software and 13 for application software (see Table 
4.10 sub section 4.2.3). Further, the distribution of low level of criticality to 
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the type of software vendor is: 6 for proprietary source software vendor and 8 
for open source software vendor (see Table 4.7 sub section 4.2.3). 
Conversely, medium level of criticality of software vulnerability has a 
negative relationship with the response time at the 0.01 significance level 
(one–tailed). This indicates a shorter response time to release software 
patches for medium level of criticality of software vulnerability (see 
Appendix A). 
 A strong negative relationship between type of software vendor and the 
response time indicates that proprietary source software vendors take a longer 
response time to release a software patch than open source software vendors 
at the 0.01significance level (one–tailed). 
 A positive relationship between type of software and the response time 
indicates that releasing patches for application software vulnerabilities is 
quicker than releasing patches for operating system software at the 0.05 
significance level (two–tailed). 
 
The resulting multiple regression model developed from this research is shown in 
figure 4.14: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
b3= 0.26 
 
b1= - 0.39 
 
b2= 0.08 
 
Level of Criticality of 
Software Vulnerability 
 
Type of Software Vendor 
1. Open Source Software 
Vendors   
2. Proprietary Source 
Software Vendors 
Type of Software 
1. Operating System Software  
2. Application Software 
 
 
       
    Response Time 
Figure 4.14 The Resulting Multiple Regression Model 
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To summarize the multiple regression model shown in figure 4.14, the individual 
beta coefficients corresponding to the predictor variables (independent variables) in 
the regression model can be interpreted as the average change in the appropriate 
predictor variable while holding the other predictor variables constant or unchanged. 
The following interpretations of the individual beta coefficient in relation to the 
hypothesis are summarized as follows:  
 
The Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability 
H1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium 
level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low 
and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software 
vulnerability. 
 
b3 = 0.256 indicates that, on average, an increase of 0.256 in the response time can be 
expected with a unit increase in the level of criticality of a vendor informed software 
vulnerability if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged (i.e. 
constant). This indicates that software vendors increase their response time to release 
software patches with the increase in the level of criticality of a software 
vulnerability.  
 
As per test of H1, MRA was run individually for low, medium and high levels of 
criticality of software vulnerabilities and identified beta coefficient for low level (bl = 
0.12), medium level (bm = -0.18) and high level (bh = 0.22) of criticality of software 
vulnerabilities (see Appendix A for full results of these three MRA).  
 
Where bl is beta coefficient for low level of criticality of software vulnerability, bm is 
beta coefficient for medium level of criticality of software vulnerability and bh is beta 
coefficient for high level of criticality of software vulnerability. 
 
The beta coefficient for low level of criticality (bl = 0.12) indicates that, on average, 
an increase of 0.12 in the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the 
level of criticality toward the lowest level of criticality of vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged 
(i.e. constant). 
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The beta coefficient for medium level of criticality (bm = -0.18) indicates that, on 
average, a decrease of 0.18 in the response time can be expected with a unit decrease 
in the level of criticality toward the medium level of criticality of vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept 
unchanged (i.e. constant). 
 
The beta coefficient for high level of criticality (bh = 0.22) indicates that, on average, 
an increase of 0.22 in the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the 
level of criticality toward the highest level of criticality of vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged 
(i.e. constant). 
 
Table 4.23 (sub section 4.2.4) shows the variation of response time mean values 
across the levels of criticality. Table 4.23 shows that the response time is longer for 
software vulnerabilities with very high, high and low level of criticality; and shorter 
for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality.  
 
 
Open Source versus Proprietary Source Software Vendor 
H2: Open source software vendors release patches for open source software 
vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for 
proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been 
informed to the software vendor. 
 
b1 = -0.387 indicates that open source software vendors are 39% quicker in releasing 
software patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities than proprietary source 
software vendors if type of software and the level of criticality of software 
vulnerability are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).  
 
Table 4.29 shows the average response time to release a software patch for 
proprietary source software vendors versus open source software vendors. 
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Table 4.29 Response Time across Software Vendor Type 
 
 
 
The mean value presented in table 4.29 shows that, overall, open source software 
vendors have a shorter response time in releasing a software patch compared to 
proprietary source software vendors. 
 
Operating System Software versus Application Software 
H3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly 
than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability 
has been informed to software vendors. 
 
b2 = 0.082 indicates that patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are 
released 8% slower than patches of application software if type of software vendor 
and the level of criticality of software vulnerability are kept unchanged (i.e. 
constant). 
 
Table 4.30 shows the average response time to release a software patch for 
application software versus operating system software. 
 
Table 4.30 Response Time across Software Type 
 
 
 
 
The mean value presented in table 4.30 shows that the response time to release 
patches for operating system software vulnerabilities is longer than the response time 
to release software patches for application software vulnerabilities for vendor 
informed software vulnerabilities. 
 
From table 4.30 it can be noted that the number of operating system software 
vulnerabilities is 56 compared to 611 application software vulnerabilities in the total 
sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities. The number of operating system 
Group Statistics 
 Software Vendor Type  N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Response Time  Proprietary Source Software Vendor 418 155.95 216.860 10.607 
Open Source Software vendor 249 34.33 99.799 6.325 
Group Statistics 
 Software Type  N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Response Time Application Software 611 105.64 193.421 7.825 
Operating System Software 56 164.10 159.120 21.263 
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software vulnerabilities is less than 10% of the total sample population. Therefore, 
results of the hypothesis test H3 in this study should be treated with caution as the 
results may be unreliable. 
 
4.4.1 Discussion of Results of Hypothesis Tests 
The beta coefficient, the level of significance and other descriptive statistics 
discussed in this chapter determine the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses 
investigated in this study. Table 4.31 shows the summary of the hypotheses tested in 
the proposed research model. 
 
Table 4.31 Summary of Hypotheses Tests and Results 
Hypotheses Results 
H1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a 
shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the 
vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability 
Supported 
H2: Open source software vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities more 
quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the 
software vulnerability has been informed to software vendor 
Supported 
H3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly than patches for 
application software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been informed to software 
vendor 
Not Supported 
 
The Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability 
 
Hypothesis H1 states: 
H1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium 
level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low 
and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software 
vulnerability: (Supported) 
 
The beta coefficient (b3 = 0.256) indicates that, on average, an increase of 0.256 in 
the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the level of criticality of a 
vendor informed software vulnerability if type of software vendor and type of 
software are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).  
 
The beta coefficient for low level of criticality (bl = 0.12) indicates that, on average, 
an increase of 0.12 in the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the 
level of criticality toward the lowest level of criticality of a vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged 
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(i.e. constant). 
 
The beta coefficient for medium level of criticality (bm = -0.18) indicates that, on 
average, a decrease of 0.18 in the response time can be expected with a unit decrease 
in the level of criticality toward the medium level of criticality of a vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept 
unchanged (i.e. constant). 
 
The beta coefficient for high level of criticality (bh = 0.22) indicates that, on average, 
an increase of 0.22 in the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the 
level of criticality toward the highest level of criticality of a vendor informed 
software vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept 
unchanged (i.e. constant). 
 
Table 4.13 (sub section 4.2.3) shows that 75% of medium level criticality software 
vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 100 days), 77% of high level 
criticality software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 200 days), 
73% of very high level criticality software vulnerabilities have software patches 
released in (1 to 200 days) and 78% of low criticality software vulnerabilities have 
software patches released in (1 to 300 days). The results show that software vendors 
take a shorter response time to release patches for software vulnerabilities with a 
medium level of criticality than for software vulnerabilities with low and high levels 
of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerabilities. 
 
Similarly, Table 4.23 (sub section 4.2.4) shows that the medium level of criticality of 
software vulnerabilities have the shortest response time. From medium to very high 
level of criticality of software vulnerability, software vendors are increasing the 
response time with the increase in the level of criticality of software vulnerability. 
Similarly, for medium level to low level of criticality of software vulnerability, 
software vendors are increasing the response time with the decrease in the level of 
criticality of software vulnerability. This also suggests that software vendors release 
patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter 
response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality 
once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability. 
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Similarly, as shown in table 4.13 (sub section 4.2.3) and table 4.23 (sub section 
4.2.4), software vendors are taking a shorter response time to release software 
patches for the software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality compared 
with low and high level of criticality software vulnerabilities. This finding can be 
explained by the existing literature because, in reality, low level of criticality 
software vulnerabilities are not considered a high priority, while it may be more 
difficult to develop and release a patch for very high criticality software 
vulnerabilities (Gordon et al. 2002; Tanaka et al. 2005). Gordon‘s economic model 
of software security investment suggests that the response time of software vendors 
in releasing software patches is an optimisation decision where medium level of 
criticality of software vulnerabilities are the most optimal for software vendors to 
develop and release patches; whereas low level and high level of criticality software 
vulnerabilities are less optimal to develop and release patches for software 
vulnerabilities (Gordon et al. 2002). Furthermore, currently there is little in the way 
of government regulation and legislation which discourages this type of behaviour by 
software vendors (Kuechler 2007; Otter 2007; Saint-Germain 2005) 
 
The proposed hypothesis H1 in this study worked in the opposite way to what was 
predicted in the previous literature which identified that software vendors more 
quickly release software patches for highly critical software vulnerabilities (Arora et 
al. 2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et al. 2007). In these 
studies the response time for releasing software patches was calculated from the full 
disclosure date of software vulnerabilities and software vulnerabilities are fully 
disclosed after the grace period provided to the software vendor to release software 
patches (Arora et al. 2005a; Farrow 2000; Meunier 2008). However, in this study the 
response time to release a software patch is calculated from the vendor informed 
date.  
 
Similarly, previous studies identified that software vendors usually know of a 
software vulnerability before its full disclosure and they are provided a grace period 
to release a patch for software vulnerability before full disclosure (Cavusoglu et al. 
2004 ; Cooper 1999; OIS 2004; SANS 2003). Once a full disclosure of software 
vulnerability occurs, most responsible software vendors release a software patch on 
or before the day of full disclosure. This indicates that there is little or no influence 
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of full disclosure of software vulnerabilities on the response time to release a 
software patch. However, vendor informed dates for software vulnerabilities can 
provide a more accurate response time of software vendors in releasing a software 
patch to a software vulnerability. This can then be used to determine whether the 
software vendor is actually influenced to release a software patch to a software 
vulnerability by the level of criticality of that software vulnerability.   
 
Open Source Software Vendor versus Proprietary Source Software Vendor 
 
Hypothesis H2 states: 
H2: Open source software vendors release patches for open source software 
vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for 
proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been 
informed to software vendor: (Supported) 
 
The beta coefficient (b1 = -0.387) for the variable software vendor type which is a 
binary variable indicates that open source software vendors release software patches 
39% quicker than proprietary source software vendors for vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities. Similarly, the mean value of response time to release software 
patches by software vendor type in table 4.29 (section 4.4) provides further evidence 
for findings regarding H2 which indicate that open source software vendors release 
patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source 
software vendors once software vulnerabilities has been informed to software 
vendors.  
 
Similarly, table 4.21 (sub section 4.2.4) shows that open source software vendor 
response time to release software patches for 84% software vulnerabilities is between 
(1 to 100 days). In contrast, table 4.22 (sub section 4.2.4) shows that proprietary 
source software vendor response time to release software patches for 84% of 
software vulnerabilities is between (1 to 300 days). This shows that open source 
software vendors‘ response time to release software patches for open source software 
vulnerabilities is quicker than proprietary source software vendors‘ response time to 
release software patches for proprietary source software vulnerabilities. 
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Further, table 4.7 (sub section 4.2.3) shows that 48% of software vulnerabilities with 
medium level criticality were found in open source software vendors; whereas 18% 
of software vulnerabilities with medium level criticality were found in proprietary 
source software vendors. Similarly, 48% of software vulnerabilities with high and 
very high level criticality were found in open source software vendors; whereas 81% 
of software vulnerabilities with high and very high level criticality were found in 
proprietary source software vendors. From the discussion of H1 it has been shown 
that software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium 
level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low 
and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software 
vulnerability. This also explains why open source software vendors are quicker in 
releasing a software patch compared to proprietary source software vendors once a 
software vulnerability has been informed to the software vendor.  
 
Schryen (2009) did not find any significant difference in vendors‘ patching 
behaviour between open source software vendors and proprietary source software 
vendors for fully disclosed software vulnerabilities. However, Arora et al. (2010a) 
found that open source software vendors release software patches quicker than 
proprietary source software vendors for fully disclosed software vulnerabilities. 
Based on the previous literature, this research supports the findings of Arora et al. 
(2010a) that open source software vendors release patches for open source software 
vulnerabilities quicker than proprietary source software vendors release patches for 
proprietary source software vulnerabilities. 
 
Therefore, hypothesis H2 developed in this study that open source vendors release 
software patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than 
proprietary source software vendors release software patches for proprietary software 
vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been informed to software vendor 
is supported. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 116 - 
 
Operating System Software versus Application Software 
 
Hypothesis H3 states: 
H3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly 
than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability 
has been informed to software vendors: (Not supported) 
 
The beta coefficient (b2 = 0.082) for the variable type of software which is a binary 
variable indicates that software patches for operating system software vulnerabilities 
are released 8% slower than patches for application software once software 
vulnerability has been informed to software vendors. Similarly, the mean value of 
response time for application and operating system software in table 4.30 section 4.4 
shows that software vendor release patches for operating system are slower than 
application software once software vulnerabilities has been informed to software 
vendors. 
 
Similarly, table 4.4 (sub section 4.2.2) shows that buffer errors, SQL injection and 
cross site scripting (XSS) are the mostly commonly found software vulnerabilities in 
application software; and table 4.20 shows that software vendors‘ response time to 
release software patches for most buffer errors, SQL injection and cross site scripting 
(XSS) software vulnerabilities in application software is between (1 to 100 days). In 
contrast table 4.4 (sub section 4.2.2) shows that buffer errors, code injection, 
resource management errors and numeric errors are the most common software 
vulnerability in operating system software; and table 4.20 (sub section 4.2.4) shows 
that software vendors‘ response time to release software patches for most buffer 
errors, code injection, resource management errors and numeric errors software 
vulnerabilities in operating software is between (1 to 300 days). This also provides 
further explanation for why software vendors‘ response time to release software 
patches for application software is quicker than response time to release software 
patches for operating system software. 
 
Moreover, table 4.10 (sub section 4.2.3) shows that 90% of operating system 
software has a high level of criticality and 5% of operating system software has a 
medium level of criticality compared to 66% of application software with a high 
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level of criticality, and 31% of application software with a medium level of 
criticality. As the result of H1 shows, software vendors take a longer response time 
in releasing a software patch for a highly critical software vulnerability compared to 
medium critical software vulnerability. It can be concluded that this is one of the 
main reasons why operating system software is patched more slowly than application 
software. This result is also supported by Gordon‘s economic model of software 
security investment which contends software vendors release patches for operating 
system software vulnerabilities much slower because the optimisation of investment 
in software security is higher for software with a high level of criticality (Gordon et 
al. 2002). 
 
Previous empirical research by SANS and TippingPoint (2009; 2009) found that 
software vendors patch operating system software vulnerabilities more quickly than 
application software vulnerabilities. However, these empirical studies analysed the 
patching behaviour of a limited number of software vendors with their software 
vulnerabilities.  
 
This research has analysed the patching behaviour of 160 software vendors with 667 
software vulnerabilities and found that software vendors patch operating system 
software vulnerabilities slower than application software vulnerabilities. This result 
might be unreliable to generalize as a whole because in the total sample population 
of 667 software vulnerabilities, 611 software vulnerabilities are application software 
vulnerabilities and 56 software vulnerabilities are operating system software 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, this hypothesis needs further investigation in future 
research where operating system software vulnerabilities are more representative in 
the sample population.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presented and discussed the results of the quantitative analysis 
generated from the statistical tests. The results and findings in relation to the 
statistical tests were discussed. The statistical tests included descriptive statistics, 
multi-collinearity, one way ANOVA and multiple regression analysis.  
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The descriptive statistics revealed that the three key factors (1) type of software, (2) 
type of software vendor and (3) the level of criticality of software vulnerability have 
a significant impact on the response time in releasing software patches.  
 
The ANOVA analysis showed that there is a significant difference between the open 
source software vendor and proprietary source software vendor with the level of 
criticality of a software vulnerability. Similarly, there is also a significant difference 
between the operating system software and application software with the level of 
criticality of a software vulnerability.  
 
Further, the mean difference of the response time in releasing a software patch 
revealed that (1) there is a difference between open source and proprietary source 
software vendors in releasing a software patch; and (2) there is a difference between 
operating system software and application software vendors in releasing a software 
patch. 
 
The multiple regression model was used to test the research hypotheses formulated 
from the conceptual and theoretical model developed in chapter 2 (literature review). 
The hypothesis testing showed that the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities 
and the type of software have a positive relationship with the response time; and type 
of software vendor has a strong negative relationship with the response time. 
Although, the hypothesis testing showed that the level of criticality has a positive 
relationship, a single positive result it is not possible to show whether the longer 
response time for both high and low level of criticality of software vulnerability and 
shorter response time for medium level of criticality of software vulnerability is 
supported as stated in H1. Therefore, the level of criticality has been split into three 
levels—low, medium and high. The MRA test for each level of criticality shows that 
high level and low level of criticality of software vulnerability have a positive 
relationship with the response time. Conversely, medium level of criticality of 
software vulnerability has a negative relationship with the response time.  
 
The next chapter is the concluding chapter of this study and provides an overall 
summary of this study including the research problem, hypotheses test results, a 
discussion on the theoretical and practical contributions of the findings of this 
research, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the main conclusions of this empirical research regarding the 
patching behaviour of software vendors for informed software vulnerabilities in 
terms of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, the type of software 
vendor and the type of software. This chapter begins with a summary of the research 
problem, the general research question, the three specific research questions 
addressed in this research, the three research hypotheses that were tested and the 
research methodology used in this study. The key findings and conclusions regarding 
the results of the descriptive data analysis, one way ANOVAs and research 
hypotheses tests using multiple regression analysis are then summarized. The key 
contributions of this study to theory and practice are then discussed; and the 
limitations of this study are acknowledged. Finally, this chapter provides some 
suggestions for future research regarding the key factors impacting on the response 
time of software vendors in releasing patches for vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities. 
 
5.2 Summary of this Study 
This section provides a summary of the research problem and general research 
question investigated in this study, the research hypotheses tested, and the research 
method used in this study. The key findings of descriptive data analyses and 
hypotheses testing are then summarized.  
 
5.2.1 Research Problem 
Previous studies analysed the influence of the level of criticality of software 
vulnerabilities on software vendors‘ patching behaviour on the basis of the full 
disclosure date (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et 
al. 2007). Arora et al. (2010a) also argued that open source software vendors are 
quicker than proprietary source software vendors in releasing software patches for 
software vulnerabilities on the basis of full disclosure date. Conversely, Schryen 
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(2009) argued that there is no significant difference between open source software 
vendors and proprietary source software vendors in releasing software patches for 
software vulnerabilities on the basis of full disclosure date. Furthermore, previous 
studies argued that software vendors release software patches for operating system 
software vulnerabilities quicker than application software vulnerabilities on the basis 
of the full disclosure date (SANS 2009; TippingPoint 2009). All the above studies 
based their analysis of software vendors‘ patching behaviour on the full disclosure 
date of software vulnerability and paid little attention to analysing software vendors‘ 
patching behaviour on the basis of vendor informed date. To address the identified 
gaps in the literature, this study investigated the following general research question: 
 
To what extent does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of 
software vendor (Open source, Proprietary source vendor), and type of software 
(Operating system software, Application software) influence the response time of 
software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of 
software vulnerabilities? 
 
To answer the general research question for this research, the following three specific 
research questions are addressed: 
 
RSQ1. How does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities influence the 
response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is 
informed of software vulnerabilities? 
 
RSQ2. Is there a difference between open and proprietary source software vendors in 
terms of their response time in releasing patches when the software vendor is 
informed of software vulnerabilities? 
 
RSQ3. Is there a difference between operating system software and application 
software in terms of response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the 
software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities? 
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5.2.2 Research Hypotheses 
The three hypotheses were formulated from the three research questions above after 
being justified and grounded in the existing relevant literature on software 
vulnerabilities and software vendors‘ behavior in releasing software patches. The 
three hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium 
level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low 
and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software 
vulnerability.  
 
H2: Open source vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities 
more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary 
software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software 
vulnerability. 
 
H3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly 
than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has 
been informed of the software vulnerability. 
 
These three hypotheses together test the effect of the level of criticality of software 
vulnerabilities, type of software vendor and type of software on the response time of 
software vendors in releasing patches once the vendor is informed of the software 
vulnerabilities.  
 
A research model showing the results of hypotheses testing using multiple regression 
analysis is presented in figure 5.1.  
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** = Significant at p<0.05 (two tailed), *** Significant at p<0.01 (one tailed) 
 
 
 
In order to test hypothesis H1, the sample population for this study was split on three 
levels of criticality of software vulnerabilities (Low, Medium, High) in order to 
determine if software vendors released patches for medium level software 
vulnerabilities quicker than for low and high level software vulnerabilities once 
informed of the software vulnerability. Table 5.1 shows the beta coefficients, as well 
as corresponding significance level, for each level of criticality from each of the 
three MRAs conducted to test H1 hypothesis (full details of the three MRAs 
conducted for H1 hypothesis are available in Appendix A). 
 
Table 5.1 Three Levels of Criticality Beta Coefficients and Level of Significance for 
Three MRA ran for Hypothesis H1 
Level of Criticality Beta Coefficients Significance Level 
Low Level of Criticality         (H1l)           bl = 0.121(*)(NS) 0.754 
Medium Level of Criticality   (H1m)     bm = -0.181 (***) 0.004 
High Level of Criticality        (H1h)         bh = 0.222 (***) 0.000 
* (NS) Insignificant, *** Significant at p<0.01 (one tailed) 
Source: Developed for this research 
 
Figure 5.1 Research Model and Results of Hypotheses Tests using MRA 
Source: Developed for this research 
 
H1 (***) 
 
b3 = 0.256 
        H2 (***) 
       
        b1 = -0.39 
 
H3 (**) 
 
b2 = 0.08 
 
Level of Criticality of 
Software Vulnerability 
 
 
Response Time 
 
Type of Software Vendor 
 
5. Open Source Software 
Vendors 
 
6. Proprietary Source 
Software Vendors 
 
Type of Software 
 
 1. Operating System Software 
2. Application Software 
8% slower 
39% quicker 
R2= 0.304 
H1l (*NS) (bl = 0.121)  
H1m (***) (bm = -0.181)  
H1h (***) (bh = 0.222)  
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Table 5.2 provides a summary of the hypotheses which were supported or not 
supported in this study. A discussion of each hypothesis is presented in the next 
section. 
 
Table 5.2 Supported and Unsupported Hypotheses of This Study 
Hypotheses Relationship investigated Supported? 
H1  High level and low level of criticality of software vulnerability have a positive relationship 
with the response time 
 Medium level of criticality of software vulnerability has a negative relationship with the 
response time 
Yes 
H2 A strong negative relationship between type of software vendor and the response time Yes 
H3 A positive relationship between type of software and the response time No 
Source: Developed for this Research 
 
5.2.2 Summary of Results of Research Hypothesis Testing 
H1: The beta coefficient (b3 = 0.256) (figure 5.1) indicates the overall impact of the 
level of criticality of software vulnerabilities on response time of software 
vendors in releasing patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities. 
However, this result did not distinguish between the response time for software 
vulnerabilities with high or low level of criticality and the response time for 
medium level of criticality of software vulnerability as stated in H1.  
 
Therefore, in order to test the hypothesis H1 appropriately, the sample 
population of 667 software vulnerabilities was split into three levels of criticality 
(low, medium and high). A MRA was run for a subset of the sample population 
for each level of criticality to determine the actual relationship between each of 
the three levels of criticality of software vulnerabilities and the software 
vendors‘ response time (see Appendix A). Table 5.1 shows the beta coefficients 
for each level of criticality of software vulnerabilities after running each 
individual MRA. The beta coefficient (bl = 0.12) for software vulnerabilities 
with a low level of criticality indicates that an increase towards the lowest level 
of criticality increases the response time. However, this relationship is 
statistically insignificant. Moreover, the beta coefficient (bh = 0.22) for high 
level of criticality indicates that an increase towards the highest level of 
criticality increases the response time. In contrast, the beta coefficient (bm = -
0.18) for medium level of criticality indicates that a decrease towards the 
medium level of criticality decreases the response time. 
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Therefore, one of the key findings of this study is that the results of three MRAs 
for H1 hypothesis test provides support for the argument that software vendors 
release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a 
shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of 
criticality: (Supported) 
 
H2: Open source software vendors are 39% quicker than proprietary source software 
vendors in releasing software patches when informed of software vulnerabilities. 
 
Another key finding of this study is that the results of the H2 hypothesis test 
provided support for the argument that open source vendors release patches for 
open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source 
vendors release patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the 
software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability: (Supported). 
 
H3: The results of H3 hypothesis test did not provide support for the argument that 
software patches for operating system software are released quicker than those 
for application software (Not supported). Conversely, the results suggest that 
software patches for operating system software are released 8% slower than for 
application software when the software vendor is informed of a software 
vulnerability, which is contrary to predictions in the existing literature (Not 
supported). 
 
5.2.3 Research Methodology 
This is explanatory research which uses a quantitative approach to test the research 
model to examine the relationship between the independent variables: level of 
criticality of software vulnerability; type of software vendor; and type of software, as 
well as the dependent response time of software vendors‘ in releasing patches for 
software vulnerabilities once informed of the software vulnerability. The sample 
population of 667 vendor informed software vulnerabilities was archival data 
obtained from four related software vulnerability databases SecurityFocus, Open 
Source Vulnerability Database, National Vulnerability Database and Secunia. These 
four software vulnerability databases contain archival data about software 
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vulnerabilities which has been rigorously collected and screened.  
The software vulnerability data obtained from these four databases over the time 
period 2008 to 2010 did not provide all the required information to test the proposed 
hypotheses. Therefore, a sub set of those software vulnerabilities which have all the 
required information was selected as the sample population for this study. The total 
sample population of vendor informed software vulnerabilities was analysed using 
descriptive statistics, one way ANOVAs and multiple regression analysis. The results 
from the data analysis together with the existing literature were used to explain the 
main findings of this study. 
 
5.2.4 Conclusions about Descriptive Data Findings 
This study analyzed software vulnerabilities data with a vendor informed date in 
contrast to previous studies which analysed software vulnerabilities data with a full 
disclosure date (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et 
al. 2007). The descriptive data findings regarding the total sample population of 667 
vendor informed software vulnerabilities for this study are summarised below. 
 
Descriptive Data Analysis Findings about Type of Software Vendor and 
Software Vulnerabilities 
 The majority of software vulnerabilities are found in the software of 
proprietary source software vendors in this study. In the total sample 
population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 418 (62.7%) software 
vulnerabilities are in proprietary source vendor software and 249 (37.3%) 
software vulnerabilities are in open source vendor software (refer to table 4.1 
subsection 4.2.1). 
 Buffer errors (160, 38%) is the most common software vulnerability category 
for the software of proprietary source software vendors in this study (refer to 
table 4.2 subsection 4.2.1). 
 Cross site scripting (XSS) (74, 30%) is the most common software 
vulnerability category in the software of open source software vendors in this 
study (refer to table 4.2 subsection 4.2.1). 
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Descriptive Data Analysis Findings about Type of Software and Software 
Vulnerabilities 
 Most software vulnerabilities in this study are found in application software. 
In the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 56 (8.4%) 
software vulnerabilities are classified as operating system software, compared 
to 611 (91.6%) software vulnerabilities classified as application software 
(refer to table 4.3 subsection 4.2.2). 
 Buffer errors (178, 29%), cross site scripting (XSS) (116, 19%) and SQL 
injection (39, 6%) are the most commonly found categories of software 
vulnerabilities in application software (611) in this study (refer to table 4.4 
subsection 4.2.2). 
 Buffer errors (19, 34%), code injection (10, 18%), numeric errors (7, 13%) 
and resource management errors (6, 11%) are the most commonly found 
categories of software vulnerabilities in operating system software (56) in this 
study (refer to table 4.4 subsection 4.2.2). 
 
Descriptive Data Analysis Findings about Level of Criticality and Software 
Vulnerabilities 
 Almost half of the software vulnerabilities (319, 48%) are of a very high level 
of criticality in this study (refer to table 4.5 subsection 4.2.3). 
 The majority of the software vulnerabilities (262, 63%) in the software of 
proprietary source software vendors are of a very high level of criticality in 
this study (refer to table 4.7 subsection 4.2.3). 
 Almost half of the software vulnerabilities (120, 48%) in the software of open 
source software vendors are of a medium level of criticality in this study 
(refer to table 4.7 subsection 4.2.3). 
 Software vulnerabilities in the software of open source software vendors are 
overall less critical than software vulnerabilities in the software of proprietary 
source software vendors in this study. The average level of criticality of 
software vulnerability for open source software vendors is 3.68, whereas the 
average level of criticality of software vulnerability for proprietary source 
software vendors is 4.42 (refer to table 4.8 subsection 4.2.3). 
- 127 - 
 
 In terms of the level of impact, the following categories of software 
vulnerabilities: buffer errors, numeric errors, resource management errors 
and code injection mostly have a very high level of criticality, while cross site 
scripting (XSS) and SQL injection mostly have a medium level criticality in 
this study (refer to table 4.14 subsection 4.2.3).  
 There were 192 (31%) software vulnerabilities in application software with a 
medium level of criticality, 406 (66%) with high levels (i.e. high and very 
high) of criticality and 13 (2.1%) with a low level of criticality in this study 
(refer to table 4.10 subsection 4.2.3). 
 There were 3 (5%) software vulnerabilities in operating system software with 
a medium level of criticality, 52 (93%) with high levels (i.e. high and very 
high) of criticality and 1 (1.8%) with a low level of criticality in this study 
(refer to table 4.10 subsection 4.2.3). 
 Overall operating system software vulnerabilities are more critical than 
application software vulnerabilities in this study. The average level of 
criticality of software vulnerabilities for operating system software is 4.55, 
whereas the average level of criticality of software vulnerabilities for 
application software is 4.1 (refer to table 4.11 subsection 4.2.3). 
 
Descriptive Data Findings about Response Time and Software Vulnerabilities 
 Software vendors release patches for the majority of software vulnerabilities 
(377, 57%) between 1 to 100 days in this study (refer to table 4.15 subsection 
4.2.4). 
 For the majority of software vulnerabilities in open source software (194, 
78%), the software vendor response in releasing a software patch was 
between 1 to 100 days (refer to table 4.18 subsection 4.2.4). 
 For the majority of software vulnerabilities in proprietary source software 
(349, 84%), the software vendor response in releasing a software patch was 
between 1 to 300 days (refer to table 4.18 subsection 4.2.4). 
 Open source software vendors are quicker in releasing a software patch 
compared to proprietary source software vendors once informed of a software 
vulnerability. The average response time of open source software vendors to 
release a software patch for a software vulnerability is 34 days, whereas the 
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average response time of proprietary source software vendors to release a 
software patch for a software vulnerability is 156 days (refer to table 4.29 
subsection 4.4). 
 Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium 
level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities 
with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of 
the software vulnerability. The average response time in releasing a software 
patch for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality is 55 
days, whereas the average response time in releasing a software patch for 
software vulnerabilities with low, high and very high levels of criticality are 
97 days, 84 days and 157 days respectively (refer to table 4.23 subsection 
4.2.4).  
 Software patches for application software vulnerabilities overall are released 
quicker compared to operating system software vulnerabilities once software 
vulnerabilities have been informed to the software vendor. The average 
response time to release a software patch for application software 
vulnerabilities is 105 days, whereas the average response time to release a 
software patch for operating system software vulnerabilities is 164 days (refer 
to table 4.30 subsection 4.4). 
 The percentage of software patches released between 1 to 200 days for 
application software vulnerabilities (480, 78%) is greater when compared to 
operating system software (35, 62%) (refer to table 4.19 subsection 4.2.4). 
 
From the summary of the above descriptive statistics, it is concluded that open 
source software vendors are quicker than proprietary source software vendors in 
releasing software patches when informed of software vulnerabilities. Similarly, 
software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of 
criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high 
levels of criticality. In contrast, software patches for operating system software are 
released more slowly than application software when the software vendor is 
informed of a software vulnerability. 
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The descriptive data findings with regard to the type of software might be unreliable 
and should be treated with caution because the distribution of software vulnerabilities 
across the two types of software is unequal (i.e. the proportion of operating system 
software vulnerabilities is less than 10% of the total sample population of 667). 
 
5.2.5 Conclusions Concerning Results of Research Hypotheses Tests 
The result of the research hypotheses tests shows that all the independent variables, 
namely, (1) the level of criticality of software vulnerability, (2) type of software 
vendor, and (3) type of software have a significant effect on the dependent variable, 
response time.  
 
Hypothesis H1: The key finding from the results of the three MRAs performed to test 
hypothesis H1 show that software vendors release patches for software 
vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than 
software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has 
been informed of the software vulnerability. This finding provides further support for 
Gordon and Loeb‘s (2002) economic model of software security investment that 
argued the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches is an 
optimisation decision. Software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality are 
the most optimal for software vendors to develop and release patches. In contrast, for 
software vulnerabilities with low level and high level of criticality it is less optimal 
to develop and release patches (Gordon et al. 2002). Moreover, this finding 
contradicts the findings of Arora et al. (2010a) and Schryen and Rich (2010). Arora 
et al. (2010a) argued that software vendors are more responsive and patch highly 
critical software vulnerabilities quicker than less critical software vulnerabilities. 
Conversely, Schryen and Rich (2010) did not find any significant difference in 
software vendors‘ patching behaviour for highly critical software vulnerabilities 
compared to less critical software vulnerabilities. 
 
Hypothesis H2: The key finding from the results of Hypothesis H2 test show that 
open source software vendors release software patches more quickly than proprietary 
source software vendors once informed of the software vulnerability. This finding 
provides further support for Arora et al.‘s (2010a) study which found that open 
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source vendors are quicker to release a patch than proprietary source vendors. This 
finding contradicts the finding of Schryen‘s (2009) study that found there is no 
significant difference in vendor patching behaviour for fully disclosed software 
vulnerabilities between open source software and proprietary source software. 
 
Hypothesis H3: The key finding from the results of Hypothesis H3 test show that 
software vendors‘ response to release patches for application software vulnerabilities 
is quicker than operating system software vulnerabilities in this study. This finding 
contradicts the findings of SANS (2009) and TippingPoint (2009). Both these studies 
argued software vendors‘ response to release patches for operating system software 
vulnerabilities is quicker than for application software vulnerabilities. However, this 
finding in relation to H3 might be unreliable since the distribution of software 
vulnerabilities between two types of software is unequal (i.e. the proportion of 
operating system software vulnerabilities is less than 10% of the sample population). 
 
5.3 Contribution of this Study 
This study has made several contributions to theory and practice as follows. 
5.3.1 Contribution to Theory 
This research contributed to theory and existing knowledge by: 
 Identifying that software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality 
influence the response time of software vendors in releasing patches quicker 
than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the 
software vendor is informed of the software vulnerabilities (Gordon et al. 
2002; Swire 2004, 2006). Most of the previous studies which investigated the 
impact of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities on the response 
time of software vendors in releasing software patches identified that the 
higher the level of criticality of a software vulnerability the more responsive 
software vendors are in releasing software patches for disclosed software 
vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; 
Telang et al. 2007). Furthermore, this study identified that analysing the 
impact of level of criticality of software vulnerabilities on the software 
vendor‘s response time in releasing software patches based on the date of full 
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disclosure date is not accurate measure of the response time as most software 
patches are released before the full disclosure date. Therefore the findings of 
this study also show that the vendor informed date for a software 
vulnerability disclosure is a much more accurate measure of the response 
time than the full disclosure date of software vulnerabilities. 
 This study confirmed that open source software vendors are quicker than 
proprietary source software vendors in terms of their response time in 
releasing patches once the software vendor is informed of software 
vulnerabilities. In previous studies, Arora et al. (2010a) argued that open 
source software vendors are quicker to release software patches for software 
vulnerabilities than for proprietary source software vendors. Conversely 
Schryen (2009) argued that there is no significant difference in software 
vendors patching behaviour for fully disclosed software vulnerabilities 
between open and proprietary source software vendor. Both studies analysed 
the software vendors patching behaviour on fully disclosed software 
vulnerabilities. The findings in this study show that the response time for 
open source software vendors in releasing software patches is quicker 
compared to proprietary source software vendor on the basis of responsible 
disclosure date of software vulnerability (Hobbs et al. 1868; Swire 2004, 
2006).  
 This study do not confirm that the response time of software vendors in 
releasing patches for operating system software is quicker than application 
software once the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities. 
Previous studies found that software vendors released software patches more 
quickly for operating system software vulnerabilities than for application 
software (SANS 2009; TippingPoint 2009). The findings in this study show 
that the vendors‘ response time in releasing software patches for application 
software vulnerabilities is quicker compared to operating system software 
vulnerabilities on the basis of responsible disclosure of software vulnerability 
(Hobbs et al. 1868; Swire 2004, 2006). However this finding may not be 
reliable because operating system software was not sufficiently represented in 
the sample population.  
 This study established empirical support for responsible disclosure (vendor 
informed date) as a more accurate mechanism for determining the response 
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time of software vendors in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities. 
Previous studies have used the full (public) disclosure date as a mechanism 
for determining how quickly software vendors respond in releasing patches 
for software vulnerabilities. However the full disclosure date is not an 
accurate measure of the response time of software vendors as most software 
vendors release patches on or before the full disclosure date as software 
vendors are given a grace period by security advisories to develop and release 
a software patch (Arora et al. 2010a).  
 
Thereby, the results of this study indicate that software vendors are more responsive 
in releasing patches to software vulnerabilities with medium level of criticality than 
software vulnerabilities with a high and low level of criticality. Open source software 
vendors take a shorter response time than proprietary source software vendors to 
release a software patch for a vendor informed software vulnerability. Application 
software patches are released more quickly than operating system software patches 
once the vendor is informed of a software vulnerability.  
 
Furthermore, from the empirical investigation of vendor informed software 
vulnerabilities, this study also contributes to existing knowledge and theory by 
establishing that full disclosures of software vulnerability have little or no effect on 
the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches because most 
software vendors release software patches on or before the date of full disclosure of a 
software vulnerability. Therefore, this study confirms that responsible disclosure of 
software vulnerabilities is a more effective mechanism for encouraging software 
vendors to release software patches, rather than inconsistent full disclosure of 
software vulnerabilities from different information security advisories. 
 
5.3.2 Contribution to Practice 
The findings of this study can be used by both practitioners and policy makers (i.e. 
information security advisories) to better understand the software vulnerability 
landscape and the complex process of software vendors‘ patching behaviour in 
response to software vulnerabilities. The findings of this study should also assist 
practitioners in deciding how to more effectively undertake preventive measures for 
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different categories of software vulnerabilities based on the level of criticality, the 
software type and the type of software vendor. The findings of this study suggest that 
responsible disclosure of software vulnerabilities (vendor informed date) is a more 
effective mechanism that government and industry regulatory bodies can use in 
encouraging software vendors to release software patches. 
 
5.4 Limitation of this Study 
As with all research, this research has some limitations. One limitation of this study 
is that only 667 software vulnerabilities provided the complete information required 
to test the research hypothesis, although the total population of software vulnerability 
reported from 2008 to 2010 in the OSVDB database was 11,758. Some of the 
categories of software vulnerabilities have a low representation in the sample 
population of 667 software vulnerabilities used in this study. For instance, of the 667 
software vulnerabilities, there were only 14 with a low level of criticality and, of 
these, only one was a operating system software vulnerability with the other 13 being 
application software vulnerabilities. Therefore, any interpretation of the impact of 
software vulnerabilities with low level of criticality on the response time of software 
vendors in releasing a patch once informed of a software vulnerability should be 
treated with caution. Similarly, the number of software vulnerabilities in operating 
system software was less than 10 percent (56) in the sample population of 667. 
Therefore, the finding that patches for software vulnerabilities in application 
software are released quicker than for software vulnerabilities in operating system 
software also needs to be treated with caution. 
 
5.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
In this study, the research model confirms that independent variables explain 30% of 
the variation in the dependent variable, response time. This finding suggests that 
there are other key factors that could impact on the response time of software 
vendors in releasing software patches. The research model in this study determined 
the impact of (1) level of criticality of software vulnerability, (2) type of software 
vendor and (3) type of software on the response time of a software vendor in 
releasing a software patch once informed of a software vulnerability. This 
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study found that software vendors are slower in releasing software patches for high 
level of criticality of software vulnerabilities compared to medium level of criticality 
of software vulnerabilities. To address this gap, future research should identify the 
motivational factors that encourage software vendors to release software patches 
once they are informed about software vulnerabilities with high levels of criticality. 
The losses incurred from the exploitation of software vulnerabilities with a high level 
of criticality are not tolerable to individuals or organizations. Another important area 
identified as worthy of further research is the role of government and industry in 
regulating and legislating the responsibility and liability of software vendors in 
relation to software vulnerabilities in their software products. Such legislation should 
encourage software vendors to be more proactive in developing and releasing patches 
for software vulnerabilities with higher levels of criticality. In addition, it has also 
been identified that the representation of operating system software vulnerabilities in 
this study was very low (i.e. less than 10% of total sample population). To be more 
confident in the findings achieved from this study, future research should replicate 
this study with a more equal representation of both operating system software and 
application software.  
 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter provided a summary of the key findings of this study, followed by the 
main contributions of the key findings to theory and practice, acknowledgment of the 
limitations of the study, and directions for future research.  
 
This study developed a research model which is underpinned by software security 
disclosure theory (Swire 2004, 2006) and Gordon and Loeb‘s (2002) economic 
model of software security investment to investigate the following general research 
question: ‗To what extent does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type 
of software vendor (Open source, Proprietary source vendor), and type of software 
(Operating system software, Application software) influence the response time of 
software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of 
software vulnerabilities‘. This general research question is broken down into three 
specific research questions (see subsection 5.2.1). To answer these three research 
questions, three hypotheses (see subsection 5.2.1) were formulated for this study. 
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The following major conclusions were drawn from the result of three research 
hypotheses tests: 
 
 Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium 
level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities 
with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of 
the software vulnerability 
 Open source software vendors release patches for open source software 
vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches 
for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been 
informed of the software vulnerability  
 Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released slower than 
patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software 
vulnerability has been informed to the software vendor. 
 
This study contributes to theory by investigating the impact of key factors: (1) the 
level of criticality of software, (2) type of software vendor (open source software 
vendor, proprietary source software vendor, and (3) type of software (operating 
system software, application software) on software vendors‘ response time in 
releasing a software patch once informed of a software vulnerability. Similarly, the 
study contributes to existing theory by establishing an experimental support for 
responsible disclosure (vendor inform date) as a more precise mechanism for 
determining the response time of software vendors in releasing patches for software 
vulnerabilities. 
 
This study further contributes to practice by helping both practitioners and policy 
makers enhance their decision-making when undertaking preventive measures for 
different categories of software vulnerabilities based on the level of criticality of 
software vulnerability, the software type and the software vendor type. Similarly, 
government and industry regulatory bodies can adopt a responsible disclosure of 
software vulnerability (vendor inform date) which is recognised as a more effective 
disclosure of software vulnerability to encourage software vendors to release 
software patches. 
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As with all research, this study has some limitations. The sample population was 
restricted to 667 software vulnerabilities that had complete information to test the 
research hypothesis, although 11,758 software vulnerabilities were reported from 
2008 to 2010 in the OSVDB database. A larger sample population which is more 
representative of operating system software vulnerabilities would provide further 
confirmation of the key findings of this research. The research model in this study 
confirmed the significance of three independent variables which explain 30 percent 
of the variance in the dependent variable response time of software vendors in 
releasing software patches. Future research could also extend the research model by 
identifying and including other key factors to explain more of the variance in the 
dependent variable response time. Similarly, determining the role of government and 
industry in regulating and legislating the responsibility and liability of software 
vendors in relation to software vulnerabilities in their software products is worthy of 
future research. 
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The MRA Test for Three Levels (Low, Medium and High) of Criticality of 
Software Vulnerabilities 
 
 
 
Coefficient Test for Low Level of Criticality 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.240 1.393  .890 .408      
Low Level of 
Criticality 
.179 .544 .121(*)(NS) .328 .754 .124 .133 .104 .734 1.363 
Type of Software 
Vendor 
-.928 .473 -.645 -
1.963 
.097 -.576 -.625 -
.620 
.926 1.080 
Type of Software .441 .892 .188 .495 .638 .075 .198 .156 .694 1.441 
a. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time) 
* (NS) Insignificant 
 
 
 
Coefficient Test for Medium Level of Criticality 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 2.919 .437  6.674 .000      
Medium Level of 
Criticality 
-.273 .095 -.181 (***) -2.885 .004 -.221 -.205 -
.180 
.992 1.008 
Type of Software 
Vendor 
-.673 .092 -.458 -7.282 .000 -.464 -.468 -
.455 
.986 1.014 
Type of Software .874 .441 .124 1.982 .049 .088 .143 .124 .994 1.007 
a. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time) 
*** Significant at p<0.01 (one tailed)  
 
 
 
Coefficient Test for High Level of Criticality 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .800 .228  3.509 .000      
High Level of 
Criticality 
.127 .025 .222 (***) 5.046 .000 .298 .233 .215 .941 1.063 
Type of Software 
Vendor 
-.478 .065 -.321 -
7.309 
.000 -.378 -.328 -
.311 
.940 1.064 
Type of Software .182 .087 .089 2.094 .037 .096 .099 .089 .999 1.001 
a. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time) 
*** Significant at p<0.01 (one tailed) 
